secrets-engine/src/secrets_engine/approval_consume.py

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"""PEP consume-before-side-effect client (GH-DEC-2026-003).
The PEP that is about to cause a protected OpenBao write MUST obtain a
successful approval-engine CAS consume first. Holding a claim or an ALLOW is
not authority to act. Conflict, unavailability, or a missing binding means
do not call OpenBao.
This module does not render an authorization decision. The consume response
is mutation evidence, never a permission.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Callable
from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
from secrets_engine.approval_auth import approval_auth_configured, approval_token, credential_urlopen
from secrets_engine.approval_claim import observe_pdp_approval_claim, validate_approval_claim
feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 14:56:02 +02:00
from secrets_engine.decision_check import check_decision
from secrets_engine.authorization import (
build_action_request,
validate_decision_envelope,
)
from secrets_engine.errors import DecisionError
from secrets_engine.openbao import read_strict_token_file
from secrets_engine.pep_stance import demo_exception_enabled
DIGEST_RE = re.compile(r"^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
_MAX_BODY = 256 * 1024
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ConsumeBinding:
"""Inputs the PEP presents to approval-engine consume."""
approval_id: str
request_digest: str
decision_id: str = ""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ApprovalObservation:
"""Fresh approval input awaiting PDP correspondence; never a consume binding."""
approval_id: str
request: dict[str, Any] = field(repr=False)
claim: dict[str, Any] = field(repr=False)
feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 14:56:02 +02:00
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AuthorizedAction:
"""A validated claim and decision for one exact proposed action.
Holding this is not authority to act: GH-DEC-2026-003 still requires a
successful CAS consume before the OpenBao call.
"""
binding: ConsumeBinding
decision_id: str
expires_at: str
def as_evidence(self) -> dict[str, object]:
return {
"authorization_decision_id": self.decision_id,
"authorization_expires_at": self.expires_at,
"request_digest": self.binding.request_digest,
}
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ConsumedApproval:
"""Non-secret confirmation that consume succeeded for this request."""
approval_id: str
request_digest: str
decision_id: str = ""
idempotent: bool = False
consumed_at: str = ""
def as_evidence(self) -> dict[str, object]:
payload: dict[str, object] = {
"approval_consumed": True,
"approval_id": self.approval_id,
"request_digest": self.request_digest,
"approval_consume_idempotent": self.idempotent,
}
if self.decision_id:
payload["decision_id"] = self.decision_id
if self.consumed_at:
payload["approval_consumed_at"] = self.consumed_at
return payload
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
def _authorization_id(entry: Any, decision: Any) -> str:
"""Non-secret approval-engine object id for this lane, or "" if unbound.
flex-auth: ``ActionAuthorization.id`` is the approval-engine object UUID.
It is never the State Hub decision UUID, so it is not inferred from one.
"""
approval = getattr(entry, "approval", None) or {}
if isinstance(approval, dict):
declared = str(approval.get("authorization_id", "") or "").strip()
if declared:
return declared
for attr in ("authorization_id", "action_authorization_id"):
served = str(getattr(decision, attr, "") or "").strip()
if served:
return served
return ""
def _request_purpose(entry: Any) -> str:
"""Declared purpose for the request context. Never invented at call time."""
approval = getattr(entry, "approval", None) or {}
if isinstance(approval, dict):
declared = str(approval.get("purpose", "") or "").strip()
if declared:
return declared
for consumer in getattr(entry, "consumers", None) or []:
if isinstance(consumer, dict):
declared = str(consumer.get("purpose", "") or "").strip()
if declared:
return declared
return ""
feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 14:56:02 +02:00
def _expected_request(
cfg: Any,
entry: Any,
action: str,
*,
fields: tuple[str, ...] = (),
policy_targets: tuple[str, ...] = (),
auth_targets: tuple[str, ...] = (),
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Build the exact CheckRequest both steps must agree on.
Steps 1 and 2 must describe the same proposed action or the digests cannot
correspond, so neither builds its own.
"""
subject_id = str(getattr(cfg, "authorization_subject_id", "") or "")
subject_type = str(getattr(cfg, "authorization_subject_type", "") or "")
if not subject_id or not subject_type:
raise DecisionError(
"authorization join requires SECRETS_ENGINE_AUTHORIZATION_SUBJECT_ID "
"and _SUBJECT_TYPE; the PEP must not assert an unnamed subject"
)
purpose = _request_purpose(entry)
if not purpose:
raise DecisionError(
"authorization join requires a declared approval/consumer purpose"
)
return build_action_request(
entry,
action,
subject_id=subject_id,
subject_type=subject_type,
purpose=purpose,
fields=fields,
policy_targets=policy_targets,
auth_targets=auth_targets,
)
feat: split the validator by owning layer per GH-DEC-2026-005 gate-house resolved APPROVAL-IN-0002. Two changes fell to this repo. 1. Split validate_action_authorization. The claim from approval-engine now carries the approval fact (issuer, valid_now, consumption, binding digest, freshness, reason_code) via approval_claim.validate_approval_claim; the flex-auth DecisionEnvelope carries the decision (effect, binding match, request digest, lifetime, policy pin) via validate_decision_envelope. ActionAuthorization is deferred and never ratified (FLEX-DEC-2026-006) and cannot be served from a step-1 call; nothing validates it now. 2. Dropped AUTHORITY = "state-hub" and the provenance.authority requirement. State Hub is a read model with no runtime approval authority, so the check failed closed against every correctly issued record. flex-auth traced the constant to their own fixture and fixed it at source. Two consequences recorded rather than buried: there are now two distinct digests over the same action (approval-engine native over {action,actor,principal,purpose,target}, and the flex-auth CheckRequest digest) which are never compared to each other; and the distinct-approver threshold is no longer checked here, since the claim exposes no approver entries and approval-engine folds it into valid_now. The canonical request digest is unchanged and its contract test is preserved verbatim. Production still fails closed. 251 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 08:02:01 +02:00
def fetch_approval_claim(
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
*,
base_url: str,
token_file: Path | None = None,
token_provider: Callable[[], str] | None = None,
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
authorization_id: str,
timeout_seconds: float = 3,
opener: Callable[..., Any] = credential_urlopen,
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
) -> dict[str, Any]:
feat: split the validator by owning layer per GH-DEC-2026-005 gate-house resolved APPROVAL-IN-0002. Two changes fell to this repo. 1. Split validate_action_authorization. The claim from approval-engine now carries the approval fact (issuer, valid_now, consumption, binding digest, freshness, reason_code) via approval_claim.validate_approval_claim; the flex-auth DecisionEnvelope carries the decision (effect, binding match, request digest, lifetime, policy pin) via validate_decision_envelope. ActionAuthorization is deferred and never ratified (FLEX-DEC-2026-006) and cannot be served from a step-1 call; nothing validates it now. 2. Dropped AUTHORITY = "state-hub" and the provenance.authority requirement. State Hub is a read model with no runtime approval authority, so the check failed closed against every correctly issued record. flex-auth traced the constant to their own fixture and fixed it at source. Two consequences recorded rather than buried: there are now two distinct digests over the same action (approval-engine native over {action,actor,principal,purpose,target}, and the flex-auth CheckRequest digest) which are never compared to each other; and the distinct-approver threshold is no longer checked here, since the claim exposes no approver entries and approval-engine folds it into valid_now. The canonical request digest is unchanged and its contract test is preserved verbatim. Production still fails closed. 251 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 08:02:01 +02:00
"""GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim (PIP). Any non-200 fails closed.
The body is approval-engine's approval-claim, not a flex-auth
ActionAuthorization -- that object is deferred and was never ratified
(GH-DEC-2026-005 / FLEX-DEC-2026-006).
"""
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
if not base_url or not base_url.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
raise DecisionError("approval-engine claim URL is missing or invalid")
ident = authorization_id.strip()
if not ident or "/" in ident or any(ch.isspace() for ch in ident):
raise DecisionError("approval claim requires a concrete authorization id")
token = _request_token(token_file, token_provider)
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
request = Request(
base_url.rstrip("/") + f"/v1/approvals/{ident}/claim",
method="GET",
)
request.add_header("Authorization", f"Bearer {token}")
request.add_header("Accept", "application/json")
try:
with opener(request, timeout=timeout_seconds) as response:
if getattr(response, "status", 200) != 200:
feat: split the validator by owning layer per GH-DEC-2026-005 gate-house resolved APPROVAL-IN-0002. Two changes fell to this repo. 1. Split validate_action_authorization. The claim from approval-engine now carries the approval fact (issuer, valid_now, consumption, binding digest, freshness, reason_code) via approval_claim.validate_approval_claim; the flex-auth DecisionEnvelope carries the decision (effect, binding match, request digest, lifetime, policy pin) via validate_decision_envelope. ActionAuthorization is deferred and never ratified (FLEX-DEC-2026-006) and cannot be served from a step-1 call; nothing validates it now. 2. Dropped AUTHORITY = "state-hub" and the provenance.authority requirement. State Hub is a read model with no runtime approval authority, so the check failed closed against every correctly issued record. flex-auth traced the constant to their own fixture and fixed it at source. Two consequences recorded rather than buried: there are now two distinct digests over the same action (approval-engine native over {action,actor,principal,purpose,target}, and the flex-auth CheckRequest digest) which are never compared to each other; and the distinct-approver threshold is no longer checked here, since the claim exposes no approver entries and approval-engine folds it into valid_now. The canonical request digest is unchanged and its contract test is preserved verbatim. Production still fails closed. 251 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 08:02:01 +02:00
raise DecisionError("approval claim did not return a claim")
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
payload = json.loads(response.read(_MAX_BODY).decode("utf-8"))
except HTTPError as e:
raise DecisionError(f"approval claim refused: {_status_message(e.code)}") from e
except URLError as e:
raise DecisionError("approval-engine is unreachable for claim") from e
except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
raise DecisionError("approval claim returned a non-JSON body") from e
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise DecisionError("approval claim returned a non-object body")
return payload
def resolve_approval_observation(
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
cfg: Any,
entry: Any,
action: str,
decision: Any,
*,
fields: tuple[str, ...] = (),
policy_targets: tuple[str, ...] = (),
auth_targets: tuple[str, ...] = (),
opener: Callable[..., Any] | None = None,
) -> ApprovalObservation | None:
"""Observe a fresh fact and prepare the claim-bearing request (step 1).
feat: split the validator by owning layer per GH-DEC-2026-005 gate-house resolved APPROVAL-IN-0002. Two changes fell to this repo. 1. Split validate_action_authorization. The claim from approval-engine now carries the approval fact (issuer, valid_now, consumption, binding digest, freshness, reason_code) via approval_claim.validate_approval_claim; the flex-auth DecisionEnvelope carries the decision (effect, binding match, request digest, lifetime, policy pin) via validate_decision_envelope. ActionAuthorization is deferred and never ratified (FLEX-DEC-2026-006) and cannot be served from a step-1 call; nothing validates it now. 2. Dropped AUTHORITY = "state-hub" and the provenance.authority requirement. State Hub is a read model with no runtime approval authority, so the check failed closed against every correctly issued record. flex-auth traced the constant to their own fixture and fixed it at source. Two consequences recorded rather than buried: there are now two distinct digests over the same action (approval-engine native over {action,actor,principal,purpose,target}, and the flex-auth CheckRequest digest) which are never compared to each other; and the distinct-approver threshold is no longer checked here, since the claim exposes no approver entries and approval-engine folds it into valid_now. The canonical request digest is unchanged and its contract test is preserved verbatim. Production still fails closed. 251 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 08:02:01 +02:00
Missing serving coordinates return None, preserving the production refusal.
Correspondence and a consume binding require authorize_action's PDP step.
"""
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
base_url = str(getattr(cfg, "approval_url", "") or "")
auth_configured = approval_auth_configured(cfg)
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
authorization_id = _authorization_id(entry, decision)
if not base_url or not auth_configured or not authorization_id:
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
return None
feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 14:56:02 +02:00
expected_request = _expected_request(
cfg, entry, action,
fields=fields, policy_targets=policy_targets, auth_targets=auth_targets,
feat: implement the PIP claim + validate authorization join resolve_consume_binding was a `return None` stub, so protocol step 1 of docs/approval-consumption.md (GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim) and the validation join never existed. validate_action_authorization had no caller in src/ at all - it was reachable only from tests. Production fail-closed was correct, but for an undocumented second reason, and WP-0007-T04's "what remains is not local engine work" was wrong. The join now reproduces the exact CheckRequest via build_action_request, fetches the durable ActionAuthorization, and validates request binding, digest, validity, authority, policy pin, and distinct-approver threshold before offering a consume binding. _require_lane_approval threads the exact field set for provision/rotate/verify/exec so the digest covers the real proposed action. Deliberate choices: - The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID; flex-auth stated GET /decisions/{uuid} is not the durable object. - No default policy pin. flex-auth stated secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 is example vocabulary, not a published package. - A half-configured join raises rather than returning None, so a partial deployment cannot be mistaken for an unconfigured one. Behavior is unchanged today: every new input is absent by default, so production still fails closed and plan/--dry-run still work. 234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 01:01:55 +02:00
)
feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 14:56:02 +02:00
feat: split the validator by owning layer per GH-DEC-2026-005 gate-house resolved APPROVAL-IN-0002. Two changes fell to this repo. 1. Split validate_action_authorization. The claim from approval-engine now carries the approval fact (issuer, valid_now, consumption, binding digest, freshness, reason_code) via approval_claim.validate_approval_claim; the flex-auth DecisionEnvelope carries the decision (effect, binding match, request digest, lifetime, policy pin) via validate_decision_envelope. ActionAuthorization is deferred and never ratified (FLEX-DEC-2026-006) and cannot be served from a step-1 call; nothing validates it now. 2. Dropped AUTHORITY = "state-hub" and the provenance.authority requirement. State Hub is a read model with no runtime approval authority, so the check failed closed against every correctly issued record. flex-auth traced the constant to their own fixture and fixed it at source. Two consequences recorded rather than buried: there are now two distinct digests over the same action (approval-engine native over {action,actor,principal,purpose,target}, and the flex-auth CheckRequest digest) which are never compared to each other; and the distinct-approver threshold is no longer checked here, since the claim exposes no approver entries and approval-engine folds it into valid_now. The canonical request digest is unchanged and its contract test is preserved verbatim. Production still fails closed. 251 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 08:02:01 +02:00
claim = fetch_approval_claim(
base_url=base_url,
token_provider=lambda: approval_token(cfg, scope="approval:read"),
feat: split the validator by owning layer per GH-DEC-2026-005 gate-house resolved APPROVAL-IN-0002. Two changes fell to this repo. 1. Split validate_action_authorization. The claim from approval-engine now carries the approval fact (issuer, valid_now, consumption, binding digest, freshness, reason_code) via approval_claim.validate_approval_claim; the flex-auth DecisionEnvelope carries the decision (effect, binding match, request digest, lifetime, policy pin) via validate_decision_envelope. ActionAuthorization is deferred and never ratified (FLEX-DEC-2026-006) and cannot be served from a step-1 call; nothing validates it now. 2. Dropped AUTHORITY = "state-hub" and the provenance.authority requirement. State Hub is a read model with no runtime approval authority, so the check failed closed against every correctly issued record. flex-auth traced the constant to their own fixture and fixed it at source. Two consequences recorded rather than buried: there are now two distinct digests over the same action (approval-engine native over {action,actor,principal,purpose,target}, and the flex-auth CheckRequest digest) which are never compared to each other; and the distinct-approver threshold is no longer checked here, since the claim exposes no approver entries and approval-engine folds it into valid_now. The canonical request digest is unchanged and its contract test is preserved verbatim. Production still fails closed. 251 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 08:02:01 +02:00
authorization_id=authorization_id,
opener=opener or credential_urlopen,
feat: split the validator by owning layer per GH-DEC-2026-005 gate-house resolved APPROVAL-IN-0002. Two changes fell to this repo. 1. Split validate_action_authorization. The claim from approval-engine now carries the approval fact (issuer, valid_now, consumption, binding digest, freshness, reason_code) via approval_claim.validate_approval_claim; the flex-auth DecisionEnvelope carries the decision (effect, binding match, request digest, lifetime, policy pin) via validate_decision_envelope. ActionAuthorization is deferred and never ratified (FLEX-DEC-2026-006) and cannot be served from a step-1 call; nothing validates it now. 2. Dropped AUTHORITY = "state-hub" and the provenance.authority requirement. State Hub is a read model with no runtime approval authority, so the check failed closed against every correctly issued record. flex-auth traced the constant to their own fixture and fixed it at source. Two consequences recorded rather than buried: there are now two distinct digests over the same action (approval-engine native over {action,actor,principal,purpose,target}, and the flex-auth CheckRequest digest) which are never compared to each other; and the distinct-approver threshold is no longer checked here, since the claim exposes no approver entries and approval-engine folds it into valid_now. The canonical request digest is unchanged and its contract test is preserved verbatim. Production still fails closed. 251 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 08:02:01 +02:00
)
observe_pdp_approval_claim(claim, approval_id=authorization_id)
expected_request["context"]["approval"] = claim
return ApprovalObservation(authorization_id, expected_request, claim)
feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 14:56:02 +02:00
def authorize_action(
cfg: Any,
entry: Any,
action: str,
decision: Any = None,
*,
fields: tuple[str, ...] = (),
policy_targets: tuple[str, ...] = (),
auth_targets: tuple[str, ...] = (),
opener: Callable[..., Any] | None = None,
pdp_opener: Callable[..., Any] | None = None,
) -> AuthorizedAction | None:
"""Run steps 1 and 2 for one proposed action, or return None if unserved.
Step 1 validates the approval-claim; step 2 obtains and validates the
flex-auth DecisionEnvelope. Returning None means no serving path is
configured at all, which leaves production fail-closed. A configured but
failing path raises: a partial deployment must not read as an absent one.
"""
observation = resolve_approval_observation(
feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 14:56:02 +02:00
cfg, entry, action, decision,
fields=fields,
policy_targets=policy_targets,
auth_targets=auth_targets,
opener=opener,
)
if observation is None:
feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 14:56:02 +02:00
return None
pdp_url = str(getattr(cfg, "pdp_url", "") or "")
pdp_token = getattr(cfg, "pdp_token_file", None)
if not pdp_url or not pdp_token:
raise DecisionError(
"production action requires an access-engine decision; "
"SECRETS_ENGINE_PDP_URL / _PDP_TOKEN_FILE are unset"
)
package = str(getattr(cfg, "authorization_policy_package", "") or "")
version = str(getattr(cfg, "authorization_policy_version", "") or "")
if not package or not version:
raise DecisionError(
"authorization join requires an explicitly configured policy "
"package/version pin; the reserved coordinate is a reservation, "
"not a publication, and must not be used as a default"
)
expected_request = observation.request
feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 14:56:02 +02:00
envelope = check_decision(
base_url=pdp_url,
token_file=Path(pdp_token),
request=expected_request,
opener=pdp_opener or urlopen,
)
validated = validate_decision_envelope(
envelope,
expected_request,
accepted_policy_packages={package},
accepted_policy_versions={version},
expected_approval_binding_digest=observation.claim["binding"]["pdp_digest"],
)
# Recheck freshness after the network call before issuing a consume binding.
validate_approval_claim(
observation.claim, approval_id=observation.approval_id,
expected_pdp_digest=envelope["binding"]["approval_binding_digest"],
feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 14:56:02 +02:00
)
if validated.action != action:
raise DecisionError("access-engine decision does not bind this action")
return AuthorizedAction(
binding=ConsumeBinding(
approval_id=observation.approval_id,
request_digest=validated.request_digest,
feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
2026-09-06 14:56:02 +02:00
decision_id=validated.decision_id,
),
decision_id=validated.decision_id,
expires_at=validated.expires_at,
)
def consume_approval(
*,
base_url: str,
token_file: Path | None = None,
token_provider: Callable[[], str] | None = None,
binding: ConsumeBinding,
timeout_seconds: float = 3,
opener: Callable[..., Any] = credential_urlopen,
) -> ConsumedApproval:
"""POST /v1/approvals/{id}/consume. Fail closed on anything but confirmed use."""
if not base_url or not base_url.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
raise DecisionError("approval-engine consume URL is missing or invalid")
approval_id = binding.approval_id.strip()
if not approval_id or "/" in approval_id or any(ch.isspace() for ch in approval_id):
raise DecisionError("approval consume requires a concrete approval id")
if not DIGEST_RE.fullmatch(binding.request_digest):
raise DecisionError("approval consume requires the canonical request digest")
token = _request_token(token_file, token_provider)
body: dict[str, str] = {"request_digest": binding.request_digest}
if binding.decision_id:
body["decision_id"] = binding.decision_id
encoded = json.dumps(body).encode("utf-8")
request = Request(
base_url.rstrip("/") + f"/v1/approvals/{approval_id}/consume",
data=encoded,
method="POST",
headers={
"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Accept": "application/json",
},
)
try:
response = opener(request, timeout=timeout_seconds)
try:
status = int(response.getcode())
raw = response.read(_MAX_BODY + 1)
finally:
response.close()
except HTTPError as exc:
status = int(getattr(exc, "code", 0) or 0)
try:
exc.read(_MAX_BODY)
except Exception:
pass
raise DecisionError(_status_message(status)) from None
except (URLError, TimeoutError, OSError):
raise DecisionError(
"approval-engine unreachable; OpenBao must not be called"
) from None
if status != 200 or len(raw) > _MAX_BODY:
raise DecisionError(_status_message(status if status != 200 else 502))
try:
payload = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
raise DecisionError("approval consume returned invalid JSON") from exc
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise DecisionError("approval consume returned invalid payload")
if payload.get("status") != "consumed":
raise DecisionError("approval consumption was not confirmed")
if payload.get("request_digest") != binding.request_digest:
raise DecisionError("approval consume digest does not match the request")
decision_id = payload.get("decision_id")
if decision_id is not None and (
not isinstance(decision_id, str) or not decision_id
):
raise DecisionError("approval consume returned an invalid decision id")
consumed_at = payload.get("consumed_at")
if consumed_at is not None and not isinstance(consumed_at, str):
raise DecisionError("approval consume returned an invalid consumed_at")
return ConsumedApproval(
approval_id=str(payload.get("approval_id") or approval_id),
request_digest=binding.request_digest,
decision_id=decision_id or binding.decision_id,
idempotent=bool(payload.get("idempotent")),
consumed_at=consumed_at or "",
)
def require_production_consume(
cfg: Any,
entry: Any,
*,
binding: ConsumeBinding | None,
evidence: Any = None,
opener: Callable[..., Any] | None = None,
) -> ConsumedApproval | None:
"""CAS-consume before a production OpenBao call. No-op off the prod path.
Build/test remain fail-open relative to approval-engine. The three-factor
unsafe-demo exception is not a consume path. Missing binding, URL, or
credential fail closed so a stance bypass cannot reach OpenBao.
"""
if getattr(entry, "stage", "") != "prod":
return None
if demo_exception_enabled(cfg):
return None
if binding is None:
raise DecisionError(
"production OpenBao call requires CAS consume of an approval "
"after an access-engine ALLOW; no durable consume binding is served"
)
base_url = str(getattr(cfg, "approval_url", "") or "")
auth_configured = approval_auth_configured(cfg)
if not base_url:
raise DecisionError(
"production OpenBao call requires approval-engine consume; "
"SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_URL is unset"
)
if not auth_configured:
raise DecisionError(
"production OpenBao call requires approval-engine consume; "
"SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_TOKEN_FILE or _CLIENT_SECRET_FILE is unset"
)
consumed = consume_approval(
base_url=base_url,
token_provider=lambda: approval_token(cfg, scope="approval:consume"),
binding=binding,
opener=opener or credential_urlopen,
)
if evidence is not None and hasattr(evidence, "mark_consumed"):
evidence.mark_consumed(consumed)
return consumed
def _status_message(status: int) -> str:
if status == 409:
return "approval consume conflict; OpenBao must not be called"
if status == 404:
return "approval not found; OpenBao must not be called"
if status in {401, 403}:
return "approval consume unauthorized; OpenBao must not be called"
if status == 503:
return "approval-engine unavailable; OpenBao must not be called"
if status == 0:
return "approval-engine unreachable; OpenBao must not be called"
return "approval consume failed; OpenBao must not be called"
def _request_token(
token_file: Path | None, token_provider: Callable[[], str] | None,
) -> str:
if (token_file is None) == (token_provider is None):
raise DecisionError("approval request requires exactly one credential provider")
token = (
token_provider() if token_provider is not None
else read_strict_token_file(Path(token_file), purpose="approval credential")
)
if not isinstance(token, str) or not token or any(ch.isspace() for ch in token):
raise DecisionError("approval credential is invalid")
return token