risk-nexus/findings/RISK-F-0002-ops-warden-sign-ungated.md

id	type	title	status	reported_by	reported_via	routed_by	date_reported	system	environment	fix_owner	fix_tracking	related	severity	severity_at_production	impact	likelihood	fidelity_modifier	production_rescore	constraint_on	constraint_severity	constraint	disclosure	embargo_condition	embargo_since	embargo_review	escalation	escalation_trigger	escalation_status	last_checked	next_check	cadence	clean_streak	graded_by	ruling
RISK-F-0002	finding	ops-warden signs SSH certificates with no authorization decision, and its unblock is now unsafe	open	ops-warden	ops-warden	ops-warden	2026-08-18	ops-warden	production	ops-warden	WARDEN-WP-0007 (gate shipped, disabled) / FLEX-WP-0007 (runtime deploy)	RISK-F-0001	medium	medium	I3	L2	false	false	RISK-F-0001	lifted	LIFTED 2026-08-19 — flex-auth /v1/check now authenticates callers (RISK-F-0001 fixed). Enabling policy.enabled is now an availability question for ops-warden, no longer an attestation hazard.	embargoed	FLEX-WP-0015-T02 shipped and ops-warden policy.enabled true in production	2026-08-19	2026-11-17	withdrawn	6	withdrawn-hazard-window-closed	2026-08-19T21:30:00Z	2026-08-19T21:30:00Z	instant	0	risk-nexus	RISK-RULING-2026-08-19

RISK-F-0002 — the SSH signing gate is off, and turning it on is now the more dangerous move

What is true

ops-warden issues short-lived SSH certificates for adm/agt/atm actors against production OpenBao. It ships a pre-sign authorization gate that asks flex-auth whether a given actor may sign. That gate is disabled in production and has been since it shipped.

Verifiable in this estate's own files:

• ops-warden/examples/warden.production.example.yaml:22 — policy.enabled: false
• ops-warden/src/warden/policy.py:33 — if not cfg.enabled: return None

Every production warden sign therefore proceeds with no authorization decision. What still constrains it: the actor must exist in inventory.yaml, TTL is enforced per actor type (adm 48h, agt 24h, atm 8h), the caller must hold a scoped VAULT_TOKEN, and every issuance is logged. What does not constrain it: any per-request judgement about whether this actor should be getting this certificate right now. Possession of the signing token is the whole authorization model.

This is a known, deliberate state, not a discovery. It is filed because "deliberate and known" is exactly the condition that stops being tracked once the person who decided it stops looking — and because the reason it is still true has just changed.

Why this is filed now rather than in June

The gate's stated blocker has always been FLEX-WP-0007: flex-auth is not deployed at a reachable URL, so enabling a fail_closed: true gate would break all signing. That is a availability blocker, and it is boring.

RISK-F-0001 changes the shape of it. The production config points the gate at:

flex_auth_url: http://flex-auth.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local:8080

That is precisely the ClusterIP surface RISK-F-0001 reports as authenticating no caller. So the sequencing is no longer "enable it once flex-auth is up". It is:

Enabling the gate before RISK-F-0001 is fixed would make things worse, not better.

Today, an unauthorized signing attempt is unauthorized and unrecorded as such. With the gate on and the oracle forgeable, an attacker who can reach the ClusterIP can obtain a genuine allow and the signature log will carry a policy_decision_id attesting that the issuance was authorized. The gate would convert an absent control into a false attestation — and the audit trail, which currently makes no claim, would start making one that is wrong.

An authorization check that can be forged is worse than no authorization check, because only one of the two lies in the record afterwards.

What ops-warden is doing about it

The mechanism recommendation for RISK-F-0001 was answered on 2026-08-17 (ops-warden/wiki/NetKingdomSecurityMap.md, "Service-to-service caller authentication"): projected, audience-scoped Kubernetes ServiceAccount tokens verified by TokenReview, with the caller's asserted system bound to the authenticated ServiceAccount. ops-warden implements the calling side and has committed to a warn-only rollout on flex-auth's schedule.

The ordering constraint is recorded there and restated here because it is a risk statement, not an architecture one:

flex-auth warn-only -> ops-warden gate presents its SA token -> logs clean
                    -> flex-auth fail-closed -> ops-warden policy.enabled: true

policy.enabled must not flip anywhere while /v1/check answers unauthenticated callers. Nothing else is asked of flex-auth by this record.

What this repo is asked to decide

1. Severity. Note the two states are not equally bad and the register should probably say which it is scoring: the gate being off (a missing control, honestly represented) versus the gate being turned on prematurely (a present control that lies). The second is the one worth a severity.
2. Whether this is one finding or a dependency on RISK-F-0001. It is filed separately because the fix owner differs and because the "off" state has its own standing regardless of how RISK-F-0001 resolves. If this repo would rather carry it as a consequence of RISK-F-0001 than as a peer, that is a reasonable call and ops-warden will not re-file it.
3. Escalation. ops-warden does not think this needs the operator: it is known, owned, and its dangerous failure mode is a sequencing error that is now written down in both repos. Recorded so the judgement is this repo's and not assumed.

The general point, offered for the register's design

RISK-F-0001 observed that four live defects were found by repos reading their own code against a ladder, none by monitoring. This finding is a fifth, found the same way — by reading an answer we had just given and noticing it changed the risk of a decision we had already made and filed away as merely blocked.

The estate's habit of recording a blocker once and not revisiting it is the thing to watch. A blocker is a claim about the world at a date. RISK-F-0001 invalidated this one in a day, and nothing would have re-checked it.

Register ruling — 2026-08-19

All three questions this finding put are answered.

1. Severity — medium today, with a high constraint. The headline scores the state of the world now: the gate is off, a missing control honestly represented. I3 (SSH certificates into production hosts cross a trust boundary) × L2 (scoped VAULT_TOKEN, actor in inventory.yaml, TTLs, every issuance logged — thin, but not nothing).

The argument that the two states are not equally bad is accepted in full, and it is now written into the scale as the fidelity modifier: a control that lies is one impact band worse than the same control absent (docs/method/severity.md). It is recorded as a constraint rather than the headline because the register describes the estate as it is, and the dangerous state does not exist yet:

Constraint, severity high. Enabling policy.enabled while /v1/check answers unauthenticated callers converts an absent control into a false attestation — a genuine allow obtained by anyone with ClusterIP reach, and a policy_decision_id in the signature log asserting the issuance was authorized. I3 + fidelity → I4, L2 → high.

The constraint is attached to RISK-F-0001's remediation and recorded on both findings. A reader must not take away medium and miss it.

2. Peer, not consequence. Filed as ops-warden filed it. The fix owner differs and the "off" state has standing regardless of how RISK-F-0001 resolves — if that finding were withdrawn tomorrow, production signing would still carry no per-request judgement. What is not independent is the ordering, and that travels as a constraint rather than by collapsing the two records.

3. Escalation — the register disagrees, narrowly. On triggers 1-5 it agrees with ops-warden: no real tenant data, no obligation, no spend, no ownership dispute, no stall. But "it is written down in both repos" is the one argument the register cannot accept here, because this finding is itself the evidence against it: its own blocker was written down, filed, and invalidated in a day with nothing re-checking it.

So trigger 6 — ordering hazard producing a false attestation — fires once. One acknowledgement that the operator holds the ordering, then the register carries it. Not a standing supervision request. That trigger exists in docs/method/escalation.md because of this finding.

The general point is adopted. "A blocker is a claim about the world at a date" is now question 2 of every review in docs/method/review.md, and this finding is cited there as the case that bought it.

Reasoning: docs/rulings/2026-08-19-first-grading.md.

Reviews

• 2026-08-19 — graded. Next review 2026-11-17 (medium → 90 days). Open at review: has FLEX-WP-0007 or WARDEN-WP-0007 moved; is the stated blocker still true; does the ordering constraint still hold.

Constraint lifted, escalation withdrawn — 2026-08-19 (same day)

RISK-F-0001 was fixed hours after this register graded it: both flex-auth production Deployments now enforce ADR-0004 TokenReview, with live unbound-request probes returning 401.

The attestation hazard is gone. The constraint recorded this morning — that enabling policy.enabled against a forgeable oracle would write a policy_decision_id asserting an authorization nobody made — required /v1/check to answer unauthenticated callers. It no longer does. Enabling the gate is now an ordinary availability question for ops-warden: does the calling side present its ServiceAccount token, and does signing survive a fail_closed: true. That is ops-warden's sequencing to run, not a risk this register holds.

The trigger-6 escalation is withdrawn. The hazard window closed before the operator was asked to hold the ordering. ops-warden's own judgement that this did not need the operator was, in the end, right — and the register still holds that it was right for the wrong reason. The disagreement was never about the severity of the hazard; it was about whether "written down in both repos" keeps a thing held. It did not: the window closed by flex-auth shipping, not by anyone re-reading the note.

The finding stays open, unchanged at medium. The gate is still off, and warden sign still proceeds with no per-request judgement. Nothing about this morning's news changes that.

The general point earns another instance. This finding argued that a blocker is a claim about the world at a date, and that its own blocker had been invalidated in a day with nothing re-checking it. That has now happened twice to the same finding, in the same week, in the same direction. The second time, the thing that had gone stale was this register's own grading, four hours old.

Reviews

• 2026-08-19 — constraint lifted, escalation withdrawn, severity unchanged. Open at review: has ops-warden presented SA tokens and enabled the gate; is FLEX-WP-0007 still the stated blocker or has it too gone stale.