| capability.security.credential-lifecycle |
secrets-engine |
draft |
infotech |
| discovery |
availability |
| current |
target |
confidence |
rationale |
| D3 |
D5 |
medium |
Owner scope, neighboring responsibilities, concrete use cases and limitations are documented; no exhaustive or generalized maturity claim. |
|
| current |
target |
confidence |
rationale |
| A2 |
A2 |
medium |
Source interface assessed 2026-10-14: CLI catalog, plan, exact OpenBao metadata apply, provisioning, verification, delivery and revoke. Availability describes the delivery form, not production acceptance. Production protected execution and independently anchored PDP authentication remain incomplete. |
|
|
| completeness |
reliability |
| level |
confidence |
basis |
| C1 |
low |
Source artifacts establish a bounded capability; no independent consumer-completeness assessment in this review. |
|
| level |
confidence |
basis |
| R0 |
low |
No longitudinal consumer reliability measurement established by this review. |
|
|
Cataloged credential lifecycle |
Decision-gated CLI for cataloged OpenBao lanes covering catalog, plan, exact metadata apply, provisioning, verification, exec delivery (exec-env/npm-config/exec-file), wrapped handoff, rotate, revoke and lifecycle, with founder-signed trust admission and a local evidence outbox. |
| security |
| netkingdom |
| framework-reuse |
|
| intent |
includes |
excludes |
use_cases |
| CLI catalog, plan, exact OpenBao metadata apply, provisioning, verification, delivery and revoke |
| CLI catalog, plan, exact OpenBao metadata apply, provisioning, verification, delivery and revoke |
|
| Production protected execution and independently anchored PDP authentication remain incomplete |
|
| U04: Protected operation obtains and consumes exact human approval before its side effect |
| U05: Operator provisions and delivers a scoped workload credential through the approved owner lane |
| U07: Owner inventories, rotates, revokes and detects exposure of credentials |
|
|
| current_level |
target_level |
current_artifacts |
consumption_modes |
| A2 |
A2 |
| SCOPE.md |
| src/secrets_engine/decision_check.py |
| src/secrets_engine/founder_admission.py |
| docs/founder-admission.md |
| tools/verify_service_jwt_boundary.py |
| tools/check-keycape-recovery-selector.py |
|
|
|
| related_to |
| capability.security.approval-lifecycle |
| capability.authorization.policy-evaluate |
| capability.railiance.platform-services |
| capability.security.ssh-certificate-issuance |
|
|
| documentation |
| SCOPE.md |
| src/secrets_engine/decision_check.py |
| src/secrets_engine/founder_admission.py |
| docs/founder-admission.md |
| tools/verify_service_jwt_boundary.py |
| tools/check-keycape-recovery-selector.py |
|
|
| recommended_for |
not_recommended_for |
known_limitations |
| Protected operation obtains and consumes exact human approval before its side effect |
| Operator provisions and delivers a scoped workload credential through the approved owner lane |
| Owner inventories, rotates, revokes and detects exposure of credentials |
|
| Production protected execution and independently anchored PDP authentication remain incomplete |
|
| Production protected execution and independently anchored PDP authentication remain incomplete |
| Founder-signed admission of the PDP trust file and recovery attempts is source only (2026-10-21); the real producer key admission (SECRETS-WP-0014-T04) and native rollout (T03) are outstanding. |
| service-jwt is login-only; it cannot carry engine actions yet. |
| 2026-10-14 architecture review estimates operational maturity separately; a registry entry does not authorize execution or establish deployment. |
|
|