tegwick
00106ffcdd
F-0006: backup spend approved, no ceiling stated. Permission is no longer the blocker; the embargo still needs a demonstrated restore. F-0007: pragmatic default before production — accepted (not closed, keeps its severity, review interval and production re-score, stays visible in the register), with a written on-request path so a named consumer boundary can be verified when someone asks. The acceptance expires at the production transition, which is an event and not a date. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
155 lines
6.4 KiB
Markdown
155 lines
6.4 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: RISK-F-0007
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type: finding
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title: "No consumer's tenant boundary is verified anywhere"
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status: accepted
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reported_by: net-kingdom
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reported_via: risk-nexus
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routed_by: risk-nexus
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date_reported: "2026-08-19"
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date_filed: "2026-08-19"
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system: estate
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environment: build
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fix_owner: per-consumer, on request
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fix_tracking: unset
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related: [RISK-F-0004, RISK-F-0005]
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# Graded by risk-nexus 2026-08-19 — docs/rulings/2026-08-19-second-grading.md
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severity: high
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severity_at_production: critical
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impact: I3
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likelihood: L3
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fidelity_modifier: false
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production_rescore: true
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disclosure: embargoed
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embargo_condition: "a verification exists for at least one consumer boundary"
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embargo_since: "2026-08-19"
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embargo_review: "2026-09-18"
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escalation: answered
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escalation_trigger: 4
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escalation_status: assigned
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escalation_answered: "2026-08-19"
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escalation_answered_by: the-custodian
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escalation_act: assign
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accepted_by: the-custodian
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accepted_on: "2026-08-19"
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accepted_until: "production transition (hard expiry, not a date)"
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decision: "pragmatic default before production — carried unverified; verification of a named consumer boundary on request"
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last_reviewed: "2026-08-19"
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review_by: "2026-09-18"
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graded_by: risk-nexus
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ruling: RISK-RULING-2026-08-19-B
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---
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# RISK-F-0007 — nothing checks that tenants stay apart
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## What is true
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No consumer's tenant boundary is verified anywhere in the estate. This is
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Broken Object Level Authorization, first on the OWASP API Security Top 10
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since that list launched.
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It is currently **open question 3 in NetKingdom's *Tenancy Posture*, which is a
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draft and not a register** — which is precisely why `INTENT.md` names it as the
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thing that had nowhere to live. Filing it here does not amend that standard,
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does not ratify it, and does not settle the question it poses. A finding may
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say a standard is wrong; it cannot change one.
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## Why it is a finding and not a research note
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The floor asks whether an owner could act and whether recording it changes a
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decision. Both are yes, and the second is now demonstrable rather than
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asserted: every time a repo has looked at its own boundary this month, it has
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found a defect. `RISK-F-0004` (`tenant-engine`, unfiltered event read) and
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`RISK-F-0005` (`audit-core`, no tenant filter on read) are two instances found
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by two repos in one round.
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An absent verification is not the same as an absent boundary. But the sample so
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far is two for two, and the register does not get to assume the unexamined
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cases are better than the examined ones.
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## What is not established
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- Whether any consumer boundary *is* in fact correct. Nobody has checked; that
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is the finding.
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- Who owns the fix. `fix_owner` is `unset` deliberately — see the escalation.
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## Register ruling — 2026-08-19
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`high` today (`I3` × `L3`), `critical` at production, embargoed, **escalated on
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trigger 4 (ownership)**.
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Today's impact is `I3` and not `I4` because there is no real tenant data behind
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the unverified boundary yet; the consequence of one occurrence is bounded by
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what the estate is currently holding. `L3`: no additional step is needed by
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anything already inside, and the two confirmed instances say the reach is real
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rather than theoretical.
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`production_rescore: true`, and this is the finding that matters most on that
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day: at production the same defect is `I4` × `L3` — `critical` — and the
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re-score is not optional.
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**Escalation, trigger 4.** This is the ownership case the trigger was written
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for, in its purest form: the defect is estate-wide, no repo owns "every
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consumer's boundary", and a routing exchange cannot settle it because there is
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nobody to route it to. Only the operator can say who verifies tenant
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boundaries — a repo, a test suite, a review obligation on each consumer — or
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that the estate deliberately carries it unverified until production.
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Until that is answered, `fix_owner` stays `unset` rather than being assigned to
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a repo that has not accepted it. An unowned finding with an honest `unset` is
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better than a routed one nobody agreed to.
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## Reviews
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- **2026-08-19** — filed and graded. Open at review: has an owner been named;
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have any further instances been found; is the Tenancy Posture question still
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open.
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## Operator decision — 2026-08-19: pragmatic default, tighter control on request
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The custodian ruled: **before production, carry it.** Verifying every
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consumer's tenant boundary is not attempted as a programme now; a named
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boundary is verified when someone asks for it.
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The finding moves to `accepted` — which in this register is not `closed`. It
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keeps its severity, its review interval and its production re-score, and it
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stays in `REGISTER.md` where an accepted risk is supposed to be visible while
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it is being carried.
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**The acceptance expires at the production transition, and that is an event,
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not a date.** `production_rescore` is `true`: at production the same defect is
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`I4` × `L3` — `critical` — and the acceptance does not survive it. Nobody has
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to remember; `make check` lists it under what is owed at that transition.
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### The on-request path
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So that "on request" is a mechanism and not a sentiment:
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- **Who may ask** — any repo that consumes or is consumed by another, the
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operator, or an outside counterparty through the operator.
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- **What they get** — verification scoped to one named consumer boundary, not
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a general audit. The request names the consumer and what would have to be
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true.
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- **Who does it** — the owning repo of that consumer. This register scopes and
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records; it does not verify, and it does not fix.
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- **What it produces** — a dated verification record here. If the boundary
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holds, that is evidence and this finding's likelihood falls for that
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consumer. If it does not, that is a finding of its own with its own owner,
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filed normally.
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Requests arrive as a message to `risk-nexus` and appear in the register within
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one review cycle.
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### What the register keeps saying while this is carried
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The two-for-two record stands: every repo that has looked at its own boundary
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this month found a defect (`RISK-F-0004`, `RISK-F-0005`). The acceptance does
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not make that less true, and this finding is the place it stays visible. If a
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third instance arrives, the pragmatic default is worth re-taking before
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production rather than at it.
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## Reviews
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- **2026-08-19** — escalation answered, accepted until production with
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verification on request. Open at review: any request received; any further
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instances found; whether production is close enough to re-take the default.
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