86 lines
3 KiB
Markdown
86 lines
3 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: REEF-RAILIANCE-WP-0003
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type: workplan
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title: "Complete rapp-qonto production gates"
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domain: financials
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repo: reef-railiance
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status: active
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owner: codex
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topic_slug: railiance
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created: "2026-07-26"
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updated: "2026-07-27"
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state_hub_workstream_id: "c3f9fbfd-3db1-4387-8b65-7d53ba57138d"
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---
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# REEF-RAILIANCE-WP-0003 - rapp-qonto production gates
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## T01 - Verify workload identity and secret delivery
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```task
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id: REEF-RAILIANCE-WP-0003-T01
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "de8a8e05-93f9-4082-bbb0-5b522179421d"
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```
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Establish the `rapp-qonto` identity and OpenBao-backed ExternalSecret lane
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without exposing credential values.
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2026-07-27: Live topology invalidated the original Kubernetes-auth design:
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Coulombcore OpenBao cannot validate railiance01 service-account tokens. The
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failed objects were removed. The revised, explicitly approved ops-mason plan
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`rapp-qonto-openbao-approle-bridge` reuses the existing exact-scope Qonto
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policy and establishes a transitional AppRole bridge with 15-minute tokens,
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30-minute maximum TTL, eight uses, and a revocable bootstrap identity held by
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ESO. Live metadata-only verification reports
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`ClusterSecretStore/openbao-rapp-qonto` `Valid`,
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`ExternalSecret/rapp-qonto` `SecretSynced`, and exactly two keys in the
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derived Secret. No credential value was exposed. Same-cluster Kubernetes auth
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remains the migration target.
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## T02 - Enforce restricted Qonto egress
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```task
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id: REEF-RAILIANCE-WP-0003-T02
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status: progress
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "2a6742f1-6fcf-4164-b885-a7a9ea39521d"
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```
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Implement and verify FQDN-aware policy or a controlled egress proxy. Do not
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substitute unrestricted HTTPS.
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2026-07-27: Implemented a pinned Canonical Squid controlled-proxy candidate
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that permits `CONNECT` only to exact host `thirdparty.qonto.com:443`, with
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private-address exclusions and namespace/pod isolation policies. Repository
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tests and Kubernetes server-side validation passed. Live probes did not:
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allowlisted proxy access returned `000`, non-allowlisted access returned
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`000`, and direct Qonto HTTPS unexpectedly succeeded despite namespace
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default-deny. The candidate was removed from the live cluster and is not
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included by the runtime Kustomization. T02 remains `progress` until
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railiance01 NetworkPolicy enforcement is repaired and the three-way probe
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proves allowlisted success, other-host denial, and direct-bypass denial.
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## T03 - Deploy and verify rapp-qonto
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```task
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id: REEF-RAILIANCE-WP-0003-T03
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status: wait
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "ddf25c7b-23b0-4e67-8881-5d29fa71e9ad"
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```
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After T01 and T02, verify cold start, audit, revocation, dependency failure,
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idempotency, and previous-revision rollback using machine-readable evidence.
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## T04 - Reassess production failure-domain risk
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```task
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id: REEF-RAILIANCE-WP-0003-T04
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status: wait
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "9d0c1f61-0ed8-4d5c-b4c2-2578424ad3b4"
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```
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Production approval requires mitigation or explicit acceptance of the
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single-node/shared-control-plane risk after all automated workload gates pass.
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