tegwick
4daff5503f
Four in as findings — tenant-engine unfiltered event read (high), audit-core read path bounded by a flag not by code (medium), apps-pg with no backup at all (high, escalated on spend), and the unverified tenant boundary itself (high now, critical at production, escalated on ownership, fix_owner deliberately unset). Two out as notes — noisy neighbours and erasure-versus-audit, both real, neither changing a decision this month, both carrying an event to be re-read at. The round amended the scale twice: build mode lowers impact as well as likelihood, and non-adversarial findings get their own likelihood reading. The escalation rule gained a ratio test that distinguishes a first sweep from steady-state intake, and a batching rule. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| id | type | title | status | reported_by | reported_via | routed_by | date_reported | date_filed | system | environment | fix_owner | fix_tracking | related | severity | severity_at_production | impact | likelihood | fidelity_modifier | production_rescore | disclosure | embargo_condition | embargo_since | embargo_review | escalation | escalation_trigger | escalation_status | last_reviewed | review_by | graded_by | ruling | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RISK-F-0006 | finding | apps-pg has no backup configured at all: R0 means no recovery | open | railiance-platform | flex-auth | risk-nexus | 2026-08-17 | 2026-08-19 | railiance-platform | production | railiance-platform | unset |
|
high | critical | I4 | L2 | false | true | embargoed | a backup exists and a restore has been demonstrated once | 2026-08-19 | 2026-09-18 | required | 3 | pending-operator | 2026-08-19 | 2026-09-18 | risk-nexus | RISK-RULING-2026-08-19-B |
RISK-F-0006 — the platform database cannot be recovered
What is true, as reported
apps-pg (railiance-platform) has no backup configured at all: no
barmanObjectStore, no retention policy, and BestEffort QoS on the pod.
Reported in the same round as RISK-F-0001, whose author noted that R0 here
means no recovery, not merely no erasure policy.
Not verified by this repo. railiance-platform owns it.
Why it is graded highest of the round despite being the least exciting
The other findings in this round are about someone reaching something. This one
is about nothing coming back. There is no attacker in it and no clever step —
an ordinary node failure, a lost volume, a mistaken DROP, and the data that
was in apps-pg is gone.
BestEffort QoS makes the pod the first candidate for eviction under memory
pressure. Eviction alone is an availability event and recoverable. What is not
recoverable is anything that damages the volume, and that is the case with no
answer today.
Register ruling — 2026-08-19
high today (I4 × L2, non-adversarial reading), critical at production,
embargoed, and escalated on trigger 3 (spend).
I4: apps-pg is shared platform infrastructure, so the loss is not confined
to one system, and it is unrecoverable rather than degraded. L2 on the
non-adversarial reading the scale gained for this finding: irrecoverable loss
needs a volume or corruption event, which is an ordinary failure the estate
has seen the shape of but not an expected weekly occurrence.
production_rescore: true: at production this is L3, because the surface
area of ordinary operational events grows with real traffic and real operators.
Escalation, trigger 3. Object storage for backups is recurring spend that
is not currently committed, and no repo can authorise it for itself. The ask
is narrow: approve a backup target and its cost, or state that the estate
accepts running apps-pg with no recovery and for how long. The second is a
legitimate answer in build mode and needs saying out loud rather than
happening by default.
The disclosure condition deliberately includes a demonstrated restore. A
backup nobody has restored from is a claim, not a control — the same class of
error as the gate in RISK-F-0002.
Reviews
- 2026-08-19 — filed and graded from
RISK-F-0001's unfiled list. Open at review: has the spend been ruled on; is a backup configured; has a restore been demonstrated; doesrailiance-platformtrack it anywhere.