railiance-infra/SCOPE.md

# SCOPE

> This file describes the repository as it works today. Aspirational direction
> belongs in `INTENT.md`; known differences are recorded under `history/`.

---

## One-liner

The S1 host substrate for Railiance: source-backed inventory, Ansible OS
convergence, host firewall policy, SSH bootstrap, and recurring baseline
verification for the existing Railiance servers.

---

## Core Idea

`railiance-infra` owns host-level facts and controls below Kubernetes. It keeps
the current server identities in source, converges supported Linux hosts toward
a security baseline, and checks the resulting live state. A higher layer should
receive a reachable, hardened host rather than needing to configure the host
itself.

The two current managed hosts are existing Host Europe virtual servers. The
repository also contains a Hetzner Terraform and cloud-init path, but that path
is not an operable representation of the current inventory: it supports only
Hetzner and expects provisioning fields that the two adopted Host Europe
entries do not contain.

---

## In Scope

- Canonical connection inventory for `Railiance01` and `CoulombCore` in
  `inventory/servers.yaml`
- Dynamic Ansible inventory, including per-host exceptions
- Debian/Ubuntu host convergence for base packages, SSH hardening, fail2ban,
  timezone, swap, user resource limits, and host access keys
- Declared UFW management where `ufw_manage` is enabled
- Tunnel-only k3s API policy, source-restricted Flannel grants, and removal of
  retired public grants
- Grant validation before opening public web ports 80/443 for a reef
- Installation of OpenBao SSH user-CA trust and per-user principals
- Installation of SOPS/age tooling and SOPS-encrypted storage of the Hetzner
  provider token
- Goss host checks, TAP evidence, and an hourly on-host pass/fail signal
- Non-secret `Railiance01` identity, capacity, utilization, and host-operations
  evidence for downstream resource accounting
- Local age-encrypted snapshots of selected S1 OS configuration and installed
  package selections
- A reference NetKingdom host-bootstrap capability declaration

---

## Out of Scope

- Kubernetes installation and runtime management (`railiance-cluster`, S2)
- OpenBao, databases, ingress, Forgejo, and other platform services
  (`railiance-platform`, S3)
- Developer tooling and application deployment (S4/S5)
- Workload execution contracts (`rail-*`) and workload packaging (`rapp-*`)
- Reef topology, workload placement, and exposure decisions; this repo only
  enforces a supplied substrate grant
- Provider billing, contracts, lifecycle dates, and cost records
- Secret issuance or live credential custody; this repo encrypts selected
  material at rest and installs client tooling
- Host Europe provisioning or lifecycle automation; the current Host Europe
  servers are adopted resources
- Cluster, database, or application backup and restore

Historical Forgejo migration and restore-drill material remains in this repo,
but it is not an S1 capability or an ownership precedent.

---

## Relevant When

- Adding or changing a managed host identity
- Converging or auditing host packages, SSH, fail2ban, UFW, swap, or resource
  limits
- Changing host-level network grants or proving k3s API exposure remains
  tunnel-only
- Installing SSH CA trust or automation public keys on a host
- Running or collecting host baseline checks
- Producing non-secret host-capacity evidence
- Developing or repairing the Hetzner provisioning path

---

## Not Relevant When

- The change is to Kubernetes objects, cluster components, platform services,
  or applications
- The request is for a secret value, login token, provider contract, or invoice
- The decision concerns which workloads or rails belong in a reef
- A backup or restore concerns persistent application or cluster data

An already-provisioned host can still be in scope: convergence, firewall
maintenance, evidence collection, and drift checks are ongoing S1 work.

---

## Current State

- Status: maintained and operational for adopted-host convergence and
  verification
- Managed inventory: `Railiance01` (`92.205.62.239`) and `CoulombCore`
  (`92.205.130.254`), both reached as user `tegwick`
- `Railiance01`: UFW is managed from this repo; the k3s API is tunnel-only and
  the Host Europe Nydus exception is declared
- `CoulombCore`: UFW is deliberately unmanaged because its live packet filter
  has not been migrated safely to this repo's UFW model
- Verification: the executable baseline now resolves `ufw-managed` and
  `external-firewall` profiles into both Ansible and Goss. The fail-closed
  handoff command is remotely read-only, refuses a stale installed Goss
  surface, and emits metadata-only receipts; a fresh attended all-host receipt
  is still pending
- Provisioning: adopted and provider-managed records now have a validated
  schema. Terraform selects only provider-managed Hetzner records, with mock
  plan tests proving the current Host Europe records select no resources. It
  does not provision either live Host Europe server
- Secrets: `secrets/hetzner-token.yaml` is SOPS-encrypted. The Ansible
  `sops_agent` role installs tools but intentionally does not place a private
  age key on a host
- Evidence: the latest committed `Railiance01` capacity observation is a
  point-in-time record, not continuous resource telemetry

---

## How It Fits

- Upstream tools: Ansible, Goss, SOPS/age, Terraform, SSH, and provider APIs
- Downstream: `railiance-cluster` depends on host reachability and an acceptable
  S1 posture; higher layers depend on it transitively
- Access path: `ops-bridge` supplies the SSH tunnels used for private cluster
  and State Hub access; this repo declares host-side SSH access and firewall
  posture but does not own tunnel orchestration
- Resource accounting: `resource-control` consumes the non-secret evidence
  interface under `docs/evidence/resource-hosteurope-railiance01/`; `fin-hub`
  owns booked cost

---

## Terminology

- **Adopted host**: an existing provider resource represented and managed here,
  but not created by this repo
- **Convergence**: applying Ansible roles to move a host toward declared state
- **Verification**: evaluating live host state with Goss
- **Substrate grant**: an approved host-level network opening supplied by the
  owning reef declaration
- **S1**: the infrastructure-substrate layer below the cluster runtime

---

## Related / Overlapping

- `railiance-cluster` — owns the S2 Kubernetes runtime
- `railiance-platform` — owns S3 shared services and service data protection
- `ops-bridge` — owns workstation-to-host tunnel orchestration
- `resource-control` — owns the resource portfolio assembled from evidence
  produced here
- `reef-*` repos — own substrate grouping and exposure intent
- `railiance-hosts` — superseded predecessor; not a second source of truth

---

## Getting Oriented

- Session and work routing: `AGENTS.md` and `.custodian-brief.md`
- Current host identities: `inventory/servers.yaml`
- Host convergence: `ansible/playbooks/bootstrap.yaml` and `ansible/roles/`
- Host-specific posture: `ansible/inventory/host_vars/`
- Firewall defaults: `ansible/roles/base/defaults/main.yml`
- Verification: `goss/baseline.yaml.j2`, `docs/verification.md`, and
  `docs/conformance-loop.md`
- Hetzner prototype path: `terraform/hetzner/` and `docs/provisioning.md`
- Operator entry points: `make converge`, `make converge-check`,
  `make converge-firewall`, `make verify`, and `make goss-status`

---

## Provided Capabilities

```capability
type: infrastructure
title: Adopted-host inventory and convergence
description: Resolve the two current server identities into Ansible inventory and converge supported Debian/Ubuntu host packages, SSH posture, fail2ban, swap, resource limits, and access keys.
keywords: [ansible, inventory, host, convergence, hardening, linux]
```

```capability
type: security
title: Host firewall grant enforcement
description: Converge declared UFW rules, keep the k3s API tunnel-only, restrict Flannel peers, revoke retired sources, and require a reef exposure grant before opening public web ports.
keywords: [ufw, firewall, k3s, tunnel, flannel, reef, exposure]
```

```capability
type: infrastructure
title: Recurring host baseline verification
description: Resolve host-specific profiles into Goss checks, run them on demand or hourly on-host, retain local failure state, collect TAP evidence, and support a fail-closed handoff receipt.
keywords: [goss, verification, drift, systemd-timer, tap, evidence]
```

```capability
type: security
title: SSH trust bootstrap
description: Install automation public keys and OpenBao SSH user-CA trust with host-specific authorized principals; certificate issuance remains with ops-warden.
keywords: [ssh, certificate-authority, openbao, principals, access]
```

```capability
type: infrastructure
title: Host capacity evidence interface
description: Collect a bounded, non-secret Railiance01 observation across provider metadata, operating-system capacity, and k3s allocatable state for resource-control.
keywords: [capacity, evidence, hosteurope, resource-control, inventory]
```

---

## Notes

The exact differences between this operational scope and the aspirational
mission in `INTENT.md` are assessed in
`history/2026-08-23-scope-against-intent.md`.