tegwick
42bbf5d2dc
Operator ruling 2026-08-20. Severity no longer sets the review interval. A check that comes back clean climbs one rung — instant, 1h, 8h, 24h, 48h, 96h, 7d, 14d, 1mo, 1q — and anything wrong drops straight back to instant. A quarter is the ceiling. The operator may defer an instant finding to a stated date; that is the only other way off the bottom rung. The rung is the point: it says how stable the estate has been on that matter, which is information severity does not carry. Volatile things get attention automatically; quiet things stop consuming it; neither judgement has to be made by a person who might be busy. Escalation trigger 5 rebased onto the ladder — fourteen days at the bottom rung, whether that is failing checks or no checks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
4.7 KiB
| id | type | title | status | reported_by | reported_via | routed_by | date_reported | date_filed | system | environment | fix_owner | fix_tracking | related | severity | severity_at_production | impact | likelihood | fidelity_modifier | production_rescore | disclosure | embargo_condition | embargo_since | embargo_review | escalation | escalation_trigger | escalation_status | escalation_answered | escalation_answered_by | escalation_act | decision | last_checked | next_check | cadence | clean_streak | graded_by | ruling | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RISK-F-0006 | finding | apps-pg has no backup configured at all: R0 means no recovery | open | railiance-platform | flex-auth | risk-nexus | 2026-08-17 | 2026-08-19 | railiance-platform | production | railiance-platform | unset (railiance-platform to open) |
|
high | critical | I4 | L2 | false | true | embargoed | a backup exists and a restore has been demonstrated once | 2026-08-19 | 2026-09-18 | answered | 3 | approved | 2026-08-19 | the-custodian | approve | spend for apps-pg backup storage approved; no ceiling stated | 2026-08-19T23:05:00Z | 2026-08-19T23:05:00Z | instant | 0 | risk-nexus | RISK-RULING-2026-08-19-B |
RISK-F-0006 — the platform database cannot be recovered
What is true, as reported
apps-pg (railiance-platform) has no backup configured at all: no
barmanObjectStore, no retention policy, and BestEffort QoS on the pod.
Reported in the same round as RISK-F-0001, whose author noted that R0 here
means no recovery, not merely no erasure policy.
Not verified by this repo. railiance-platform owns it.
Why it is graded highest of the round despite being the least exciting
The other findings in this round are about someone reaching something. This one
is about nothing coming back. There is no attacker in it and no clever step —
an ordinary node failure, a lost volume, a mistaken DROP, and the data that
was in apps-pg is gone.
BestEffort QoS makes the pod the first candidate for eviction under memory
pressure. Eviction alone is an availability event and recoverable. What is not
recoverable is anything that damages the volume, and that is the case with no
answer today.
Register ruling — 2026-08-19
high today (I4 × L2, non-adversarial reading), critical at production,
embargoed, and escalated on trigger 3 (spend).
I4: apps-pg is shared platform infrastructure, so the loss is not confined
to one system, and it is unrecoverable rather than degraded. L2 on the
non-adversarial reading the scale gained for this finding: irrecoverable loss
needs a volume or corruption event, which is an ordinary failure the estate
has seen the shape of but not an expected weekly occurrence.
production_rescore: true: at production this is L3, because the surface
area of ordinary operational events grows with real traffic and real operators.
Escalation, trigger 3. Object storage for backups is recurring spend that
is not currently committed, and no repo can authorise it for itself. The ask
is narrow: approve a backup target and its cost, or state that the estate
accepts running apps-pg with no recovery and for how long. The second is a
legitimate answer in build mode and needs saying out loud rather than
happening by default.
The disclosure condition deliberately includes a demonstrated restore. A
backup nobody has restored from is a claim, not a control — the same class of
error as the gate in RISK-F-0002.
Reviews
- 2026-08-19 — filed and graded from
RISK-F-0001's unfiled list. Open at review: has the spend been ruled on; is a backup configured; has a restore been demonstrated; doesrailiance-platformtrack it anywhere.
Operator decision — 2026-08-19: approved
The spend is approved. railiance-platform may provision backup storage for
apps-pg without returning for authorisation.
No ceiling was stated, so none is recorded. The register asks
railiance-platform to report the actual target and its monthly cost once
chosen; a figure materially above the trigger-3 band (recurring €50/month)
comes back for confirmation rather than being assumed covered. That is the
register being careful with an open approval, not a condition on it.
What is now blocking is work, not permission. The finding stays open at
high, and the embargo condition is unchanged: a backup exists and a
restore has been demonstrated once. A backup nobody has restored from is a
claim, not a control.
fix_tracking is still unset and is now railiance-platform's to open.
Reviews
- 2026-08-19 — escalation answered, spend approved. Open at review: is a backup configured; has a restore been demonstrated; what does it cost.