railiance-platform/INTENT.md
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Declare the security layer, and repair the placement admission check
Layer declaration (gate-house). INTENT.md now carries the declaration in its own
voice with layer.yaml as the machine-readable form, adapted from ops-warden's
reference. railiance-platform is Staff: operating OpenBao is not a claim to the
Tooling layer, because §4 is explicit that no operator-of-third-party-Tooling
shape exists and that someone running it stays a declared gap. Six direct
Tooling contacts are mapped by capability rather than by file — one §5.2
conduit, one §5.1 diagnostic, four §5.3 gaps with intended owners and review
dates — and the uncatalogued contacts are listed so the check is total. We are
PEP-shaped and the unreachable-engine stance map is NOT published; that is
recorded as an open obligation to build against v0.8, not left silent.

Placement admission. canned-prompts was added as a PostgresConsumer on
platform-pg-2 in rapp-postgres 1b68b4c without a placement owner here, which is
exactly the cross-repo drift the assurance check exists to catch; the check had
been failing on it. Registered with its real boundary evidence, corrected the
stale test expectation that pinned the overflow cell at one consumer, and
updated the SCOPE occupancy line to 2/4.

Also records owner input received today: key-cape's issuer view on CCR-2026-0020's
presenting actor, and their confirmation that codex-railiance-platform correctly
stays tenant:coulomb, so the flagged T02 discrepancy is closed as not-a-defect.

The whynot-design npm field is NOT changed. Two dated live receipts here name
NPM_AUTH_TOKEN as the field, including an attended founder fetch; that is
recorded against the counterparty claim rather than either side being flipped
before the session settles it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WLUjpv3ssxNRAEPPgLFnEB

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1275505@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 97265baa-f08f-4032-b290-a1e2965a69c5
2026-09-09 23:27:14 +02:00

6.4 KiB

layer role security_layer_declaration standard_version declared_at
Staff null layer.yaml 0.7 2026-09-09

INTENT

This file captures why this repository exists, the direction it is moving toward, and the kind of system it is meant to become. It is intentionally aspirational and stable, not a description of current implementation.


One-liner

The shared platform-services layer — the dependable foundation of stateful services (data, cache, secrets, object storage, messaging) that everything else builds on.


Why This Exists

Applications should not each reinvent, operate, and secure their own databases, caches, secret stores, object storage, and message brokers.

When every application carries its own copy of these services, the result is:

  • duplicated operational burden,
  • inconsistent durability and backup guarantees,
  • and a sprawling, hard-to-secure surface.

This layer exists to provide those stateful services once, operably, and consistently, so that everything built above it can assume a reliable, backed-up, secure substrate instead of building one each time.


The Mission

Where we are going.

To become the canonical home for shared, stateful platform services — where data persistence, caching, secret custody, object storage, messaging, and their backup and recovery are provided as well-operated, independently evolvable services behind stable interfaces.

This means:

  • Stateful services are operated to clear durability, availability, and recovery guarantees
  • Secret material has a dependable custody and delivery mechanism
  • Consumers depend on stable service interfaces, not on internal topology
  • The layer can evolve — operators, engines, versions, topologies — without breaking what is built on it

Core Principles

1. Shared, Not Duplicated

Provide each stateful service once and well, rather than letting every application carry and operate its own.

2. Stable Interfaces over Internal Detail

Consumers bind to service contracts. The operators, engines, and topologies behind those contracts can change underneath without forcing changes above.

3. Durable by Default

Persistence, backup, and tested recovery are part of providing a service — not an afterthought added later.

4. Secure Custody

Secret material is held and delivered through a dependable authority, never scattered across the consumers that need it.

In OAS terms this layer carries Q1 Security and Compliance on the Quality dimension — approval gates, delegated apply, revocation semantics, and front-door readiness. That practice was built before the dimension was named; naming it does not change what S3 does, it makes the responsibility legible to the rest of the fleet.

5. Operable and Observable

Every service is monitored, recoverable, and diagnosable as a first-class property.

Observability itself is not this layer's to own. It is Q2 and belongs to railiance-telemetry; S3's obligation is to emit through the standard contract rather than to build its own monitoring. The recoverability half is Q3, currently unowned across the fleet.

6. Independently Evolvable

The layer can adopt new operators or engines, and migrate between them, without forcing rewrites in the things that depend on it.


What This Is (Conceptually)

This layer is:

  • a shared platform-services layer
  • a dependable substrate of stateful infrastructure
  • a custody and delivery point for secret material
  • a backup and recovery home for platform data
  • a stable interface surface for the services consumers depend on

What This Is Not

This layer is not:

  • an application or business-capability provider
  • the infrastructure or cluster runtime beneath it
  • an identity or authorization authority
  • a place for application-specific logic

It is the stateful foundation that other systems rely on.


Direction of Evolution

This layer is expected to evolve toward:

  • Consolidation of stateful services behind well-operated operators
  • Stronger durability, backup, and disaster-recovery guarantees
  • Dependable runtime secret custody and delivery
  • Clear, versioned service interfaces for consumers
  • Self-healing and observable platform services

Guiding Question

How can the stateful foundation an entire landscape relies on be made dependable, secure, and recoverable — while remaining free to evolve underneath everything built on it?


Security layer declaration

Declared in our own voice, per §2 of the NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.7. The machine-readable form is layer.yaml.

railiance-platform is Staff. What this repository produces is specifications, decisions, workplans, credential-change requests and acceptance evidence. It is not deterministic in the §1 sense: the work here is judgment about what should be provisioned, for whom, under what custody, and that is Staff work however much of it lands as YAML.

The obvious objection is that we operate OpenBao and the shared databases, and operating a store looks like producing state. §4 answers it directly and we accept the answer: there is deliberately no operator-of-third-party-Tooling shape, because a clean operator shape would turn a tracked gap into a permanent allowance. Someone must run OpenBao. That we are the someone is a declared gap whose review keeps returning, not a claim to the Tooling layer.

We are PEP-shaped (§5, §6.4). Applying a policy, seeding or rotating a workload credential, and activating a delivery lane are protected side effects caused on this side. Our unreachable-engine stance map is not yet published, and that is recorded as an open obligation in layer.yaml rather than left silent. Every protected side effect here is currently attended and founder-gated, so no unattended branch has had to decide without a reachable engine — which is why the gap has not bitten, and is not a substitute for the map.

Conformance state: declared gap. Six direct Tooling contacts, one of them a §5.2 conduit and one a §5.1 read-only diagnostic; the rest are §5.3 gaps with named intended owners and review dates. The uncatalogued contacts — the cluster, State Hub, the forge and the backup destinations — are listed too, so the check is total rather than selectively silent.

If any of this is wrong, contest it. A correction is worth more than a label.