risk-nexus/findings/RISK-F-0001-flex-auth-unauthenticated-check.md

---
id: RISK-F-0001
type: finding
title: "flex-auth /v1/check authenticates no caller"
status: open
reported_by: flex-auth
reported_via: rapp-postgres
routed_by: rapp-postgres
date_reported: "2026-08-17"
system: flex-auth
environment: production
fix_owner: flex-auth
fix_tracking: FLEX-WP-0015-T02
# The three fields below are risk-nexus's, not the reporter's. Left unset
# deliberately: the reporter says what is true, this repo says how bad it is
# and who hears about it (INTENT, "What it does not own").
severity: unset
disclosure: unset
escalation: unset
---

# RISK-F-0001 — flex-auth authenticates no caller on the decision surface

## What is true

`POST /v1/check` and `POST /v1/batch_check` authenticate no caller. Any
workload with network reach to the ClusterIP Service can assert any subject and
any tenant and receive an authoritative **allow**.

`flex-auth` is the estate's authorization oracle. Every service that delegates
a decision to it is relying on an answer that anyone able to reach the pod can
obtain for any identity they care to name.

Self-reported by `flex-auth` as `A0` on their own inbound surface, in their
Tenancy Posture review. Their words: "flex-auth is the estate's authorization
oracle and it trusts its callers completely."

## How it was found

Not by a probe, an incident, or an alert. By `flex-auth` assessing themselves
against the Tenancy Posture A ladder during a review they were asked to do —
and their own note says they did not know they were carrying it.

That provenance matters for triage: nothing was watching for this, and nothing
would have found it. It has presumably been true for as long as the endpoint
has existed.

## Exposure, as far as the reporter stated it

- The Service is `ClusterIP`, so reach requires a workload inside the cluster.
- No claim was made that network policy restricts which workloads can reach it,
  and this record does not assume one. **If a default-deny NetworkPolicy fronts
  the service, that materially changes the exposure and should be verified
  rather than inferred** — `flex-auth` did not state it either way, and I have
  not checked, because doing so would be reporting on a system I do not own.

## What makes it worse than a single service's defect

A false allow from this endpoint is not confined to `flex-auth`. It is the
answer other services act on. `tenant-engine` separately reports that its own
mutations are authorized by `flex-auth` and that direct authority over its rows
would mean "privilege escalation across NetKingdom rather than data tampering
confined to one store". The same reasoning applies to a forged allow.

## Owner and state

`flex-auth` owns the fix and has tracked it as `FLEX-WP-0015-T02`, to ship
through the staged-promotion path rather than a direct apply. They classify it
as the only urgent item of their five follow-ups. Nothing is asked of them by
this record beyond what they have already committed to.

## What this repo is asked to decide

1. **Severity.** Not the reporter's to set.
2. **Disclosure.** Build mode is currently public-by-default, and this is
   precisely the class of finding where that stops being obviously right — a
   live authorization bypass in the service every other service trusts. The
   controlled-disclosure scheme this repo anticipates does not exist yet, so
   the choice today is publish or hold, with no mechanism between them.
3. **Escalation.** Whether this reaches the operator personally. The candidate
   triggers in INTENT include "anything exposing real tenant data" — this
   exposes the decision that governs access to it, which may or may not be the
   same thing, and that judgement is this repo's.

## Related, reported at the same time and not yet filed

Three further defects surfaced from the same review round. They are recorded
here so they are visible, not filed as findings, because filing them was not
asked for:

- `tenant-engine` — `events()` returns the entire event log unfiltered. A live
  cross-tenant read at `E2`.
- `audit-core` — read path applies no tenant filter; a credential with
  `may_read` can read any tenant's events. Bounded by deployment (`may_read:
  false` on the production sender) and not by code. Tracked `AUDIT-WP-0008-T04`.
- `apps-pg` (`railiance-platform`) — no backup configured at all: no
  `barmanObjectStore`, no retention policy, `BestEffort` QoS. `R0` there means
  no recovery, not merely no erasure policy.

All four were found the same way, by repos reading their own code against a
ladder, within a day of each other. That is a fact about the estate's
observability worth carrying into triage: **four live defects, none found by
monitoring.**