tegwick
7d6ded5743
Read the repo inbox after grading, which is the wrong order and is now recorded as such. flex-auth had answered the NetworkPolicy question on 2026-08-18 (narrow ingress, not default-deny — L3 becomes L2, critical becomes high) and reported RISK-F-0001 fixed at 12:35 today with live 401 probes. F-0001 closes fixed and public; its escalation is withdrawn before it was ever sent. RISK-F-0002's ordering constraint lifts with it and its trigger-6 escalation is withdrawn. audit-core had routed the erasure-versus-audit legal question here on 2026-08-18 asking for an owner. RISK-N-0002 was wrong to call it a note: the remedy is not retrofittable, so the decision can only be taken early. Promoted to RISK-F-0008, owned by this repo as regulatory intake, escalated on trigger 2. Accepted rapp-postgres's record format and ops-warden's typed-act escalation vocabulary. Reading the inbox is now question zero of every review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
54 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
54 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
# Register
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Generated by `tools/register_index.py` from `findings/`. Do not edit by hand. Last built 2026-08-19.
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7 open of 8 findings; 2 notes below the floor.
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## Findings
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| ID | Finding | System | Severity | Disclosure | Escalation | Fix owner | Status | Review by |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| [RISK-F-0008](findings/RISK-F-0008-audit-retention-legal-basis-assumed.md) | The legal basis for retaining audit facts against an erasure request has been assumed, never established | audit-core | medium | public | **required** (t2, pending-operator) | risk-nexus | open | 2026-11-17 |
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| [RISK-F-0007](findings/RISK-F-0007-unverified-tenant-boundary.md) | No consumer's tenant boundary is verified anywhere | estate | **high** | embargoed | **required** (t4, pending-operator) | unset | open | 2026-09-18 |
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| [RISK-F-0006](findings/RISK-F-0006-apps-pg-no-backup-configured.md) | apps-pg has no backup configured at all: R0 means no recovery | railiance-platform | **high** | embargoed | **required** (t3, pending-operator) | railiance-platform | open | 2026-09-18 |
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| [RISK-F-0005](findings/RISK-F-0005-audit-core-unfiltered-read-path.md) | audit-core read path applies no tenant filter; the bound is deployment, not code | audit-core | medium | embargoed | none | audit-core | open | 2026-11-17 |
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| [RISK-F-0004](findings/RISK-F-0004-tenant-engine-unfiltered-event-read.md) | tenant-engine events() returns the entire event log unfiltered | tenant-engine | **high** | embargoed | none | tenant-engine | open | 2026-09-18 |
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| [RISK-F-0003](findings/RISK-F-0003-ops-warden-read-boundary-ungraded-lanes.md) | ops-warden agent read-boundary does not fire on ungraded catalog lanes | ops-warden | **high** | embargoed | none | ops-warden | open | 2026-09-18 |
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| [RISK-F-0002](findings/RISK-F-0002-ops-warden-sign-ungated.md) | ops-warden signs SSH certificates with no authorization decision, and its unblock is now unsafe | ops-warden | medium | embargoed | **withdrawn** (t6, withdrawn-hazard-window-closed) | ops-warden | open | 2026-11-17 |
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| [RISK-F-0001](findings/RISK-F-0001-flex-auth-unauthenticated-check.md) | flex-auth /v1/check authenticates no caller | flex-auth | **high** | public | **withdrawn** (t1, withdrawn-before-sending) | flex-auth | fixed | 2026-08-26 |
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## Constraints
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Hazards created by acting in the wrong order. Each binds another finding's remediation.
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| From | Binds | Severity | Constraint |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| RISK-F-0002 | RISK-F-0001 | **lifted** | LIFTED 2026-08-19 — flex-auth /v1/check now authenticates callers (RISK-F-0001 fixed). Enabling policy.enabled is now an availability question for ops-warden, no longer an attestation hazard. |
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## Embargoes
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Held from publication with a stated condition. A hold with no moving condition is a stall.
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| Finding | Since | Lifts when | Re-decided |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| RISK-F-0007 | 2026-08-19 | a verification exists for at least one consumer boundary | 2026-09-18 |
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| RISK-F-0006 | 2026-08-19 | a backup exists and a restore has been demonstrated once | 2026-09-18 |
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| RISK-F-0005 | 2026-08-19 | AUDIT-WP-0008-T04 lands a tenant filter in the read path | 2026-11-17 |
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| RISK-F-0004 | 2026-08-19 | the read path filters by tenant in code | 2026-09-18 |
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| RISK-F-0003 | 2026-08-19 | the five exec_capable lanes graded under WARDEN-WP-0032-T05 | 2026-09-18 |
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| RISK-F-0002 | 2026-08-19 | FLEX-WP-0015-T02 shipped and ops-warden policy.enabled true in production | 2026-11-17 |
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## Notes (below the floor)
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Seen, deliberately not findings. Not graded, not reviewed, not published.
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| ID | Note | Why below the floor |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| [RISK-N-0003](notes/RISK-N-0003-defects-found-by-reading-not-monitoring.md) | Every defect in this register was found by reading, none by monitoring | no owner and no defect — it is an argument about where to invest detection, and the register cannot route an argument |
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| [RISK-N-0001](notes/RISK-N-0001-noisy-neighbour-uncharacterised.md) | Noisy-neighbour behaviour is uncharacterised | no decision changes today — no tenant shares a saturating workload, and what is missing is measurement work, not a defect to route |
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## How to read this
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Severity is `docs/method/severity.md`; disclosure `docs/method/disclosure.md`;
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escalation `docs/method/escalation.md`; review dates `docs/method/review.md`.
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A constraint may be graded higher than the finding that carries it — read both.
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