railiance-platform/workplans/RPF-WP-0029-backup-credential-default-removal.md

---
id: RPF-WP-0029
type: workplan
title: "Remove backup credential default and verify governed replacement"
domain: financials
repo: railiance-platform
status: finished
flavor: implementation
owner: codex
created: "2026-09-05"
updated: "2026-09-15"
state_hub_workstream_id: "bb326ebb-a313-549e-b35f-1bf17e1c58fd"
---

# Remove backup credential default and verify governed replacement

Source: State Hub message `ee702ac9-9118-4b9b-963a-01943052b65a`. Reviewed against current repository state
on 2026-09-05. Repository implementation is complete; live closure remains pending.

## Remove source fallback and verify fail-closed behavior

```task
id: RPF-WP-0029-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "4b5aefdb-a746-54f9-ba29-ebb840e7848d"
```

Removed the literal upload credential default from tools/cmd/forgejo-backup. Missing governed input now fails before cluster operations with a value-free diagnostic; encryption dry-runs skip upload authentication. Offline tests prove missing-input denial, explicit input, and mocked OpenBao resolution.

2026-09-05 continuation: removed credentials and credential-bearing URLs from
curl argv; curl config travels through stdin with curlrc disabled. Both upload
backends suppress credential-bearing diagnostics, require HTTPS and reject
redirects/non-success status. Added transport containment and failure tests.

## Invalidate predecessor and prove replacement recovery

```task
id: RPF-WP-0029-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "b3f3402f-890b-5781-9b3e-1c9c0d28cea8"
```

Provider-side invalidation and replacement custody need the attended provider owner and CCR-2026-0004 lifecycle procedure. Record only non-secret invalidation, encrypted upload and restore receipts. No provider authority or replacement receipt was available; source removal alone does not close the reported exposure. Never record the predecessor value, fingerprint, length, or shape.

Prepared owner execution procedure: `docs/backup-credential-recovery.md`.
The dedicated Backup account cutover is complete under T03. Awaiting owner
authority for invalidating the old Bernd-owned share. Full offsite application
recovery passed on September 6 (evidence below). Activity-core is
also a consumer of this upload lane. Preserve AGE_PRIVATE_KEY and historical
exposure evidence; upload-token rotation cannot clear recovery-key taint.
T03 proves encrypted fixture transport and decryption; September 6 evidence
also proves full application recovery. Operator attested predecessor unshare
on 2026-09-15.

## Portfolio review — 2026-09-05

INTENT binding: dependable backup custody and recovery. Retain T02 until the
provider owner invalidates the predecessor and supplies replacement upload and
restore receipts through CCR-2026-0004. Source removal is already complete.
S1 backup scheduling belongs to RAIL-HO-WP-0012; forge backup orchestration and
artifact retention belong to railiance-forge. RPF-WP-0036-T06 will obtain an
accepted compatibility handoff, but this exposure obligation stays visible
here until its evidence is accepted. No rotation was executed in this review.

## Move future backups to the dedicated Backup account

```task
id: RPF-WP-0029-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "f85b1b4e-9a20-56e2-9e7d-d1d6f1c77bd9"
```

User explicitly selected Nextcloud user `Backup` with 10 GB quota and operator
credentials at UI `secrets/operators/nextcloud/backup`. Live resolution is KVv2
`operators/nextcloud/backup`, fields BACKUP_USERNAME/BACKUP_PASSWORD. Native
WebDAV login verified; actual quota is 10737418240 bytes (10 GiB). Keep the
account password in operator custody, create a Backup-owned create-only share
for workload delivery, and preserve the existing age escrow and retained data.
Prove encrypted upload/download/decryption and workload delivery. No automatic
pruning or personal-account revocation is inferred from this account change.
The historical predecessor invalidation obligation in T02 remains separate.

Completed 2026-09-05: Backup-owned share permissions 4; upload HTTP 201,
owner download/decryption passed, runtime GET/DELETE denied with HTTP 405.
Workload KV CAS 2→3 preserved age escrow. ExternalSecret delivery and all three
activity-core deployments verified ready with new credentials loaded. All test
fixtures removed. Account quota is enforced by Nextcloud; no automatic pruning.
Evidence: `docs/evidence/RPF-WP-0029-backup-account-2026-09-05.json`.

## Real recovery attempt — 2026-09-05

The September 4 encrypted backup passed new-account upload/download/decryption
but failed ZIP integrity, so no application restore was claimed. Fixed the
capture path to require exact producer success, transferred-byte identity and
ZIP CRC validation before encryption. A fresh 5,351,717,533-byte production
archive passed all three gates; it is encrypted in private local staging.
200 tests passed. The isolated restore implementation now requires a hash-bound
receipt for fetched bytes and uses disposable local credentials/network.

A later attended OpenBao login failed before command handoff, with revocation
not confirmed; the read-only predecessor probe did not execute. Do not reuse
that attempt or infer provider invalidation. T02 waits for a fresh attended
login to upload/fetch the validated archive and execute isolated recovery,
plus the old Bernd-owned share's invalidation receipt or protected owner path.
The failed candidate's newly created offsite copy also needs exact owner cleanup.
History: `history/2026-09-05-wp0029-real-offsite-recovery.md`.


Worker follow-through: its mounted source was still old. Deployed the immutable
`backup-verified-0220ca56520c` ConfigMap via the scoped platform helper, rolled
actcore-worker and verified all four source hashes. Future worker entry-point
invocations use the integrity checks without editing the host checkout.
Fresh encrypted archive: 5,353,024,293 bytes; 142 repository HEAD entries.
Local drill plaintext and producer temporary files were removed. Owner login
and the two remaining acceptance results above are still required.


## Primary/secondary boundary correction — 2026-09-06

User reaffirmed Scaleway as the primary backup provider. Nextcloud remains the
independent secondary lane. An actual isolated apps-pg recovery from Scaleway
passed in 42.64 seconds, including expected databases and consumer connection
limits; production stayed Ready and scratch resources were deleted. This is
primary database recovery evidence, not Forgejo or Nextcloud recovery proof.

The live primary covers apps-pg/platform-pg/platform-pg-2; forgejo-db has no
Barman destination and the Forgejo full-archive uploader still targets Nextcloud.
Do not conflate this coverage gap with the old-share incident or silently move
archives into a database-owned prefix. WP-0029's secondary acceptance gates
remain explicit. Source/platform assurance records now name the correct primary.


## Follow-up — 2026-09-06

Repaired the missing WSL browser-launcher path while retaining Warden
containment. Fresh attended login reached the owner command, the full verified
5.35 GB archive uploaded to Backup (201), downloaded (200), matched ciphertext
and decrypted archive hashes, and Warden exited 0 after session cleanup.
Evidence: `docs/evidence/RPF-WP-0029-secondary-transfer-2026-09-06.json`.
Application recovery and predecessor invalidation remain separate gates.

The earlier primary gap observation is superseded for forgejo-db: native
Scaleway base backup/WAL and isolated database recovery now pass under
RPF-WP-0038-T02/T03. Forgejo's primary full-archive delivery remains T04.
The Backup account's 10 GiB quota holds only about two current full archives;
growth and other consumers require a bounded retention policy, not automatic
deletion of retained backups.

Replacement recovery PASSED: isolated Forgejo healthy, 142 repositories, six
users, two public Git clones plus fsck, and all 2,040 package blob digests
verified. Disposable resources removed. Evidence:
`docs/evidence/RPF-WP-0029-secondary-restore-2026-09-06.json`.
T02 closed 2026-09-15 on operator-attested unshare of the Bernd-owned
predecessor file-drop. No predecessor value, fingerprint, length or shape was
recorded. The 401/403 probe was not run; the predecessor must not be
reconstructed. Replacement recovery remains the 2026-09-06 receipt. Age-key
exposure taint is unchanged. Evidence:
`docs/evidence/2026-09-15-rpf-wp-0029-predecessor-share-invalidated.json`.

Rejected drill-copy cleanup completed with conditional DELETE 204; attended
session exited 0. Temporary plaintext removed; good encrypted backups retained.

## Closeout — 2026-09-15

T01–T03 are done. Live closure of the upload-share predecessor is operator-
attested unshare; replacement recovery was already proven 2026-09-06. The
historical AGE_PRIVATE_KEY exposure remains a separate taint and is not
cleared by this share revocation.