An earlier version said the origin unblocks KEY-WP-0013-T02, 'blocked since 2026-09-08'. Both halves are wrong. T02 is done, and so is T05 -- the task that actually held the human registration. key-cape published the contract shape from its side and closed a follow-up informed-decision prompted (KEY-WP-0030). Nothing there waits on this host. The error came from repeating informed-decision's workplan prose of 2026-09-09 without checking the source repo. The origin work stands on its own: T07's acceptance requires a real origin regardless of who else is waiting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EJbh7o7UWF4tQ5jxygnNGu Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2072522@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 46173adf-7302-4ede-99d6-963b61359928
175 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
175 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
# decisions.coulomb.social — origin for the informed-decision approver surface
|
||
|
||
**Status:** applied and live. `https://decisions.coulomb.social/` answers 200
|
||
over a valid Let's Encrypt certificate as of 2026-09-10 14:32 UTC.
|
||
Last reviewed: 2026-09-10
|
||
|
||
## Why this host exists before the app does
|
||
|
||
`informed-decision` owns the browser-facing approver UI that `approval-engine`
|
||
deliberately does not contain. Its workplan task `INFD-WP-0001-T07` must publish two strings to `key-cape` — an
|
||
OIDC `client_id` and a full callback URI — and cannot do so against a host that
|
||
does not answer.
|
||
|
||
**Correction, 2026-09-11.** An earlier version of this document said the origin
|
||
unblocks `key-cape`'s `KEY-WP-0013-T02`, "blocked since 2026-09-08". That is
|
||
wrong twice over, and the error came from repeating `informed-decision`'s
|
||
workplan prose of 2026-09-09 without checking the source repo. `KEY-WP-0013-T02`
|
||
is `done`; so is `T05`, the task that actually carried the human registration.
|
||
`key-cape` published the contract shape from its side — including the
|
||
`approval:read` scope `informed-decision` asked for and a fix to the `assurance`
|
||
object's `at` field — and closed a follow-up (`KEY-WP-0030`) that
|
||
`informed-decision` prompted. **Nothing in `key-cape` is waiting on this host.**
|
||
What remains is `informed-decision`'s own `T07`, whose acceptance requires the
|
||
real origin regardless.
|
||
|
||
Both strings are now fixed except for the host:
|
||
|
||
| Field | Value |
|
||
| --- | --- |
|
||
| `client_id` | `informed-decision-approver` |
|
||
| Redirect URI | `https://decisions.coulomb.social/auth/callback` |
|
||
| Flow | authorization code + S256 PKCE, public client |
|
||
| Scopes | `openid`, `approval:read`, `approval:approve` |
|
||
|
||
Redirect URIs match byte-exactly at `/authorize`. A registration pointing at a
|
||
host that does not answer fails closed at first login and presents as a rejected
|
||
approval rather than as a registration defect — which is exactly the failure
|
||
`approval-engine` avoided by refusing to invent these strings. So the origin has
|
||
to be real before the registration is submitted, and that is S5 work here rather
|
||
than in `informed-decision`.
|
||
|
||
The approver UI itself is `INFD-WP-0001-T08`, still gated on `approval-engine`
|
||
`APPROVAL-WP-0002-T01` and on intake `INFD-IN-0003` (the evidence copy must reach
|
||
`audit-core` independently of this component). This host therefore ships a
|
||
placeholder first and the real surface later.
|
||
|
||
## What is in the repo
|
||
|
||
| File | Contents |
|
||
| --- | --- |
|
||
| `manifests/informed-decision-origin.yaml` | Namespace, placeholder nginx ConfigMap/Deployment/Service on `informed-decision:80` |
|
||
| `manifests/informed-decision-ingress.yaml` | Traefik Ingress + `letsencrypt-prod` certificate for `decisions.coulomb.social` |
|
||
| `manifests/informed-decision-http-redirect.yaml` | `redirectScheme` Middleware + `web`-entrypoint Ingress, HTTP → HTTPS |
|
||
|
||
The placeholder is `nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged`, read-only root filesystem,
|
||
non-root, `noindex`. When the real surface lands it takes over the same Service
|
||
name and the origin file shrinks to the Namespace.
|
||
|
||
## Deliberate single path rule
|
||
|
||
The Ingress carries exactly one rule: `/` Prefix to one backend.
|
||
|
||
`reuse-surface` reported on 2026-07-07 that an Ingress declaring an `Exact`
|
||
`/health` rule alongside a catch-all `/` Prefix rule on the same host had the
|
||
exact match swallowed by the catch-all — the public health URL returned 404 from
|
||
the landing container while the pod was `1/1 Ready` and its own probes passed.
|
||
Splitting `/auth`, `/api` and `/` across backends here would reproduce that on a
|
||
host whose whole purpose is an exact-match redirect URI. If a second backend ever
|
||
becomes necessary, set `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.priority`
|
||
explicitly rather than relying on rule order.
|
||
|
||
## Preconditions verified 2026-09-10
|
||
|
||
- DNS `decisions.coulomb.social` → `92.205.62.239` (same A record as `reuse`).
|
||
- `letsencrypt-prod` ClusterIssuer `Ready=True`.
|
||
- No existing Ingress claims `decisions.coulomb.social`.
|
||
- Server-side dry-run of all five objects against the live API is clean.
|
||
The namespaced four were validated against an existing namespace, since a
|
||
server dry-run cannot create the new one first; see
|
||
`DRY_RUN_CREATE_NAMESPACES` in `tools/k8s-server-dry-run.sh`.
|
||
|
||
## Deployed 2026-09-10
|
||
|
||
Applied with operator approval. Evidence:
|
||
|
||
| Check | Result |
|
||
| --- | --- |
|
||
| Placeholder pod | `1/1 Running`, `/healthz` → `ok` in-pod |
|
||
| Certificate `informed-decision-tls` | `Ready=True`, ACME order `valid` |
|
||
| Issuer / subject | `CN=decisions.coulomb.social`, Let's Encrypt `YR2` |
|
||
| Validity | `2026-09-10` → `2026-12-09` (cert-manager renews) |
|
||
| `GET https://decisions.coulomb.social/` | `HTTP/2 200`, chain verify `0` |
|
||
| `GET https://decisions.coulomb.social/auth/callback` | `200` — the exact redirect URI resolves |
|
||
| `GET http://decisions.coulomb.social/` | `301`/`308` → HTTPS (added 2026-09-10) |
|
||
|
||
`/auth/callback` currently returns the placeholder page via the SPA `try_files`
|
||
fallback. That is the correct behaviour for now: the origin answers, which is
|
||
what the registration needs. The real surface will handle the path when
|
||
`INFD-WP-0001-T08` ships.
|
||
|
||
**`informed-decision` can now submit `docs/keycape-client-registration.md` to
|
||
`key-cape`.** That closes its own `INFD-WP-0001-T07`, not a `key-cape` task —
|
||
see the correction above.
|
||
|
||
## Redeploy / recovery
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
export KUBECONFIG=$HOME/.kube/config-hosteurope
|
||
kubectl apply -f manifests/informed-decision-origin.yaml
|
||
kubectl apply -f manifests/informed-decision-ingress.yaml
|
||
kubectl apply -f manifests/informed-decision-http-redirect.yaml
|
||
kubectl -n informed-decision get pods,svc,ingress
|
||
kubectl -n informed-decision get certificate informed-decision-tls -w
|
||
curl -sSI https://decisions.coulomb.social/ | head -1
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
That `curl` succeeded on 2026-09-10, which is the gate `informed-decision` was
|
||
waiting on.
|
||
|
||
**Note on the kubeconfig:** `~/.kube/config-hosteurope` names port `16443`, but
|
||
the `k3s-api-railiance01` ops-bridge tunnel currently listens on `16444`.
|
||
Override with `--server https://127.0.0.1:16444` or fix the kubeconfig; `bridge
|
||
check` reports the tunnel healthy either way, so it does not surface the
|
||
mismatch.
|
||
|
||
## HTTP → HTTPS
|
||
|
||
`manifests/informed-decision-http-redirect.yaml` adds a `redirectScheme`
|
||
Middleware plus a `web`-entrypoint Ingress, following the `reuse-surface`
|
||
pattern. Applied 2026-09-10.
|
||
|
||
`http://decisions.coulomb.social/` now returns `308` to HEAD and `301` to GET.
|
||
That split is not a defect in this configuration — `reuse.coulomb.social`, which
|
||
uses the identical Middleware, behaves the same way. It is Traefik's own
|
||
behaviour on this cluster.
|
||
|
||
The main Ingress stays `websecure`-only; this is a second router on port 80
|
||
rather than a change to the first.
|
||
|
||
### Router priority is load-bearing here
|
||
|
||
cert-manager solves HTTP-01 by creating a temporary solver Ingress on **this
|
||
same host and this same `web` entrypoint**, serving
|
||
`/.well-known/acme-challenge/<token>`. A catch-all `/` redirect on that
|
||
entrypoint competes with it directly.
|
||
|
||
Traefik would normally settle this by rule length — the solver's `Path` rule is
|
||
much longer than `PathPrefix(/)` — but `reuse-surface`'s 2026-07-07 report is
|
||
precisely a case of a specific rule losing to a catch-all when precedence was
|
||
left implicit. There the symptom was a 404 someone noticed within the day. Here
|
||
it would be a **silently failed renewal about 60 days out**, surfacing as an
|
||
expired certificate on the origin backing an OIDC redirect URI — the kind of
|
||
failure that presents as a broken login rather than as an expired cert.
|
||
|
||
So the redirect router pins `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.priority: "1"`.
|
||
Any solver router, using the default computed priority, outbids it.
|
||
|
||
**Verified by probe, twice, on 2026-09-10.** A throwaway Ingress mimicking the
|
||
solver shape (`web` entrypoint, `Exact` acme-challenge path, default priority)
|
||
was applied and the challenge path was polled:
|
||
|
||
| Condition | `/.well-known/acme-challenge/<token>` | `/` |
|
||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||
| No solver present | `301` (redirect catches it — correct) | `301` |
|
||
| Solver present | `200` (**solver wins**) | `301` |
|
||
| Solver removed | `301` | `301` |
|
||
|
||
Traefik takes 30–60s to converge on Ingress changes, so the flip is not
|
||
instant; poll rather than reading a single response. The probe was deleted after
|
||
each run and is not in the repo — recreate it from this table if the redirect
|
||
or the priority annotation is ever changed.
|
||
|
||
The next real renewal is due around 2026-11-09. Confirm the certificate's
|
||
`notAfter` advances then; that is the only test that exercises the real solver
|
||
rather than a probe of its shape.
|