risk-nexus/findings/RISK-F-0006-apps-pg-no-backup-configured.md

---
id: RISK-F-0006
type: finding
title: "apps-pg has no backup configured at all: R0 means no recovery"
status: fixed
owner: risk-nexus
reported_by: railiance-platform
reported_via: flex-auth
routed_by: risk-nexus
date_reported: "2026-08-17"
date_filed: "2026-08-19"
system: railiance-platform
environment: production
fix_owner: railiance-platform
fix_tracking: RPF-WP-0019 (finished)
related: [RISK-F-0001]
# Graded by risk-nexus 2026-08-19 — docs/rulings/2026-08-19-second-grading.md
severity: high
severity_at_production: critical
impact: I4
likelihood: L2
fidelity_modifier: false
production_rescore: true
disclosure: public
publication: pending-handover
publication_id: risk-f-0006-apps-pg-no-backup
publication_path: "findings/apps-pg-no-backup/v1/index.html"
publication_subtitle: "A shared production database had no backup or recovery path; encrypted off-host backup and a demonstrated restore closed the gap."
revision: "fixed-1"
last_reviewed: "2026-08-21"
review_interval: 6m
embargo_lifted: "2026-08-20 — backup live, restore demonstrated with matching row counts"
embargo_was_since: "2026-08-19"
escalation: answered
escalation_trigger: 3
escalation_status: answered
date_fixed: "2026-08-20"
escalation_answered: "2026-08-19"
escalation_answered_by: the-custodian
escalation_act: approve
decision: "spend for apps-pg backup storage approved; no ceiling stated"
last_checked: "2026-08-21T07:32:09Z"
next_check: "2026-08-21T07:32:09Z"
cadence: instant
clean_streak: 0
graded_by: risk-nexus
ruling: RISK-RULING-2026-08-19-B
checked_by: "risk-nexus"
---

# RISK-F-0006 — the platform database cannot be recovered

## What is true, as reported

`apps-pg` (`railiance-platform`) has no backup configured at all: no
`barmanObjectStore`, no retention policy, and `BestEffort` QoS on the pod.
Reported in the same round as `RISK-F-0001`, whose author noted that `R0` here
means **no recovery**, not merely no erasure policy.

Not verified by this repo. `railiance-platform` owns it.

## Why it is graded highest of the round despite being the least exciting

The other findings in this round are about someone reaching something. This one
is about nothing coming back. There is no attacker in it and no clever step —
an ordinary node failure, a lost volume, a mistaken `DROP`, and the data that
was in `apps-pg` is gone.

`BestEffort` QoS makes the pod the first candidate for eviction under memory
pressure. Eviction alone is an availability event and recoverable. What is not
recoverable is anything that damages the volume, and that is the case with no
answer today.

## Register ruling — 2026-08-19

`high` today (`I4` × `L2`, non-adversarial reading), `critical` at production,
embargoed, and **escalated on trigger 3 (spend)**.

`I4`: `apps-pg` is shared platform infrastructure, so the loss is not confined
to one system, and it is unrecoverable rather than degraded. `L2` on the
non-adversarial reading the scale gained for this finding: irrecoverable loss
needs a volume or corruption event, which is an ordinary failure the estate
has seen the shape of but not an expected weekly occurrence.

`production_rescore: true`: at production this is `L3`, because the surface
area of ordinary operational events grows with real traffic and real operators.

**Escalation, trigger 3.** Object storage for backups is recurring spend that
is not currently committed, and no repo can authorise it for itself. The ask
is narrow: approve a backup target and its cost, or state that the estate
accepts running `apps-pg` with no recovery and for how long. The second is a
legitimate answer in build mode and needs saying out loud rather than
happening by default.

The disclosure condition deliberately includes a demonstrated restore. A
backup nobody has restored from is a claim, not a control — the same class of
error as the gate in `RISK-F-0002`.

## Reviews

- **2026-08-19** — filed and graded from `RISK-F-0001`'s unfiled list.
  Open at review: has the spend been ruled on; is a backup configured; has a
  restore been demonstrated; does `railiance-platform` track it anywhere.

## Operator decision — 2026-08-19: approved

The spend is approved. `railiance-platform` may provision backup storage for
`apps-pg` without returning for authorisation.

No ceiling was stated, so none is recorded. The register asks
`railiance-platform` to report the actual target and its monthly cost once
chosen; a figure materially above the trigger-3 band (recurring €50/month)
comes back for confirmation rather than being assumed covered. That is the
register being careful with an open approval, not a condition on it.

**What is now blocking is work, not permission.** The finding stays `open` at
`high`, and the embargo condition is unchanged: a backup exists **and** a
restore has been demonstrated once. A backup nobody has restored from is a
claim, not a control.

`fix_tracking` is still `unset` and is now `railiance-platform`'s to open.

## Reviews

- **2026-08-19** — escalation answered, spend approved. Open at review: is a
  backup configured; has a restore been demonstrated; what does it cost.
- **2026-08-20** — clean check: checked against the inbox and the owner's record; nothing moved. Cadence instant → 1h (1 clean in a row); next check 2026-08-20 11:02Z.

## Check — 2026-08-21: fixed, and the evidence was read rather than taken

`railiance-platform` finished `RPF-WP-0019` on 2026-08-20. This register read
their evidence file rather than accepting the report:
`railiance-platform/docs/evidence/RPF-WP-0019-backup-restore-2026-08-20.md`.

- Governed target live at `s3://railiance-platform-pg-backup/platform-pg/apps-pg/`,
  30-day retention, continuous WAL.
- `apps-pg-daily-20260820204148` completed in 8s, `LastBackupSucceeded=True`.
- **A separately named scratch cluster restored both consumer databases in 56s,
  with exact database sizes and all 13 `coulomb_social` user-table row counts
  matching.** The scratch namespace was deleted; production stayed `Ready`.

**The embargo condition required a demonstrated restore and got one.** That
condition existed because a backup nobody has restored from is a claim, not a
control — and the demonstration is the difference between this finding closing
and merely appearing to.

They also fixed something the grading had cited but not asked for: `apps-pg-1`
moved from `BestEffort` to `Burstable` QoS, with requests and limits, which was
part of why `L2` rather than `L1`. And their evidence records a failed first WAL
attempt against the wrong prefix rather than only the successful one, which is
the standard this register keeps asking of reporters.

`fixed`, `public`, escalation closed. The spend approved on 2026-08-19 has a
real target behind it.
- **2026-08-21** — not clean: owner replied; see the dated check section Cadence 1h → instant; checked again immediately.