feat: prepare empty Anthropic custody entry for UI handoff

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a0726e-5232-73f2-aaca-2c05ceb62efb
This commit is contained in:
codex 2026-09-05 21:10:43 +02:00
parent cb6396caab
commit a16c33942a
2 changed files with 126 additions and 22 deletions

View file

@ -10,11 +10,16 @@ in_flight:
missing_fields:
- openbao.policy_file
- openbao.auth
blocking_reason: Anthropic organization and workspace budget await user input; the sandbox owner machine identity and protected delivery path have not been verified. No live grant or key exists from this request.
blocking_reason: Provider organization, key name and expiration supplied by user.
Empty-only KV seed authorized for operator UI handoff; live custody and the sandbox
owner machine identity/delivery remain unverified. Workspace scope and budget
are not confirmed.
owner: railiance-platform
requester:
agent: codex
reason: User selected a dedicated Anthropic workload API key for GLAS-WP-0012 and SAND-WP-0015. Establish custody and owner delivery before the real local Claude proof.
reason: User selected a dedicated Anthropic workload API key for GLAS-WP-0012 and
SAND-WP-0015. Establish custody and owner delivery before the real local Claude
proof.
review:
required: true
required_approvers:
@ -24,13 +29,21 @@ review:
- at: '2026-09-05'
reviewer: user via chat
decision: authentication_model_selected
comment: User requested establishment of an Anthropic workload API key. This records the chosen authentication model; final machine bindings are not yet known.
comment: User requested establishment of an Anthropic workload API key. This records
the chosen authentication model; final machine bindings are not yet known.
- at: '2026-09-05'
reviewer: user via chat
decision: empty_seed_authorized
comment: User authorized preparing the existing proposed location with an empty
version; user will create a version containing the secret through the OpenBao
UI. No runtime grant authorized by this seed.
target:
domain: infotech
tenant: glas-harness
workload: sand-boxer-claude-agent-dev
environment: production
purpose: Dedicated Claude Code inference for the Glas local agent-dev profile, delivered by the sandbox owner.
purpose: Dedicated Claude Code inference for the Glas local agent-dev profile, delivered
by the sandbox owner.
openbao:
mount: platform
kv_path: platform/workloads/glas-harness/claude-agent-dev
@ -46,34 +59,71 @@ access_frontdoor:
resolvable: false
delivery:
surface: owner-exec
target: Sand-boxer delivers ANTHROPIC_API_KEY only to the selected Claude workload; neither the Glas caller nor the runtime receives an OpenBao token.
target: Sand-boxer delivers ANTHROPIC_API_KEY only to the selected Claude workload;
neither the Glas caller nor the runtime receives an OpenBao token.
risk:
classification: high
notes:
- Proposed KV coordinates and catalog selector are reserved design names, not surveyed live objects.
- Provider credential can incur API charges; use a dedicated workspace and user-selected budget.
- Use a workspace-scoped service account key; organization administration is outside the workload grant.
- OpenBao token expiration does not expire the provider key. Provider revocation is required for compromise.
- Owner environment injection can expose the key to descendants within that workload; it is not per-process secrecy against workload code.
- Proposed KV coordinates and catalog selector are reserved design names, not surveyed
live objects.
- Provider credential can incur API charges; use a dedicated workspace and user-selected
budget.
- Use a workspace-scoped service account key; organization administration is outside
the workload grant.
- OpenBao token expiration does not expire the provider key. Provider revocation
is required for compromise.
- Owner environment injection can expose the key to descendants within that workload;
it is not per-process secrecy against workload code.
verification:
positive:
- Confirm provider organization, workspace, service account, key identifier and expiration using metadata only.
- Exact authenticated sandbox owner can read only the intended data entry and deliver the field without logging it.
- Bounded real Claude proof succeeds through enforced provider egress and removes private state on teardown.
- Confirm provider organization, workspace, service account, key identifier and
expiration using metadata only.
- Exact authenticated sandbox owner can read only the intended data entry and deliver
the field without logging it.
- Bounded real Claude proof succeeds through enforced provider egress and removes
private state on teardown.
negative:
- Wrong owner identity, sibling KV path, metadata read, parent listing and workload writes are denied.
- Wrong owner identity, sibling KV path, metadata read, parent listing and workload
writes are denied.
- Generic coding-agent identity cannot retrieve the credential directly.
- No credential or OpenBao token appears in execution replies, artifacts, source tree or State Hub.
- No credential or OpenBao token appears in execution replies, artifacts, source
tree or State Hub.
- A revoked predecessor provider key fails authentication after controlled rotation.
activation_conditions:
- User confirms Anthropic organization and workspace budget; provider service account and key are created through attended Console custody.
- Confirm actual sandbox host service identity and auth binding; review exact read policy and separate protected custody writer before apply.
- Seed KV with compare-and-set zero through attended custody; never enter values in chat or command arguments.
- Positive and negative access, owner delivery and provider authentication evidence pass before route activation.
- User confirms Anthropic organization and workspace budget; provider service account
and key are created through attended Console custody.
- Confirm actual sandbox host service identity and auth binding; review exact read
policy and separate protected custody writer before apply.
- Seed KV with compare-and-set zero through attended custody; never enter values
in chat or command arguments.
- Positive and negative access, owner delivery and provider authentication evidence
pass before route activation.
evidence:
- at: '2026-09-05'
actor: codex
kind: empty_seed
result: passed
details:
- Empty ANTHROPIC_API_KEY version 1 created with CAS zero; user will create version
2 in UI.
- Request id 50cafc25-8d24-c1d6-5be8-1ade049e088b.
- Provider metadata recorded; metadata-only recovery completed after empty response
parsing fix; contained sessions revoked.
- No secret data read or real key handled; runtime lane remains inactive.
lifecycle:
deactivate: Disable the owner route and provider key; revoke outstanding OpenBao reader tokens. Preserve KV history under platform retention rules.
rotate: Create a replacement provider key, write with expected-version CAS, stop old runs, verify new delivery and inference, then revoke the predecessor at Anthropic and prove its denial.
compromised: Disable the provider key immediately, stop affected runs and owner route, revoke Bao leases, replace forward through protected custody and record non-secret incident evidence.
deactivate: Disable the owner route and provider key; revoke outstanding OpenBao
reader tokens. Preserve KV history under platform retention rules.
rotate: Create a replacement provider key, write with expected-version CAS, stop
old runs, verify new delivery and inference, then revoke the predecessor at Anthropic
and prove its denial.
compromised: Disable the provider key immediately, stop affected runs and owner
route, revoke Bao leases, replace forward through protected custody and record
non-secret incident evidence.
state_hub:
workplan_id: GLAS-WP-0012
task_id: GLAS-WP-0012-T02
provider_metadata:
organization_id: e1a8f305-9e64-4639-a7fd-af48e34f37c7
key_name: claude_key_bernd.worsch
expires_at: '2027-01-31T21:00:00Z'
source: user supplied; provider identity and workspace scope not independently verified

View file

@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""User-authorized empty KV seed for CCR-2026-0016; silent OIDC child."""
import json
from pathlib import Path
import subprocess
import sys
DATA_PATH = 'platform/data/workloads/glas-harness/claude-agent-dev'
META_PATH = 'platform/metadata/workloads/glas-harness/claude-agent-dev'
RECEIPT = Path('/tmp/glas-anthropic-empty-receipt.json')
def bao(*args, payload=None):
r = subprocess.run(['bao', *args], input=None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload),
text=True, capture_output=True, timeout=30)
if r.returncode:
raise RuntimeError('bao_operation_failed')
return json.loads(r.stdout) if r.stdout.strip() else {}
def main():
if sys.argv[1:] == ['--complete-metadata']:
receipt = json.loads(RECEIPT.read_text())
if receipt.get('path') != DATA_PATH or receipt.get('version') != 1:
raise RuntimeError('invalid_receipt')
observed = bao('read', '-format=json', META_PATH)['data']
if observed.get('current_version', 0) < 1:
raise RuntimeError('missing_seed')
elif not sys.argv[1:]:
# CAS zero makes concurrent creation and existing versions refuse; no data GET.
result = bao('write', '-format=json', DATA_PATH, '-',
payload={'options': {'cas': 0}, 'data': {'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY': ''}})
version = result['data']['version']
receipt = {'ccr': 'CCR-2026-0016', 'path': DATA_PATH, 'version': version,
'empty_seed_created': True, 'metadata_written': False,
'request_id': result.get('request_id')}
with RECEIPT.open('x') as f:
json.dump(receipt, f)
else:
raise RuntimeError('invalid_arguments')
# Only non-secret custom metadata. No secret expiry is enforced by KV metadata.
bao('write', '-format=json', META_PATH, '-', payload={'custom_metadata': {
'ccr': 'CCR-2026-0016', 'custody_owner': 'railiance-platform',
'provider': 'anthropic', 'organization_id': 'e1a8f305-9e64-4639-a7fd-af48e34f37c7',
'provider_key_name': 'claude_key_bernd.worsch',
'provider_expires_at': '2027-01-31T21:00:00Z',
'seed_version': '1', 'seed_contains_secret': 'false',
'handoff': 'operator creates next version in UI; runtime lane remains inactive'}})
receipt['metadata_written'] = True
RECEIPT.write_text(json.dumps(receipt))
if __name__ == '__main__':
try:
main()
except Exception:
sys.exit(1) # contained executor must never return provider/client output