Reuse the gated-executor approval pattern: ssh-keygen -Y signatures over exact
bytes, verified against a runtime-unwritable allowed_signers anchor with a fixed
namespace per purpose. load_trust now refuses responder trust without a founder
admission; the KeyCape selector preflight gains --admission for one exact,
bounded recovery attempt. WP14 re-pointed to CUST-WP-0082-T06 and split founder
key admission into human-gated T04; WP15 T04 now requires the signed admission.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 809600@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 40ba228f-c8a0-4ec9-bb29-3129951afdc4
SCOPE, layer.yaml and the custody doc said the platform JWT role was
unpublished. The role is applied, its consumer contract is published
(railiance-platform 21b8af3) and login was proven on 2026-10-10. The role
is login-only, so engine actions still use the named providers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 544698@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 279b8520-335f-4041-ba2a-9491335473db
A configured exec owner may receive fields from other consenting kv lanes.
Each lane is gated, consumed and read through its own AppRole; any refusal
starts no child. Companions are part of the owner digest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 226514@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 26ba103d-05fe-45a1-9cd7-9475bf239df6
SCOPE.md is the capability boundary other agents read, and three of its
claims had gone stale — one of them describing checks that were deliberately
removed months of decisions ago.
- It said the engine "builds and validates the flex-auth ActionAuthorization
profile", including State Hub authority and an independently required
distinct-approver threshold. All three are wrong: ActionAuthorization is
deferred and never ratified (FLEX-DEC-2026-006) and nothing validates it,
the State Hub authority constant was removed because State Hub is a read
model with no runtime approval authority, and the approver threshold is
folded into valid_now by the issuer rather than re-checked here. Replaced
with the actual two-artifact split from GH-DEC-2026-005, including the
reduction in what this engine verifies alone, stated rather than buried.
- It said the access-engine serving endpoint does not exist. It does, and
step 2 is proven against it. Step 1 is the unserved half.
- The layer-model table row repeated the ActionAuthorization framing.
Also records the structured-correspondence rule and the tenant requirement
in the capability list, and adds responder authentication to Not Implemented
— it is a real gap in what this engine can promise, not merely flex-auth's
open work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715726@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092
rotate replaces one declared KV field through the merge-safe patch path
and never prints the value. Overlay states active/suspended/deactivated/
compromised live under the evidence directory. compromise/reactivate and
successful suspend/deactivate/revoke update that overlay; exec/wrap/
handoff/provision refuse non-active lanes. Provider-side rotation stays
with rotation.owner. Production remains fail-closed.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a05f07-ae72-7781-9fcb-19efd61add00
session revoke accepts exactly one of --accessor-file or --lease-id-file.
Lease ids are read from a mode-0600 out-of-repo file and fingerprinted in
evidence; the handle is never printed. Production remains fail-closed.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a05f07-ae72-7781-9fcb-19efd61add00
Write the selected field to a mode-0600 temp file, inject FIELD_FILE for
the child only, then overwrite and unlink on every exit path. The value
is not copied into the child environment.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a05f07-ae72-7781-9fcb-19efd61add00
secrets-engine wrap writes a single-use OpenBao wrap token to a mode-0600
out-of-repo file and never prints it. KV reads and AppRole secret_ids are
wrapped with a 15m TTL cap. Unwrapped secret payloads fail closed.
Production wrap remains fail-closed.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a05f07-ae72-7781-9fcb-19efd61add00
Select service-jwt, bootstrap, or env exclusively: JWT login uses a JSON
file, self-revokes, and never falls back to bootstrap or BAO_TOKEN. The
platform JWT mount/role is still unpublished, so auto keeps named
bootstrap/env providers.
session revoke --accessor-file revokes an already-issued token with
fingerprint-only evidence. Production remains fail-closed.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a05f07-ae72-7781-9fcb-19efd61add00
Load pep-stance.yaml as the live unreachable-engine gate and record named
stance fields on privileged evidence. Classify evidence, queue load-bearing
records in a local outbox, and add heartbeat/drain commands that never sit
on a mutation path. Publish proposed SSH-CA and secret-use evidence
contracts without adding an OpenBao SSH-CA write.
T02 (access-engine decision records) and T06 (no standing credential) stay
wait on external endpoints.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a04cea-cb33-7c63-bad7-c1b0f9f0076b
Replace the gate-house review note with this repository's own declaration:
INTENT.md frontmatter, layer.yaml, and a published PEP stance map. SCOPE.md
and agent boundary docs now match that layer. The review under history/
identifies the implementation remainder; SECRETS-WP-0008 is the follow-on
workplan. SECRETS-IN-0001 is closed.
The layer is not contested. Catalog "custody" is a finding: OpenBao owns
custody, this engine owns the lifecycle API over it. SSH-CA signing is
accepted as a proposed engine API and declined as a Staff lane.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a04cea-cb33-7c63-bad7-c1b0f9f0076b
- SECRETS-WP-0004: scoped warden-sign OpenBao token lane for ops-warden, to
unblock FLEX-WP-0007 T4 joint smoke. First auth-capability (non-KV) lane and
first lane touching production OpenBao (bao.coulomb.social).
- SCOPE.md: add the standard sections flagged by the repo scope review (Relevant
When, Not Relevant When, How It Fits, Terminology, Related / Overlapping,
Provided Capabilities with fenced capability blocks); refresh Current State to
reflect the delivered MVP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements SECRETS-WP-0002 end to end as a uv-managed Python package:
- catalog: non-secret lane registry + strict validator (build/test/prod)
- stage roles + OpenBao ACL policies; guards refuse wildcards, sys/, identity/,
admin names, and cross-stage paths before any backend call
- plan/apply: dry-run-first, idempotent policy + approle apply, decision-gated
- decisions: State Hub lookup with local-fixture fallback; non-secret evidence
to JSONL + hub progress, scrubbed of any value
- provision/verify: mode-0600 file import + generated test values; positive/
negative checks that never print the value
- exec delivery: `exec --catalog ... -- npm publish` injects the token via a
temp .npmrc for the child only, cleaned up on exit/failure/interrupt
- ops-warden routing contract + hardening backlog docs
- 34 tests incl. live OpenBao integration; scripts/demo-e2e.sh runs the full
chain against a throwaway bao dev server
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
