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secrets-engine/tests/fixtures/flex-auth-live/PROVENANCE.md
tegwick 03c0569820
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feat: adopt the owner-documented PDP access path, and prove it live 
Adoption asked for by flex-auth (FLEX-WP-0021-T05) and glas-harness
(GLAS-WP-0015), plus the first real decision this engine has obtained from
the deployed pin -- which found a defect the fixtures could not.

ACCESS PATH. require_supported_pdp_address refuses in-cluster Service names
and any non-loopback host. This is no longer a unilateral call: the owner
path is documented as loopback kubectl port-forward over the authenticated
Kubernetes API, which is what authenticates the responder transitively
(FLEX-DEC-2026-010). A Service name from a workstation does not fail, it
resolves through the DNS search suffix to an unrelated public host, and
since decision records carry no signature, a responder knowing the
published package and version can return an allow that passes every check
we make. Fail-closed protects against a PDP that is absent, not one that
lies. The guard runs before the token is read, so a misdirected request
cannot leak it; a test pins that ordering.

LIVE PROOF. Minted a 10-minute TokenRequest token (audience flex-auth, SA
secrets-engine/secrets-engine, mode 0600 outside the worktree, shredded
after), forwarded to the named pod, and sent a real CheckRequest for
glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic. Result: allow, catalog_lane_policy_matched,
served by v2 (sha256:bd11c5fe...) -- so the redeploy flex-auth flagged as
outstanding has landed and the pin no longer serves the tenant-blind v1.
Our tenant fix is confirmed against the real service: binding.tenant is
tenant:platform.

THE DEFECT IT FOUND. The evaluator enriches from its registry before
hashing -- subject gains attributes and tenant, resource gains tenant --
so binding.request_digest is over material we never sent and cannot
reproduce. validate_decision_envelope rejects every real allow.

Every replay test passes because _request_from() rebuilds the request out
of the binding, i.e. the enriched form: a self-consistent fake agreeing
with itself, which hid this through three rounds of digest work. Third
time a real artifact has beaten a fake in this integration.

NOT FIXED, DELIBERATELY. Rejecting a valid allow is wrong in the safe
direction. Which fields may be enriched is flex-auth's contract to publish;
inferring it means accepting a binding that differs from our proposal in a
way we decided was benign -- the fail-open shape GH-DEC-2026-008 rejected
for vocabularies and FLEX-DEC-2026-007 for digests. Raised with them.

Tenant question closed by operator decision 5ed3fb35: tenant:platform
exactly, and service_auth.TENANT stays tenant:coulomb because the two
identity layers are to remain distinct. Declining to author that mapping
was right -- the answer was neither reading offered.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715726@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092
2026-09-07 00:22:12 +02:00

1.6 KiB
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Live decision from the deployed pin

Not a vendored example. This is a real DecisionEnvelope this engine obtained on 2026-09-07 from the deployed flex-auth-secrets-engine pin, through the owner-documented access path:

  • loopback kubectl port-forward to the named pod flex-auth-secrets-engine-65c74d4858-qvf2p, over the authenticated Kubernetes API (FLEX-DEC-2026-010: this is what authenticates the responder);
  • a 10-minute TokenRequest token for ServiceAccount secrets-engine/secrets-engine, audience flex-auth, in a mode-0600 file outside the worktree, shredded after use;
  • request built by build_action_request for the real catalog lane glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic, action rotate.

The decision is allow, catalog_lane_policy_matched, served by secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v2 (sha256:bd11c5fe…) — so the redeploy flex-auth flagged as outstanding has landed and the pin no longer serves the tenant-blind v1.

It contains no secret material: subject and resource metadata, digests, and policy provenance only.

Why it is kept. It is the artifact that proved the digest join does not hold against a real request. The evaluator enriches subject (attributes, tenant) and resource (tenant) from its registry before hashing, so binding.request_digest cannot equal a digest computed over the unenriched request we sent. Every replay fixture test passes because _request_from() rebuilds the request from the binding, which is the enriched form — a self-consistent fake agreeing with itself. Only a real request exposed it.