tegwick
a3897c2317
Adds the consumer custody packet for KEY-WP-0037-T02 / RPF-WP-0035-T02, strict value-free client-secret file checks with a check-secret-file CLI, synthetic tests, and SECRETS-WP-0012 tracking founder decisions and the attended delivery as needs_human wait tasks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 132360@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 769b1afd-4330-4c86-96b2-e510e26db42b
48 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
48 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# KeyCape service-auth consumer boundary
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secrets-engine now implements the consumer half of KeyCape's accepted
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`secrets-engine-openbao` service-auth contract. It performs one explicit HTTPS
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`client_credentials` exchange, keeps the resulting JWT in memory, and validates
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the non-cryptographic contract before any future OpenBao login:
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- subject `service:secrets-engine`, audience/client `secrets-engine-openbao`;
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- service principal in `tenant:platform` (platform infrastructure, tenant zero), role `secrets-engine`;
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- exact `openbao:login` scope and KeyCape AAL1 client-secret assurance;
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- RS256 declaration, bounded issue/expiry timestamps, maximum 15-minute life,
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and renewal when no more than three minutes remain;
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- no ID token, refresh token, implicit retry provider, or fallback identity.
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The confidential-client secret must be an explicitly selected mode-0600 file
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outside every Git worktree. It is sent with HTTP Basic authentication and never
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placed in a request body, command argument, evidence record, or object
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representation.
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Since 2026-10-06 the file must also be a canonical regular file (no symlink
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component) owned by the running user, in a parent directory owned by that
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user with mode 0700, and hold exactly one token.
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`secrets-engine service-auth check-secret-file [--path P] [--json]` reports
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those checks without the value. Consumer host, path, delivery and lifecycle
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coordinates: [keycape-openbao-consumer-custody.md](keycape-openbao-consumer-custody.md).
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JWT payload parsing does not prove a signature. OpenBao must verify RS256
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against the configured issuer before issuing a token. railiance-platform owns
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the exact OpenBao JWT auth mount/role, issuer keys, claim bindings, token
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policy, TTL/use limits, and cryptographic verification.
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When `SECRETS_ENGINE_OPENBAO_JWT_LOGIN` names that contract, the CLI selects
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`service-jwt` and logs in for one command, then self-revokes the OpenBao
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token. Failure of that path never falls back to `--bootstrap-token-file`,
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`BAO_TOKEN`, or AppRole. Until the contract is published, `--auth auto` keeps
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those named providers and `--auth service-jwt` fail-closes. See
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[openbao-jwt-login.md](openbao-jwt-login.md).
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Canonical provider contract:
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`key-cape/docs/openbao-service-auth-contract.md` (reviewed 2026-08-23).
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## Approval identity is separate
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[Approval service authentication](approval-service-auth.md) uses its own
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client-secret input, resource audience, exact tenant:platform and per-request
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read/consume scopes. Never put that credential into the OpenBao provider.
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Both providers now validate KeyCape’s actual `level`/`methods` assurance shape;
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the old `aal`/`method` fixture was incompatible with the issuer.
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