tegwick
0ff87c22d8
history/2026-08-21-intent-gap-analysis.md follows the estate's history convention. RISK-WP-0005 carries the seven gaps, ordered so the one place the register misreports goes first: fix_tracking is a string nobody reads, so a stalled fix and a silent owner are currently the same thing. The two INTENT claims with no implementation at all — incident intake and external report — are T02. STATE.md now says both of those out loud rather than leaving them to the assessment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
111 lines
4.9 KiB
Markdown
111 lines
4.9 KiB
Markdown
# STATE — risk-nexus
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**Updated:** 2026-08-21
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**Domain:** infotech · **Repo:** risk-nexus · **Owner:** the-custodian
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## One-line posture
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**The register decides.** Nine findings graded, three notes below the floor,
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one regulatory determination and a thirteen-entry legal policy set; every open
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question carries a default and a date, and the check cadence is scheduled on
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`activity-core` rather than on anyone remembering.
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## Workplans
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| ID | Status | Notes |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `RISK-WP-0001` | **finished** | The four instruments, the index, the first grading |
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| `RISK-WP-0002` | active | Publication handover — T01 with `policy-nexus` |
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| `RISK-WP-0003` | **finished** | Regulatory intake; the legal policy set |
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| `RISK-WP-0004` | **finished** | Running the register: cadence, verification, inbox-before-grading |
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| `RISK-WP-0005` | active | Closing the seven gaps in `history/2026-08-21-intent-gap-analysis.md` |
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## The register
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| ID | Sev | Status | Disclosure | Cadence | System |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| `RISK-F-0001` | high | fixed | public | instant | flex-auth |
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| `RISK-F-0002` | medium | open | embargoed | instant | ops-warden |
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| `RISK-F-0003` | medium | mitigated | embargoed | 1h | ops-warden |
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| `RISK-F-0004` | high | open | embargoed | 1h | tenant-engine |
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| `RISK-F-0005` | medium | open | embargoed | 1h | audit-core |
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| `RISK-F-0006` | high | open | embargoed | 1h | railiance-platform |
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| `RISK-F-0007` | high | accepted | embargoed | instant | estate |
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| `RISK-F-0008` | medium | accepted | public | instant | audit-core |
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| `RISK-F-0009` | high | open | embargoed | 1h | railiance-platform |
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Notes below the floor: `RISK-N-0001` noisy neighbours · `RISK-N-0003` found by
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reading not watching · `RISK-N-0004` zone lookup.
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Not one field reads `unset`.
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## How it works
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```
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findings/*.md source of truth; reporter fields + this repo's grade
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↓ tools/register_index.py
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REGISTER.md generated, one screen, never hand-edited
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docs/method/ severity · disclosure · escalation · review
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verification · dependencies · check-procedure
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docs/rulings/ why each grade is what it is, dated
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docs/regulatory/ RISK-REG-0001 + policies/ (13, keyed by activation)
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docs/verifications/ RISK-V-000N — what this repo checked itself
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make due the work list
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make checked ARGS=... record an outcome; moves the cadence rung
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make check index + malformed + waits + inbox + escalations
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```
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**Cadence:** `instant → 1h → 8h → 24h → 48h → 96h → 7d → 14d → 1mo → 1q`.
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Clean climbs one rung; anything moving resets to `instant`. The rung is the
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stability signal. Operator ruling, 2026-08-20.
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**Scheduled on `activity-core`:** `hourly-register-inbox-watch` (fires only on
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an unread message) and `daily-register-check-sweep` (07:15, unconditional).
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Both instruct a session that exercises judgement; neither may record an
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outcome.
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## Waiting on other people — 9 open, all defaulted
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| Who | On | Defaults |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| ops-warden | does the flex-auth pin admit ingress, before enabling `policy.enabled` | 2026-08-27 |
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| railiance-platform | deny-set coverage report (`F-0009`) | 2026-09-03 |
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| tenant-engine | confirm/correct `events()`; fix tracking | 2026-09-03 |
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| user-engine | tenant-boundary verification (`RISK-V-0002`) | 2026-09-03 |
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| policy-nexus | publication entries for two findings + five method docs | 2026-09-17 |
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| the-custodian | canon kinds packet | 2026-09-17 |
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| railiance-platform | backup target, cost, demonstrated restore | 2026-09-18 |
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| audit-core | is `may_read` false on every production credential | 2026-09-19 |
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| audit-core | keyed commitment; `platform-pg` co-residency horizon | 2026-11-17 |
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## Verify
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```
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make check # everything, including the inbox
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python3 tools/register_check.py # just the register
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statehub fix-consistency --repo risk-nexus
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```
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## Known, and being worked
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`history/2026-08-21-intent-gap-analysis.md` graded this repo against its own
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`INTENT.md`. Five of six ownership claims hold; seven gaps do not, and
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`RISK-WP-0005` carries them. The two worth knowing without reading it:
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- **`fix_tracking` is a string nobody reads.** The register claims to track
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remediation and does not — an owner who goes quiet and a fix that goes quiet
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look identical.
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- **Incident and external-report intake do not exist**, though `INTENT.md`
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claims both. Every finding so far came from a repo reading its own code.
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## Known conditions
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- **Workplans are not indexed in the hub.** C-06 on all four: this instance is
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not the identifier registrar. Needs a run with `STATEHUB_REGISTRAR=1` on the
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production instance. The estate's read model cannot see any `risk-nexus`
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workplan.
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- **C-31** fires on `RISK-F-` ids until canon registers the kinds. Packet sent.
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- **OpenBao is unverifiable from here** (403). Every grade touching an OpenBao
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policy is a grade on a document, and says so.
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