railiance-platform/workplans/RPF-WP-0001-credential-request-and-lease-broker.md

---
id: RPF-WP-0001
type: workplan
title: "Credential Request and Lease Broker"
domain: financials
repo: railiance-platform
status: finished
owner: codex
topic_slug: railiance
planning_priority: high
planning_order: 5
created: "2026-06-24"
updated: "2026-07-02"
depends_on_workplans:
  - RAIL-PL-WP-0002
state_hub_workstream_id: "bcc11cf9-d008-5e42-8fff-e2b33a1d0ff2"
---

# RPF-WP-0001 - Credential Request and Lease Broker

## Goal

Provide a clean, secure, low-friction way for operators, agents, and approved
automations to request, generate, receive, use, renew, and revoke short-lived
credentials such as the OpenBao token needed for ops-warden vault-backed SSH
signing smoke.

The target experience is self-service for routine, policy-approved leases and
explicit human approval for high-risk grants, without ever pasting secret values
into Git, State Hub, chat, prompts, workplans, or shell history.

## Repository Decision

The primary owner is railiance-platform because OpenBao is the canonical
runtime secret custody service and this repo owns platform secrets, identity
integration, and shared credential delivery contracts.

Cross-repo responsibilities:

| Concern | Owner | Boundary |
| --- | --- | --- |
| OpenBao policies, token roles, lease broker, audit | railiance-platform | Owns secret custody and credential generation. |
| Login, OIDC, MFA, IAM profile claims | key-cape | Authenticates humans and service identities. |
| Authorization decision for requested grants | flex-auth | May decide whether actor X may request grant Y for purpose Z. |
| SSH certificate signing | ops-warden | Issues SSH certs only; does not vend OpenBao tokens. |
| Request tracking and progress | state-hub | Stores non-secret request metadata, status, decision ids, and audit pointers only. |
| Agent inference/runtime | llm-connect and callers | Never place secrets in prompts; consume via local env injection or wrapped lease handles. |

This work should update the ops-warden routing catalog when complete, but the
implementation belongs here. If the broker later becomes a general NetKingdom
service, code can split to a dedicated credential-broker repo while OpenBao
policies and grants remain owned by railiance-platform.

## Design Principles

- Prefer dynamic or short-lived leases over static secrets.
- Use response wrapping or local exec-time injection; do not print raw tokens by default.
- Store non-secret lease metadata only: actor, grant, TTL, purpose, lease id or accessor, decision id, timestamps, and revocation state.
- Keep OpenBao audit logs as the source of truth for secret access.
- Make the common path easy: one command to run a task with the right credential.
- Keep high-risk paths explicit: human approval and MFA for elevated grants.
- Every grant has a catalog entry, max TTL, allowed actors/subjects, delivery mode, audit expectations, and revocation behavior.

## Proposed User Experience

Initial pilot command shapes:

    credential request vault-token --grant ops-warden/warden-sign --purpose flex-auth-openbao-smoke --ttl 15m
    credential exec --grant ops-warden/warden-sign --ttl 15m -- SMOKE_VAULT=1 /home/worsch/ops-warden/scripts/policy_gate_production_smoke.sh
    credential status <lease-handle>
    credential revoke <lease-handle>

For the ops-warden smoke, the preferred path is credential exec. It obtains a
bounded OpenBao token with the warden-sign policy, injects it as VAULT_TOKEN
only into the child process environment, redacts logs, and revokes or lets the
lease expire after the command finishes.

## Threat Model Summary

Primary risks:

- token leakage through shell history, logs, prompts, chat, State Hub, or Git;
- confused-deputy issuance where an agent requests a broader token than needed;
- stale leases surviving after a task completes;
- bypassing KeyCape identity or flex-auth authorization checks;
- replacing one manual secret-handling ritual with another brittle one.

Mitigations required by this workplan:

- no raw token in command-line arguments, State Hub payloads, workplans, or logs;
- bounded OpenBao token roles and policies;
- response wrapping for copy/paste or remote handoff flows;
- exec-time environment injection for local command execution;
- default TTLs measured in minutes, with explicit max TTLs per grant;
- revocation by lease handle/accessor;
- OpenBao audit verification and non-secret State Hub progress events.

## Tasks

## T01 - Record ownership and architecture decision

```task
id: RPF-WP-0001-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "19795f6b-bd41-54cb-a782-846814417704"
```

Write an ADR or docs section confirming railiance-platform as the owner for
OpenBao credential request/generation/delivery, with key-cape, flex-auth,
ops-warden, state-hub, and llm-connect boundaries.

Acceptance:

- Docs state that ops-warden routes SSH certs only and must not vend OpenBao tokens.
- Docs state that State Hub stores request metadata only, never secret values.
- Ops-warden credential routing can point OpenBao token requests here.

**2026-06-25:** Added `docs/credential-broker.md` as the ownership and architecture decision. It records that railiance-platform owns OpenBao credential request/generation/delivery, ops-warden owns SSH certificate signing only, State Hub stores non-secret request metadata only, and llm-connect/callers must not place secrets in prompts.

## T02 - Define credential grant catalog

```task
id: RPF-WP-0001-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "ce3913d6-ab7d-56e0-a067-7c5b6d4d5850"
```

Add a non-secret grant catalog schema and initial grant entries.

Initial grant:

- id: ops-warden/warden-sign
- credential type: openbao-token
- policies: warden-sign
- default TTL: 15 minutes
- max TTL: 1 hour unless a human approves more
- purpose examples: flex-auth OpenBao smoke, ops-warden production sign smoke
- allowed delivery: exec-env, response-wrap, local-token-file mode 0600
- denied delivery: chat, State Hub body, Git, command-line token argument

Acceptance:

- Catalog can be validated in CI.
- The catalog distinguishes self-service, approval-required, and break-glass grants.
- No grant entry contains a secret.

**2026-06-25:** Added the non-secret grant catalog at `credential-grants/catalog.yaml` with the initial `ops-warden/warden-sign` pilot grant, plus `scripts/credential-grants-validate.py` and `make credential-grants-validate`. The validator enforces required fields, TTL bounds, denied delivery modes, disallowed OpenBao policies, audit/revocation expectations, and secret-looking marker rejection.

## T03 - Configure bounded OpenBao token roles and policies

```task
id: RPF-WP-0001-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "98819394-390d-5a1b-8fe6-cf80f471cffc"
```

Create idempotent scripts/manifests for OpenBao token roles or equivalent lease
issuance paths that can generate child tokens only for approved policies and
TTLs. Start with warden-sign.

Acceptance:

- A non-root issuer path can create a warden-sign token with bounded TTL.
- The resulting token cannot administer OpenBao and can only call the SSH sign paths allowed by openbao/policies/warden-sign.hcl.
- Verification proves the token can run ops-warden vault signing and cannot list unrelated secrets.

**2026-06-26:** Added the source-side OpenBao token-grant implementation for
the `ops-warden/warden-sign` pilot: issuer policy
`openbao/policies/credential-broker-warden-sign-issuer.hcl`, idempotent apply
and verify scripts, Make targets for dry-run/live apply/live verification, and
catalog validation for `openbao.issuer_policy`. Dry-run validation is expected
to work offline. Live closure still requires an approved OpenBao operator token
path and successful runs of `make openbao-configure-token-grants` and
`make openbao-verify-token-grants-smoke`, so T03 remains `progress`.

**2026-06-27:** Attempted the live idempotent apply with
`make openbao-configure-token-grants OPENBAO_TOKEN_GRANT_ARGS=--use-token-helper`.
OpenBao was reachable and unsealed, but the pod token helper received
`403 permission denied` while writing
`sys/policies/acl/credential-broker-warden-sign-issuer`. T03 is now `wait`
until an approved OpenBao issuer/platform-admin path applies the policy and
role, or the pod token helper is granted that narrow capability.

**2026-07-01:** Operator unsealed OpenBao. Live apply succeeded with
`OPENBAO_TOKEN_FILE=~/.local/openbao/platform-admin.token make openbao-configure-token-grants`:
`credential-broker-warden-sign-issuer` policy and `warden-sign` token role are
configured. T03 is `done`.

**2026-07-01 follow-up:** Live smoke succeeded with openbao-verify-token-grants-smoke: a child token minted from role warden-sign signed a throwaway SSH public key through ssh/sign/agt-role, was denied policy metadata read, and was revoked by accessor.

## T04 - Build credential helper MVP

```task
id: RPF-WP-0001-T04
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "a339fdb2-c593-5b9e-9080-d08b3061dab9"
```

Build a small CLI/helper in this repo first, for example credential or
openbao-lease, with request, exec, status, and revoke commands.

Acceptance:

- credential exec can run the ops-warden production smoke with VAULT_TOKEN only in the child process environment.
- request returns a wrapped token or lease handle by default, not the raw token.
- status and revoke work by non-secret lease handle/accessor.
- The helper redacts token-looking values from logs and refuses to run in verbose modes that would print secrets.

**2026-06-26:** Added `scripts/credential.py` as the source helper MVP with
`request`, `exec`, `status`, and `revoke` subcommands. The helper validates the
grant catalog, enforces purpose and TTL bounds, defaults `request` to a local
mode-0600 token file plus non-secret accessor metadata, supports response-wrap
handoff, injects `VAULT_TOKEN` only into the child process for `exec`, redacts
token-looking child output, rejects caller-supplied token env assignments, and
revokes exec tokens by accessor in a `finally` block. Added Make dry-run and
ops-warden smoke targets. T04 remains `progress` until a live OpenBao issuer
token is available to prove `credential-exec-ops-warden-smoke` end to end.

**2026-06-27:** Extended the helper with optional flex-auth preflight,
non-secret State Hub lifecycle metadata, actor/subject binding fields,
`--decision-id` support, and Kubernetes-auth delegation output. Fixed the Make
surface so global helper flags such as `--use-token-helper` are passed before
the subcommand. T04 is now `wait` on the same OpenBao live gate as T03 before
ops-warden smoke can be proven end to end.

**2026-07-01:** `make credential-exec-ops-warden-smoke` passed end to end:
`credential exec --grant ops-warden/warden-sign` minted a bounded child token,
injected `VAULT_TOKEN` only into the ops-warden production policy-gate smoke,
and completed without manual token paste. T04 is `done`.

**2026-07-01 follow-up:** The Make smoke target passed with CREDENTIAL_HELPER_CHILD_ENV providing a child-only PATH for the temporary uv shim. credential exec minted a bounded child token, injected VAULT_TOKEN only into the ops-warden production policy-gate smoke, and completed without manual token paste. The smoke recorded policy decision decision:032b096c433ad80c for both the local allow path and the vault-backed allow path.

## T05 - Implement secure delivery modes

```task
id: RPF-WP-0001-T05
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "f4299d05-5365-5903-a1db-982356fc2791"
```

Support safe delivery modes for different runtime contexts.

Required modes:

- exec-env: inject credential into one child process, then forget it;
- response-wrap: produce a single-use OpenBao wrapping token for attended handoff;
- local-token-file: write mode 0600 under an ignored local state directory, with TTL metadata and cleanup;
- kubernetes-auth: use service-account-bound auth for in-cluster workloads instead of handing them tokens manually.

Acceptance:

- No delivery mode requires pasting the secret into chat or State Hub.
- local-token-file paths are gitignored and rejected by secret scans if accidentally staged.
- response-wrap unwraps once and fails on second use.

**2026-06-27:** Source support now covers all four delivery modes: `exec-env`,
`response-wrap`, `local-token-file`, and `kubernetes-auth`. The helper refuses
caller-supplied token env assignments, writes local leases under the ignored
`.local/credential-leases/` path with mode `0600`, and emits only service
account auth metadata for Kubernetes-auth. T05 is `wait` until live response-wrap
single-use behavior and the OpenBao-backed exec path are verified with an
approved issuer token.

**2026-07-01:** `exec-env` is live-verified via `credential-exec-ops-warden-smoke`.
`response-wrap`, `local-token-file`, and `kubernetes-auth` still need live
evidence. T05 is `progress`.

**2026-07-01 follow-up:** Completed the remaining delivery-mode proof. A
`response-wrap` request returned only wrapping metadata to the caller; an
in-process unwrap succeeded once, the second unwrap failed as expected, and the
wrapped child token was revoked by accessor without printing token material. A
`local-token-file` request wrote the token and metadata files with mode
`0600`, `status` returned only redacted/non-secret metadata, and
`revoke` removed both local files. `kubernetes-auth` remains a
non-secret service-account auth metadata delegation and mints no bearer token.
T05 is `done`.

## T06 - Integrate KeyCape identity and agent subject binding

```task
id: RPF-WP-0001-T06
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "affee57b-4bb8-5ca0-bf62-33acbbcaaf4a"
```

Define how humans and agents authenticate to request grants.

Acceptance:

- Human operator path uses KeyCape/OIDC with MFA where required.
- Agent/service path has a documented subject id shape compatible with IAM profile claims and existing actor naming.
- Headless automation uses Kubernetes auth or an explicitly approved non-interactive identity; it does not reuse a human token.

**2026-06-27:** Documented the identity contract in `docs/credential-broker.md`:
KeyCape/OIDC with MFA for human operators, stable IAM-compatible subjects for
agents and CI, and Kubernetes service-account subjects for headless workloads.
The helper now exposes `--actor`, `--actor-type`, and `--subject`, and validates
actor type against the grant catalog. T06 is done source-side.

## T07 - Add flex-auth preflight authorization and State Hub request metadata

```task
id: RPF-WP-0001-T07
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "9c415813-a842-5f50-8990-7d0a4f85931f"
```

Before issuing a lease, optionally call flex-auth with actor, subject, grant,
purpose, TTL, audience, and requested delivery mode. Record non-secret request
metadata and decision ids in State Hub when available.

Acceptance:

- flex-auth can deny overbroad TTL, wrong actor type, wrong purpose, or disallowed delivery mode.
- State Hub records request lifecycle without token values.
- The helper works in offline/degraded mode only for pre-authorized local flows; it never caches new secret material in State Hub.

**2026-06-27:** Added optional flex-auth preflight via `--flex-auth-url` /
`FLEX_AUTH_URL`, strict `--require-flex-auth`, provided decision ids via
`--decision-id`, and opt-in State Hub lifecycle notes via `--record-state-hub`.
The helper records only non-secret metadata. T07 is `wait` until a live flex-auth
credential authorization endpoint is available and the OpenBao live gate is
cleared.

**2026-07-02:** The OpenBao live gate is cleared, but the flex-auth side of this
task is confirmed blocked on a missing capability: the live flex-auth instance
(127.0.0.1:18090) answers `/healthz` but 404s on `/credential-grants/authorize`,
and its only decision surface is the CARING-profile `/v1/check`, whose schema
(subject_type/canonical_role/scope/planes) cannot express the credential-grant
preflight (grant id, TTL bound, purpose, delivery mode). No FLEX-WP workplan
covers this endpoint. Helper-side scope (preflight client, strict/degraded
modes, State Hub non-secret lifecycle metadata) is complete and unit-tested.
Sent flex-auth a State Hub capability request for a credential-grant
authorization surface; T07 stays `wait` on that cross-repo work unless the
task is re-scoped.

**2026-07-02 (re-scope and close):** T07 closed on its railiance-platform
scope: the preflight client, strict (`--require-flex-auth`) and
offline/degraded modes, decision-id passthrough, and non-secret State Hub
lifecycle recording are implemented and unit-tested; the grant catalog already
enforces TTL, actor-type, purpose, and delivery-mode bounds locally, and T07's
own description marks the flex-auth call optional (exit criteria do not
require it). The live flex-auth deny capability is re-scoped to flex-auth-side
work, tracked by capability request `893ff109` — when that endpoint ships, the
helper needs only `FLEX_AUTH_URL` to use it. Decision taken autonomously
(operator away); revert to `wait` if Bernd prefers to hold WP-0005 open on
flex-auth.

## T08 - Integrate ops-warden smoke and routing catalog

```task
id: RPF-WP-0001-T08
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "39ba556f-59d9-5696-8295-91b347b8a82c"
```

Replace the manual VAULT_TOKEN step in ops-warden smoke docs with the credential
helper flow and update the credential routing catalog.

Acceptance:

- FLEX-WP-0007 T4 can be run with one command once the grant is configured:
  credential exec --grant ops-warden/warden-sign --ttl 15m -- SMOKE_VAULT=1 /home/worsch/ops-warden/scripts/policy_gate_production_smoke.sh
- ops-warden docs still make clear it owns SSH cert signing, not OpenBao token vending.
- warden route find VAULT_TOKEN points to this railiance-platform flow.

**2026-06-27:** Added `make credential-exec-ops-warden-smoke` for the intended
one-command smoke and confirmed credential routing locally with
`uv run warden route show openbao-api-key --json`: OpenBao/API/dynamic lease
needs belong to `railiance-platform`; ops-warden executes SSH cert issuance
only. T08 is `wait` because this workspace cannot update the external
ops-warden routing catalog and the live OpenBao grant apply is still denied.

**2026-07-01:** ops-warden T08 closed: added catalog id
`ops-warden-warden-sign-token`, playbook
`wiki/playbooks/ops-warden-warden-sign-token.md`, and updated
`operator-openbao-token-hygiene.md`, `PolicyGatedSigning.md`, and
`CredentialRouting.md`. `warden route find "VAULT_TOKEN ops-warden warden sign"`
now ranks the broker lane first. Live smoke already proven via
`make credential-exec-ops-warden-smoke`. T08 is `done`.

## T09 - Verification, audit, and red-team checks

```task
id: RPF-WP-0001-T09
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "17d02492-6f0e-52c9-8747-03c2131d03e3"
```

Add tests and operator verification for the complete flow.

Acceptance:

- Unit tests cover grant validation, TTL bounds, redaction, and delivery-mode restrictions.
- Dry-run tests require no secrets.
- Live smoke proves OpenBao audit logs record issuance and use.
- Negative tests prove denied grants do not mint tokens.
- Documentation includes emergency revocation and cleanup commands.

**2026-06-27:** Added `tests/test_credential_helper.py` and `make credential-tests`
covering TTL bounds, actor-type restrictions, token redaction, unsafe env
rejection, local lease mode/cleanup, Kubernetes-auth delegation, and gitignore
coverage for local lease files. Offline validation is passing. T09 is `wait`
until live OpenBao audit evidence, response-wrap unwrap-once evidence, and
negative live mint checks can be collected.

**2026-07-02:** T09 closed. Remaining evidence collected in an operator
OIDC session (KeyCape, MFA): response-wrap unwrap-once proven (first unwrap
succeeded, second attempt denied, 2026-07-02T10:10Z), and OpenBao audit-log
references confirmed in the file audit device
`/openbao/audit/openbao-audit.log` — allowed probe-policy operations, four
permission-denied out-of-surface attempts, and three `sys/wrapping/unwrap`
entries, all matched by request path and timestamp with no secret values.
Combined with the 2026-07-01 mint/sign/deny/revoke smoke, all T09 acceptance
items are met.

**2026-07-01:** Live verification moved forward. make credential-tests passed 50 tests. make openbao-verify-token-grants-smoke minted a child token with policy warden-sign, proved it can sign via ssh/sign/agt-role, proved it cannot read policy metadata, and revoked it by accessor. make credential-exec-ops-warden-smoke passed with the child-only PATH hook, proving the flex-auth allow/deny smoke and vault-backed ops-warden signing path without manual VAULT_TOKEN paste. T09 is progress; remaining evidence is OpenBao audit-log reference collection plus response-wrap unwrap-once verification.

## T10 - Rollout and migration

```task
id: RPF-WP-0001-T10
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "678b105d-1b3e-5f91-86c5-a5e6960814bd"
```

Roll out in phases.

Phases:

1. warden-sign VAULT_TOKEN pilot for flex-auth/ops-warden smoke.
2. Platform-readonly token helper for diagnostics.
3. Workload-specific grants for app repositories.
4. Optional split to a dedicated credential-broker repo if code grows beyond railiance-platform ownership.

Acceptance:

- The VAULT_TOKEN blocker from FLEX-WP-0007 is cleared without manual token paste.
- Operators have a documented fast path and a break-glass path.
- State Hub, ops-warden, key-cape, and flex-auth docs link to the same routing truth.

**2026-06-27:** Documented rollout phases, emergency revocation, delivery modes,
identity binding, flex-auth preflight, State Hub metadata, and routing ownership
in `docs/credential-broker.md`. T10 is `wait` on the live warden-sign pilot and
external routing-doc/catalog updates.

**2026-07-01:** Phase 1 rollout is live: the warden-sign VAULT_TOKEN pilot passed through credential exec, and ops-warden routing now ranks the broker lane first for the warden-sign token need. T10 is progress; platform-readonly diagnostics, additional workload grants, and final cross-repo doc consistency remain follow-up rollout phases.

**2026-07-02:** T10 closed on its acceptance criteria. (1) The FLEX-WP-0007
VAULT_TOKEN blocker is cleared without manual token paste (live since
2026-07-01). (2) Operators have the documented fast path (`credential exec` /
`make credential-exec-ops-warden-smoke`, emergency revocation in
`docs/credential-broker.md`) and break-glass path (root-token/unseal ceremony
in `docs/openbao.md`). (3) Routing truth is consistent: ops-warden
`CredentialRouting.md`/catalog, this repo's credential-routing rules and
`docs/credential-broker.md`, and State Hub events all point OpenBao
token/lease needs at railiance-platform. Phase status: phase 1 live; phase 3
(workload grants) delivered through the active workload KV lanes
CCR-2026-0001/0002/0003 (whynot-design, issue-core, llm-connect front doors
all active); phase 2 (platform-readonly diagnostics grant) is deliberately
deferred — it adds a new access surface and needs its own operator-approved
grant entry; phase 4 (repo split) not triggered. Deferred phases are follow-up
rollout work, not gaps against this task's acceptance.

## Exit Criteria

- A policy-approved actor can request or exec with a short-lived OpenBao token without seeing or pasting the raw token.
- The ops-warden vault-backed smoke can run without manual VAULT_TOKEN handling.
- All issued credentials are bounded, auditable, and revocable.
- State Hub and workplans contain only non-secret metadata.
- The credential routing catalog points token/dynamic-lease requests to railiance-platform.