RPF-WP-0018: mark unevidenced P1 claims; seed RPF-WP-0019 for apps-pg

Placement policy 3.1 records that the P1 levels for vergabe and
coulomb_social are provisioning declarations without the SS13 isolation
probes - apps-pg has none. 3.2 records that apps-pg cannot produce the
noisy-neighbour artifact at all until per-consumer controls exist, per
SS13.4: with nothing to bind, a probe could only demonstrate degradation.

RPF-WP-0019 seeded for the three live defects the disclosure work found:
no backup, no per-consumer controls, no isolation probes. Kept separate
from RPF-WP-0018 so declaring is not confused with fixing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

WORK-RECORDS.md

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 | workplan | RAILIANCE-WP-0016 | finished | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0016-apps-pg-resource-evidence.md |
 | workplan | RAILIANCE-WP-0016 | finished | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0016-architecture-cleanup-backlog.md |
 | workplan | RAILIANCE-WP-0017 | finished | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0017-consumption-mode-enforcement.md |
-| workplan | RPF-WP-0018 | proposed | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
+| workplan | RPF-WP-0018 | active | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
 | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0005-T01 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0005-credential-request-and-lease-broker.md |
 | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0005-T02 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0005-credential-request-and-lease-broker.md |
 | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0005-T03 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0005-credential-request-and-lease-broker.md |
@@ -81,10 +81,10 @@
 | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0016-T04 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0016-architecture-cleanup-backlog.md |
 | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0016-T05 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0016-architecture-cleanup-backlog.md |
 | task | RAILIANCE-WP-0017-T01 | done | — | workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0017-consumption-mode-enforcement.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0018-T01 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0018-T01 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0018-T02 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0018-T02 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0018-T03 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0018-T03 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0018-T04 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0018-T04 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0018-T05 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0018-T05 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0018-T06 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0018-T06 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
-| task | RPF-WP-0018-T07 | todo | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |
+| task | RPF-WP-0018-T07 | done | — | workplans/RPF-WP-0018-policy-surface-alignment.md |

docs/placement-policy.md

@@ -70,15 +70,50 @@ has an answer that is not archaeology. The **placement owner** decides
 placement changes for that workload and is accountable for watching its
 triggers. It is not the same role as the operator of the cluster.
 
-| Workload | Substrate | Provided level | Placement owner | Co-signer |
+| Workload | Substrate | Provided level | Placement owner | Co-signer | §13 evidence |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| `audit-core` | `platform-pg` | P1 | `audit-core` | this repo |
+| `audit-core` | `platform-pg` | P1 | `audit-core` | this repo | probes exist |
-| `tenant-engine` | `platform-pg` | P1 | `tenant-engine` | this repo |
+| `tenant-engine` | `platform-pg` | P1 | `tenant-engine` | this repo | probes exist |
-| `user-engine` | `user-engine-pg` | P2 | `net-kingdom` | this repo |
+| `user-engine` | `user-engine-pg` | P2 | `net-kingdom` | this repo | not assessed here |
-| `target-revenue` | `target-revenue-pg` | P2 | `target-revenue` | this repo |
+| `target-revenue` | `target-revenue-pg` | P2 | `target-revenue` | this repo | not assessed here |
-| `forgejo` | `forgejo-db` | P2 | this repo | — |
+| `forgejo` | `forgejo-db` | P2 | this repo | — | single consumer |
-| `vergabe` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `vergabe-teilnahme` | this repo |
+| `vergabe` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `vergabe-teilnahme` | this repo | **absent** |
-| `coulomb_social` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `coulomb-social` | this repo |
+| `coulomb_social` | `apps-pg` | P1 | `coulomb-social` | this repo | **absent** |
+
+### 3.1 Two of these P1 levels are asserted without evidence
+
+§13.1 claims a level only with its artifact present. The P1–P4 artifact is
+*"provisioning declaration plus the platform's isolation probes"*.
+
+`platform-pg` has them — `rapp-postgres` runs 15 adversarial probes against the
+consumer boundary. **`apps-pg` has none.** `scripts/capture-apps-pg-evidence.py`
+captures *capacity* evidence for `resource-control`; it makes no isolation
+assertion. So the P1 levels recorded above for `vergabe` and `coulomb_social`
+are, as of 2026-08-17, **provisioning declarations without probes** — stated
+here rather than quietly carried, because a table of levels that mixes
+evidenced and unevidenced entries without saying which is which is the failure
+§13.1 exists to prevent.
+
+Recorded as owed by this repo. Until the probes exist, those two rows should be
+read as *intended* placement, not *verified* placement.
+
+### 3.2 `apps-pg` cannot produce the noisy-neighbour artifact at all
+
+Worth separating from the gap above, because it is not a matter of writing a
+missing test. §13's P1–P2 noisy-neighbour artifact requires a per-consumer
+usage baseline, a saturation run, and **evidence that the governance controls
+bind — that the greedy consumer is held at its limits.**
+
+`apps-pg` has no per-consumer governance controls. Its connection pool is not
+partitioned, there is no per-consumer connection allowance, no statement
+timeout and no resource limit on the pod. There is nothing that could be shown
+to bind, so a run against it could only demonstrate that a saturating consumer
+degrades its co-residents — which §13.4 explicitly rejects as an artifact that
+"can only fail, or that passes by being run gently enough".
+
+The honest sequence is therefore: **controls first, artifact second.** Writing
+the probe before the limits exist would produce an overclaim wearing the
+costume of evidence. Tracked as `RPF-WP-0019`.
 
 **The consuming repo is the placement owner; this repo co-signs.** The
 consumer knows its latency requirement, its erasure horizon and its compliance

docs/tenancy-posture.md

@@ -14,6 +14,19 @@ levels below are `0`. None of them is an admission of weakness, and §6 is
 explicit that a declared low level is conformant while an unevidenced high
 level is not.
 
+**Every level below carries what §13 requires of it.** §13.1: a level is
+claimed only with its evidence artifact present. §13.1a: at or below the
+"no control" rung, a declaration requires a **stated reason** instead, because
+there is nothing to overclaim at the bottom of a ladder. Floor claims here
+carry `reason:`; claims above the floor carry `evidence:`. A claim with
+neither would be the overclaim §6 prohibits.
+
+Where `target` equals `current`, that is a **settled position, not a stalled
+trajectory** — §6 permits a low level to be permanent by design, on the
+`flex-auth` precedent (`I1` forever, because verifying its own inputs would
+make it the identity provider its scope refuses to be). Those lines carry
+`permanent: true` so §12's guard does not nag them.
+
 ## Why this is a vector *set* and not a vector
 
 §5 asks a **service** for one level per axis. `railiance-platform` is an OAS
@@ -84,28 +97,65 @@ tenancy:
 tenancy:
   service: openbao
   role: credential-provider
-  current:  { I: 0, A: 2, E: 0, P: 0, R: 0 }
+  current:  { I: 0, A: 0, E: 0, P: 0, R: 0 }
-  target:   { I: 0, A: 2, E: 0, P: 0, R: 1 }
+  target:   { I: 0, A: 0, E: 0, P: 0, R: 1 }
+  permanent: [I, A, E]
   service_class: latency-critical
   reviewed: "2026-08-17"
+  reason:
+    I: "No tenant concept. OpenBao authenticates workloads via Kubernetes
+        auth; it never receives, parses or validates a NetKingdom tenant
+        identifier. Permanent by design — a secrets engine that resolved
+        tenant identity would be duplicating tenant-engine."
+    A: "No tenant context is carried, so there is nothing to bind. Permanent
+        by design, on the §6 flex-auth precedent."
+    E: "No tenant-keyed data. OpenBao holds workload secrets, not tenant
+        records."
+    P: "One instance, every consumer shares it. Single-node rail; §17
+        scaling demands apply."
+    R: "No retention position on audit device output or on KV version
+        history."
   gap:
-    R: "No retention position on audit device output or on KV version history.
+    R: "R1 (platform default) is reachable cheaply and is not yet declared.
-        R1 (platform default) is reachable cheaply and is not yet declared."
+        The only line here with a real trajectory."
-  notes:
-    - "A2 is claimed on the consumer boundary, not a tenant boundary: policy
-       per workload path, bound once, centrally, in OpenBao's own policy
-       engine. It is NOT delegated to flex-auth, so A3 is not claimed and is
-       not currently a target — a PDP in the credential path would put
-       flex-auth on OpenBao's availability path and OpenBao on flex-auth's."
-    - "E is 0 on the TENANT axis and that number is misleading without this
-       sentence: consumer separation in OpenBao is structural — a workload
-       token's policy cannot address another workload's path at all, which is
-       E4-shaped machinery. It scores 0 because the axis measures the tenant
-       boundary and OpenBao has no tenant dimension. See the provider note."
-    - "P0 is accurate and deliberate: one instance, every consumer shares it.
-       Single-node rail; §17 scaling demands apply."
 ```
 
+**Correction, 2026-08-17.** This vector first declared `A: 2`. That was
+wrong twice over and both errors are worth recording rather than quietly
+editing.
+
+*It was internally incoherent.* `E: 0` was justified on the ground that
+OpenBao has no tenant dimension. §4.2's `A2` reads "a single local
+authorization boundary; **tenant context** bound once, centrally" — the same
+dimension. A declaration cannot invoke the absence of tenant context to claim
+the floor on one axis and ignore it to claim a rung on the next.
+
+*It was unevidenced at the moment of claiming.* §13.1 requires the artifact to
+be present when the level is claimed, and none was cited. §13.1a would not
+have rescued it: the table defines an artifact from `A2` upward, so `A2` is
+precisely the first rung where the exemption stops applying.
+
+The irony is the point. This repo routed a finding about unevidenced claims
+in the same week it made one.
+
+**What the corrected zeros conceal, and why the provider note below exists.**
+`A: 0` now reads as though OpenBao performs no authorization. It performs a
+great deal, it is central, and it is mechanically evidenced —
+`scripts/openbao-verify-token-grants.py` mints a scoped child token, asserts
+it *can* sign with `ssh/sign/agt-role`, and asserts it *cannot* read policy
+metadata, then revokes by accessor. That is exactly the shape §13 asks for at
+`A2`: choke point identified, unbound request refused. It is pointed at the
+**consumer** boundary, and none of the five axes has anywhere to put it.
+
+That evidence is therefore cited under the provider statement rather than
+against a consumer axis. Consumer separation in OpenBao is structural — a
+workload token's policy cannot address another workload's path at all, which
+is `E4`-shaped machinery — and the framework's honest application scores it
+`0`.
+
+`A3` is not a target: a PDP in the credential path would put `flex-auth` on
+OpenBao's availability path and OpenBao on `flex-auth`'s.
+
 ### `platform-pg` — policy relationship only
 
 Declared by `rapp-postgres`. This repo does not restate it. What this repo
@@ -131,6 +181,18 @@ plus the provider statement is the accurate form. This is routed as a finding.
 **The five ladders describe a consumer of storage. They do not describe a
 provider of it.**
 
+**Narrowed on re-reading, 2026-08-17.** An earlier version of this finding
+claimed the framework had no way to say "this zero is structural, not weak".
+That was wrong: §6 says exactly that, and §13.1a supplies the mechanism —
+`target` equal to `current` with a stated reason is a settled position, on the
+`flex-auth` `I1`-forever precedent. This declaration now uses it. Half of the
+finding is withdrawn.
+
+What survives is the other half, and it is not expressible: a provider cannot
+state **what level it makes reachable for the workloads it holds**, nor record
+a control that is real, mechanically evidenced, and simply not on any of the
+five consumer axes.
+
 Every service above scores at or near zero on I, A and E, and in each case for
 the same structural reason rather than for a weakness: a storage or credential
 platform has no tenant dimension of its own. It is exactly as strong or weak as

workplans/RPF-WP-0019-apps-pg-recoverability-and-controls.md

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+---
+id: RPF-WP-0019
+type: workplan
+title: "apps-pg: backup, per-consumer controls, and the isolation probes they make possible"
+domain: financials
+repo: railiance-platform
+status: proposed
+owner: codex
+topic_slug: railiance
+created: "2026-08-17"
+updated: "2026-08-17"
+related:
+  - RPF-WP-0018
+origin: residual
+origin_ref: RPF-WP-0018
+---
+
+# RPF-WP-0019 — apps-pg recoverability and per-consumer controls
+
+## Goal
+
+Close the three defects `RPF-WP-0018` surfaced in `apps-pg` by writing its
+quota disclosure. Documentation found them; only this workplan fixes them.
+
+## Why this is separate from RPF-WP-0018
+
+That workplan declared posture and policy. This one changes a live cluster.
+Keeping them apart matters: a declaration workplan that quietly starts editing
+production is how "we wrote it down" becomes indistinguishable from "we fixed
+it". The declaration is published as-is, with the defects visible, and this is
+the record of closing them.
+
+## The three defects
+
+**D1 — `apps-pg` has no backup.** No `barmanObjectStore`, no `retentionPolicy`,
+nothing. This is not a short retention window; it is no recovery path at all,
+on a cluster holding two S5 application databases. Its R level is `R0` and
+`R0` here means unrecoverable, not merely un-erasable.
+
+**D2 — no per-consumer controls.** The connection pool is unpartitioned, so
+one consumer can exhaust the cluster while staying politely inside its own
+expectations. No `statement_timeout`, no `idle_in_transaction_session_timeout`,
+no CPU or memory limits — the pod is BestEffort QoS and is the first thing
+evicted under node pressure.
+
+**D3 — no isolation probes**, so the `P1` levels recorded for `vergabe` and
+`coulomb_social` in `docs/placement-policy.md` §3.1 are provisioning
+declarations without the §13 artifact.
+
+## Sequencing, and why it is not the obvious one
+
+**D1 first.** It is the only one whose failure is unrecoverable. A cluster
+with no backup is one bad afternoon from data loss that no amount of isolation
+evidence compensates for.
+
+**D2 before D3, necessarily.** Tenancy Posture §13.4: an artifact must assert
+something achievable. The noisy-neighbour artifact requires showing the
+governance controls *bind*. With no controls there is nothing to bind, so a
+probe written now could only demonstrate degradation — an artifact that "can
+only fail, or that passes by being run gently enough". Writing the probe first
+would produce an overclaim wearing the costume of evidence.
+
+D1 also depends on a backup target, which is `resource-control`'s bucket and
+the `platform-pg-backup-s3` credential lane — the same handoff
+`make postgres-backup-deploy` waits on. Check whether that is now live before
+assuming this is blocked.
+
+## Tasks
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0019-T01
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+**Establish a backup target for `apps-pg`.** Confirm the state of the
+`resource-control` bucket and the `platform-pg-backup-s3` OpenBao Secret; if
+live, configure `barmanObjectStore` and a `retentionPolicy` on the cluster. If
+not live, record the dependency and say so — do not leave the absence
+undocumented a second time.
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0019-T02
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+**Declare and enforce per-consumer controls.** Per-consumer connection
+allowance, `statement_timeout`, `idle_in_transaction_session_timeout`, and
+pod resource requests/limits to lift `apps-pg` off BestEffort QoS. Publish
+every value in `docs/s3-consumer-interfaces.md` before it takes effect —
+§10.2 is a disclosure rule, and applying a timeout consumers learn about by
+hitting it would breach the rule while implementing it.
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0019-T03
+status: todo
+priority: medium
+```
+**Declare the ceiling and overflow target.** Owed under this repo's own
+Rule P-4.1 before `apps-pg`'s third consumer; it is at two. Name the binding
+resource per Rule P-4.2 — memory or connections — and a named overflow
+substrate per P-4.3.
+
+```task
+id: RPF-WP-0019-T04
+status: todo
+priority: medium
+```
+**Isolation probes, after T02.** Consumer-boundary probes on the
+`rapp-postgres` model, then the §13 noisy-neighbour artifact: per-consumer
+baseline, saturation run, evidence the controls bind, degradation measured and
+judged against each consumer's declared service class. Update
+`docs/placement-policy.md` §3.1 and `docs/tenancy-posture.md` when the P1
+claims become evidenced.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- `apps-pg` only. `platform-pg`'s equivalents are `rapp-postgres`'s.
+- No consumer is migrated. This changes the cluster, not who is on it.
+- Values are published before they are enforced, never after.
+
+## Risks
+
+**Applying limits to a live cluster breaks a consumer that was relying on
+their absence.** Most likely with `statement_timeout`. Mitigation is the
+disclosure-first ordering in T02, which gives consumers a window to object.
+
+**T01 stays blocked on a handoff outside this repo and the cluster keeps no
+backup meanwhile.** Mitigation is that T01 requires the dependency be recorded
+explicitly rather than left as a silent absence — which is exactly how D1
+survived this long.