The anonymous JWT login inherited BAO_TOKEN/VAULT_TOKEN and the bao CLI
token helper, so it presented an env/operator token alongside the JWT.
Run that login with no env token and a token helper that returns none,
proven against the real bao CLI. This closes secrets-engine's part of the
CCR-2026-0038 no-fallback check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 544698@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 279b8520-335f-4041-ba2a-9491335473db
Founder direction 2026-10-06 and ops-mason plan
keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client-custody (658cdbc): no workstation copy.
service-jwt now gets CLIENT_SECRET from platform/workloads/keycape/
secrets-engine-openbao through one attended OIDC login on
keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-operator-workload-kv-read (-no-store, token from
a pipe, header-only GET, unconditional revoke-self). The consumer file is
refused for this profile and kept for the approval client.
service-auth probe-openbao prints value-free first-use evidence.
SECRETS-WP-0012: T02 cancelled (D1-D4 superseded), T04 done, T03 is the
founder-run first live use. Synthetic tests only; 524 passed, 1 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 132360@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 769b1afd-4330-4c86-96b2-e510e26db42b
session revoke accepts exactly one of --accessor-file or --lease-id-file.
Lease ids are read from a mode-0600 out-of-repo file and fingerprinted in
evidence; the handle is never printed. Production remains fail-closed.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a05f07-ae72-7781-9fcb-19efd61add00
secrets-engine wrap writes a single-use OpenBao wrap token to a mode-0600
out-of-repo file and never prints it. KV reads and AppRole secret_ids are
wrapped with a 15m TTL cap. Unwrapped secret payloads fail closed.
Production wrap remains fail-closed.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a05f07-ae72-7781-9fcb-19efd61add00
Select service-jwt, bootstrap, or env exclusively: JWT login uses a JSON
file, self-revokes, and never falls back to bootstrap or BAO_TOKEN. The
platform JWT mount/role is still unpublished, so auto keeps named
bootstrap/env providers.
session revoke --accessor-file revokes an already-issued token with
fingerprint-only evidence. Production remains fail-closed.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a05f07-ae72-7781-9fcb-19efd61add00
Apply, provision, and verify the prod lane on live OpenBao, publish
@whynot/design@0.4.1 through native secrets-engine exec, and teach the
OpenBao client to tolerate stage-role mount/approle probes when sys/mounts
and sys/auth are denied.
Add the warden-sign auth-capability lane, AppRole handoff, verification guards, docs, and tests.
Point the whynot-design pilot at the canonical decision and add the real publish closeout preflight/runbook.
Implements SECRETS-WP-0002 end to end as a uv-managed Python package:
- catalog: non-secret lane registry + strict validator (build/test/prod)
- stage roles + OpenBao ACL policies; guards refuse wildcards, sys/, identity/,
admin names, and cross-stage paths before any backend call
- plan/apply: dry-run-first, idempotent policy + approle apply, decision-gated
- decisions: State Hub lookup with local-fixture fallback; non-secret evidence
to JSONL + hub progress, scrubbed of any value
- provision/verify: mode-0600 file import + generated test values; positive/
negative checks that never print the value
- exec delivery: `exec --catalog ... -- npm publish` injects the token via a
temp .npmrc for the child only, cleaned up on exit/failure/interrupt
- ops-warden routing contract + hardening backlog docs
- 34 tests incl. live OpenBao integration; scripts/demo-e2e.sh runs the full
chain against a throwaway bao dev server
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
