Align Qonto gate with ThreePhoenix HA
This commit is contained in:
parent
aa5315d650
commit
4ea7798fb8
1 changed files with 13 additions and 1 deletions
|
|
@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ status: blocked
|
|||
owner: codex
|
||||
topic_slug: railiance
|
||||
created: "2026-07-26"
|
||||
updated: "2026-07-29"
|
||||
updated: "2026-08-08"
|
||||
state_hub_workstream_id: "c3f9fbfd-3db1-4387-8b65-7d53ba57138d"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -119,3 +119,15 @@ workplan is therefore `blocked` until either a second independent failure
|
|||
domain is implemented and drilled or the founder explicitly accepts
|
||||
single-node production availability risk for Qonto. The current binding
|
||||
remains accurately `verified`, not `production-approved`.
|
||||
|
||||
2026-08-08 alignment: live inspection still reports one Ready node, which also
|
||||
owns the control-plane and etcd roles. `railiance-cluster/RAIL-BS-WP-0007` now
|
||||
owns the required three-server embedded-etcd topology, source-backed
|
||||
node-to-reef failure-domain map, and machine-readable one-server-loss S2
|
||||
drill. `state-hub/CUST-WP-0038` is a downstream stateful consumer and does not
|
||||
substitute for the Qonto gate. After the S2 drill passes, T04 closes only when
|
||||
the Qonto live verification is rerun with fresh evidence while Railiance01 is
|
||||
absent, proving the service path, restricted egress, identity/secret delivery,
|
||||
dependency behavior, and restoration on the surviving cluster. The alternate
|
||||
closure remains explicit founder acceptance of the single-node production
|
||||
availability risk.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue