Four in as findings — tenant-engine unfiltered event read (high), audit-core read path bounded by a flag not by code (medium), apps-pg with no backup at all (high, escalated on spend), and the unverified tenant boundary itself (high now, critical at production, escalated on ownership, fix_owner deliberately unset). Two out as notes — noisy neighbours and erasure-versus-audit, both real, neither changing a decision this month, both carrying an event to be re-read at. The round amended the scale twice: build mode lowers impact as well as likelihood, and non-adversarial findings get their own likelihood reading. The escalation rule gained a ratio test that distinguishes a first sweep from steady-state intake, and a batching rule. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| id | type | title | status | reported_by | reported_via | routed_by | date_reported | date_filed | system | environment | fix_owner | fix_tracking | related | severity | severity_at_production | impact | likelihood | fidelity_modifier | production_rescore | disclosure | embargo_condition | embargo_since | embargo_review | escalation | last_reviewed | review_by | graded_by | ruling | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RISK-F-0004 | finding | tenant-engine events() returns the entire event log unfiltered | open | tenant-engine | flex-auth | risk-nexus | 2026-08-17 | 2026-08-19 | tenant-engine | production | tenant-engine | unset |
|
high | critical | I3 | L3 | false | true | embargoed | the read path filters by tenant in code | 2026-08-19 | 2026-09-18 | none | 2026-08-19 | 2026-09-18 | risk-nexus | RISK-RULING-2026-08-19-B |
RISK-F-0004 — the tenant event log is readable across tenants
What is true, as reported
tenant-engine's events() returns the entire event log with no tenant
filter. Reported by tenant-engine as a live cross-tenant read at E2 on the
Tenancy Posture E ladder, surfaced in the same review round as RISK-F-0001
and recorded inside that finding as visible-but-unfiled.
This repo has not verified it and does not own the code. It is filed on the
owning repo's own self-report. tenant-engine confirms or corrects it.
Why it is being filed now
It was held back pending the precedent this register set for what warrants a
record of its own. That precedent now exists (docs/method/severity.md), and
"still waiting on the precedent" has stopped being an available answer. This
finding clears the floor on both tests: tenant-engine can act, and recording
it changes when they act.
What is not established
- Whether any caller other than
tenant-engineitself currently reachesevents(). - What the log contains — whether the rows are metadata or carry tenant payload. The grade assumes cross-tenant visibility, not payload disclosure, and would rise if it is the latter.
- Whether a fix is tracked anywhere.
fix_trackingisunsetand this repo has asked.
Register ruling — 2026-08-19
high today (I3 × L3), critical at production, embargoed until the read
path filters in code, no escalation.
I3: a cross-tenant read crosses a tenant boundary inside one system. L3:
no additional step is needed by anything that can already call the method, and
the authorization that would otherwise constrain the caller is RISK-F-0001,
which authenticates nobody.
production_rescore: true. Today the log holds no real counterparty's events,
which lowers what one occurrence costs; it does not lower what the defect is.
At production the same read is I4 — real tenant data crossing a boundary
that nothing verifies — and the re-score is owed before any production
declaration completes.
No escalation: no real tenant data yet (trigger 1 reads real), owned, and
not yet stalled. It becomes an escalation on the day the estate takes real
tenant data, and that is what production_rescore is for.
Reviews
- 2026-08-19 — filed and graded from
RISK-F-0001's unfiled list. Open at review: doestenant-engineconfirm; is a fix tracked; what does the log actually contain.