d05c3000c5
Assistant: codex Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra Assistant-Session: 01a06ecb-456a-71c2-b41e-0755d336e883
130 lines
6.7 KiB
Markdown
130 lines
6.7 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: RPF-WP-0029
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type: workplan
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title: "Remove backup credential default and verify governed replacement"
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domain: financials
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repo: railiance-platform
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status: blocked
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owner: codex
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created: "2026-09-05"
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updated: "2026-09-05"
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state_hub_workstream_id: "bb326ebb-a313-549e-b35f-1bf17e1c58fd"
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---
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# Remove backup credential default and verify governed replacement
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Source: State Hub message `ee702ac9-9118-4b9b-963a-01943052b65a`. Reviewed against current repository state
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on 2026-09-05. Repository implementation is complete; live closure remains pending.
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## Remove source fallback and verify fail-closed behavior
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```task
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id: RPF-WP-0029-T01
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "4b5aefdb-a746-54f9-ba29-ebb840e7848d"
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```
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Removed the literal upload credential default from tools/cmd/forgejo-backup. Missing governed input now fails before cluster operations with a value-free diagnostic; encryption dry-runs skip upload authentication. Offline tests prove missing-input denial, explicit input, and mocked OpenBao resolution.
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2026-09-05 continuation: removed credentials and credential-bearing URLs from
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curl argv; curl config travels through stdin with curlrc disabled. Both upload
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backends suppress credential-bearing diagnostics, require HTTPS and reject
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redirects/non-success status. Added transport containment and failure tests.
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## Invalidate predecessor and prove replacement recovery
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```task
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id: RPF-WP-0029-T02
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status: wait
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "b3f3402f-890b-5781-9b3e-1c9c0d28cea8"
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```
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Provider-side invalidation and replacement custody need the attended provider owner and CCR-2026-0004 lifecycle procedure. Record only non-secret invalidation, encrypted upload and restore receipts. No provider authority or replacement receipt was available; source removal alone does not close the reported exposure. Never record the predecessor value, fingerprint, length, or shape.
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Prepared owner execution procedure: `docs/backup-credential-recovery.md`.
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The dedicated Backup account cutover is complete under T03. Awaiting owner
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authority for invalidating the old Bernd-owned share and a real offsite restore. Activity-core is
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also a consumer of this upload lane. Preserve AGE_PRIVATE_KEY and historical
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exposure evidence; upload-token rotation cannot clear recovery-key taint.
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T03 proves encrypted fixture transport and decryption; full application restore
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and historical predecessor invalidation remain open.
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## Portfolio review — 2026-09-05
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INTENT binding: dependable backup custody and recovery. Retain T02 until the
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provider owner invalidates the predecessor and supplies replacement upload and
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restore receipts through CCR-2026-0004. Source removal is already complete.
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S1 backup scheduling belongs to RAIL-HO-WP-0012; forge backup orchestration and
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artifact retention belong to railiance-forge. RPF-WP-0036-T06 will obtain an
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accepted compatibility handoff, but this exposure obligation stays visible
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here until its evidence is accepted. No rotation was executed in this review.
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## Move future backups to the dedicated Backup account
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```task
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id: RPF-WP-0029-T03
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "f85b1b4e-9a20-56e2-9e7d-d1d6f1c77bd9"
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```
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User explicitly selected Nextcloud user `Backup` with 10 GB quota and operator
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credentials at UI `secrets/operators/nextcloud/backup`. Live resolution is KVv2
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`operators/nextcloud/backup`, fields BACKUP_USERNAME/BACKUP_PASSWORD. Native
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WebDAV login verified; actual quota is 10737418240 bytes (10 GiB). Keep the
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account password in operator custody, create a Backup-owned create-only share
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for workload delivery, and preserve the existing age escrow and retained data.
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Prove encrypted upload/download/decryption and workload delivery. No automatic
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pruning or personal-account revocation is inferred from this account change.
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The historical predecessor invalidation obligation in T02 remains separate.
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Completed 2026-09-05: Backup-owned share permissions 4; upload HTTP 201,
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owner download/decryption passed, runtime GET/DELETE denied with HTTP 405.
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Workload KV CAS 2→3 preserved age escrow. ExternalSecret delivery and all three
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activity-core deployments verified ready with new credentials loaded. All test
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fixtures removed. Account quota is enforced by Nextcloud; no automatic pruning.
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Evidence: `docs/evidence/RPF-WP-0029-backup-account-2026-09-05.json`.
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## Real recovery attempt — 2026-09-05
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The September 4 encrypted backup passed new-account upload/download/decryption
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but failed ZIP integrity, so no application restore was claimed. Fixed the
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capture path to require exact producer success, transferred-byte identity and
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ZIP CRC validation before encryption. A fresh 5,351,717,533-byte production
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archive passed all three gates; it is encrypted in private local staging.
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200 tests passed. The isolated restore implementation now requires a hash-bound
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receipt for fetched bytes and uses disposable local credentials/network.
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A later attended OpenBao login failed before command handoff, with revocation
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not confirmed; the read-only predecessor probe did not execute. Do not reuse
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that attempt or infer provider invalidation. T02 waits for a fresh attended
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login to upload/fetch the validated archive and execute isolated recovery,
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plus the old Bernd-owned share's invalidation receipt or protected owner path.
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The failed candidate's newly created offsite copy also needs exact owner cleanup.
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History: `history/2026-09-05-wp0029-real-offsite-recovery.md`.
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Worker follow-through: its mounted source was still old. Deployed the immutable
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`backup-verified-0220ca56520c` ConfigMap via the scoped platform helper, rolled
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actcore-worker and verified all four source hashes. Future worker entry-point
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invocations use the integrity checks without editing the host checkout.
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Fresh encrypted archive: 5,353,024,293 bytes; 142 repository HEAD entries.
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Local drill plaintext and producer temporary files were removed. Owner login
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and the two remaining acceptance results above are still required.
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## Primary/secondary boundary correction — 2026-09-06
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User reaffirmed Scaleway as the primary backup provider. Nextcloud remains the
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independent secondary lane. An actual isolated apps-pg recovery from Scaleway
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passed in 42.64 seconds, including expected databases and consumer connection
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limits; production stayed Ready and scratch resources were deleted. This is
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primary database recovery evidence, not Forgejo or Nextcloud recovery proof.
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The live primary covers apps-pg/platform-pg/platform-pg-2; forgejo-db has no
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Barman destination and the Forgejo full-archive uploader still targets Nextcloud.
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Do not conflate this coverage gap with the old-share incident or silently move
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archives into a database-owned prefix. WP-0029's secondary acceptance gates
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remain explicit. Source/platform assurance records now name the correct primary.
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