tegwick
3a1bd4f1c8
Assistant: codex Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-sol Assistant-Session: 01a0217e-8c4c-7383-be6b-f50a6e485306
73 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
73 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# Hardening Backlog — Exit From Bootstrap Mode
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The MVP runs in **bootstrap mode**: stage roles may be driven by temporary
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root-created OpenBao tokens read from mode-0600 files. That is acceptable setup
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material, **not** the steady state. This backlog tracks the work to retire it.
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The MVP is honest about this: bootstrap mode is a documented, bounded phase with
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explicit revocation tasks — not a hidden permanent security posture.
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## H0 — Revoke outstanding bootstrap tokens (always-on hygiene)
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Every minted bootstrap token has a revocation task. Track each here:
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| Token file | Stage | Minted | TTL | Revoked? |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| `~/.secrets-engine/bootstrap/prod.token` | prod | (n/a — demo uses dev server) | 1h | n/a |
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| `~/.secrets-engine/bootstrap/prod-warden-sign.token` | prod | SECRETS-WP-0004 live lane applied via attended operator flow; file use not recorded in repo | 1h | cleanup/revocation evidence not recorded |
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| `~/.secrets-engine/bootstrap/prod-whynot-design.token` | prod | SECRETS-WP-0003 live apply/provision/publish 2026-07-03 | 1h | file shredded 2026-07-03; accessor revoke deferred (OpenBao sealed; 1h TTL likely expired) |
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Revoke: `bao token revoke -accessor <accessor>` then `shred -u <file>`.
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For SECRETS-WP-0004, the scoped `warden-sign` token used for the 2026-06-29
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smoke had a `15m` TTL; explicit accessor revocation and handoff-file cleanup are
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operator-side hygiene if any material remains. Do not record accessors or file
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contents in this repo.
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## H0a — Revoke pilot workload tokens
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| Credential | Custody path | Minted | Revocation task | Revoked? |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| whynot-design Gitea bot npm/package token | OpenBao lanes `whynot-design-npm-publish` + `platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish`; handoff file shredded after provision | SECRETS-WP-0003 publish `@whynot/design@0.4.1` 2026-07-03 | Rotate in Gitea when TTL/policy requires; handoff source file deleted with `shred -u` after provision | handoff shredded; lane value remains in OpenBao |
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## H1 — Replace bootstrap token files with OIDC / service auth
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- Stand up an OpenBao auth method (OIDC or AppRole bound to a workload identity)
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for each stage role.
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- secrets-engine logs in via that method instead of reading a token file.
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- Remove `--bootstrap-token-file` from the steady-state path (keep only for true
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break-glass, heavily audited).
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## H2 — Response-wrapped handoff
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- Add a `wrapped` delivery mode using OpenBao response wrapping for operator
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handoff flows where exec-time injection does not fit.
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## H3 — Production dual-control
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- Require two-person approval (`approval.model: dual-control`) for prod value
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provisioning before automating raw-value writes beyond the pilot.
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## H4 — Rotation & lifecycle states
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- Implement `rotate` and persistent `compromised` / `deactivated` lane states
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with evidence. Explicit suspend/deactivate/destroy plans now exist, and
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ordinary `revoke` safely aliases native AppRole/policy deactivation, but lane
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state and coordinated provider/workload rotation remain outstanding. Live
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destroy remains disabled until exact-action authorization is available.
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## H5 — Audit report command
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- `secrets-engine audit <catalog-id>` summarizing non-secret evidence (decision,
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applies, provisions, verifications, execs, revokes) for a lane.
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## H6 — API service mode
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- Expose the stabilized CLI semantics as a local service API for ops-warden,
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CI, agents, and a future UI — **after** the CLI contract is proven.
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## Exit criteria for "bootstrap mode is over"
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- No steady-state flow reads a bootstrap token file.
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- Every stage role authenticates through OIDC/service auth.
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- Production provisioning beyond the pilot requires dual-control.
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- Rotation and deactivation are first-class, evidenced operations.
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