tegwick 00106ffcdd Operator decisions on RISK-F-0006 and RISK-F-0007

F-0006: backup spend approved, no ceiling stated. Permission is no longer
the blocker; the embargo still needs a demonstrated restore.

F-0007: pragmatic default before production — accepted (not closed, keeps
its severity, review interval and production re-score, stays visible in
the register), with a written on-request path so a named consumer
boundary can be verified when someone asks. The acceptance expires at the
production transition, which is an event and not a date.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-08-19 23:48:09 +02:00

4.4 KiB

Raw Blame History

Register

Generated by tools/register_index.py from findings/. Do not edit by hand. Last built 2026-08-19.

5 open of 8 findings; 2 notes below the floor.

Findings

ID	Finding	System	Severity	Disclosure	Escalation	Fix owner	Status	Review by
RISK-F-0008	The legal basis for retaining audit facts against an erasure request has been assumed, never established	audit-core	medium	public	required (t2, pending-operator)	risk-nexus	open	2026-11-17
RISK-F-0007	No consumer's tenant boundary is verified anywhere	estate	high	embargoed	answered (t4, assigned)	per-consumer, on request	accepted	2026-09-18
RISK-F-0006	apps-pg has no backup configured at all: R0 means no recovery	railiance-platform	high	embargoed	answered (t3, approved)	railiance-platform	open	2026-09-18
RISK-F-0005	audit-core read path applies no tenant filter; the bound is deployment, not code	audit-core	medium	embargoed	none	audit-core	open	2026-11-17
RISK-F-0004	tenant-engine events() returns the entire event log unfiltered	tenant-engine	high	embargoed	none	tenant-engine	open	2026-09-18
RISK-F-0003	ops-warden agent read-boundary does not fire on ungraded catalog lanes	ops-warden	high	embargoed	none	ops-warden	mitigated	2026-09-18
RISK-F-0002	ops-warden signs SSH certificates with no authorization decision, and its unblock is now unsafe	ops-warden	medium	embargoed	withdrawn (t6, withdrawn-hazard-window-closed)	ops-warden	open	2026-11-17
RISK-F-0001	flex-auth /v1/check authenticates no caller	flex-auth	high	public	withdrawn (t1, withdrawn-before-sending)	flex-auth	fixed	2026-08-26

Constraints

Hazards created by acting in the wrong order. Each binds another finding's remediation.

From	Binds	Severity	Constraint
RISK-F-0002	RISK-F-0001	lifted	LIFTED 2026-08-19 — flex-auth /v1/check now authenticates callers (RISK-F-0001 fixed). Enabling policy.enabled is now an availability question for ops-warden, no longer an attestation hazard.

Embargoes

Held from publication with a stated condition. A hold with no moving condition is a stall.

Finding	Since	Lifts when	Re-decided
RISK-F-0007	2026-08-19	a verification exists for at least one consumer boundary	2026-09-18
RISK-F-0006	2026-08-19	a backup exists and a restore has been demonstrated once	2026-09-18
RISK-F-0005	2026-08-19	AUDIT-WP-0008-T04 lands a tenant filter in the read path	2026-11-17
RISK-F-0004	2026-08-19	the read path filters by tenant in code	2026-09-18
RISK-F-0003	2026-08-19	the five exec_capable lanes graded under WARDEN-WP-0032-T05	2026-09-18
RISK-F-0002	2026-08-19	FLEX-WP-0015-T02 shipped and ops-warden policy.enabled true in production	2026-11-17

Notes (below the floor)

Seen, deliberately not findings. Not graded, not reviewed, not published.

ID	Note	Why below the floor
RISK-N-0003	Every defect in this register was found by reading, none by monitoring	no owner and no defect — it is an argument about where to invest detection, and the register cannot route an argument
RISK-N-0001	Noisy-neighbour behaviour is uncharacterised	no decision changes today — no tenant shares a saturating workload, and what is missing is measurement work, not a defect to route

How to read this

Severity is docs/method/severity.md; disclosure docs/method/disclosure.md; escalation docs/method/escalation.md; review dates docs/method/review.md. A constraint may be graded higher than the finding that carries it — read both.

4.4 KiB Raw Blame History