Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
6.8 KiB
Approval consumption (PEP)
Status: engine consumer and the PIP claim/validate join are implemented; live production remains fail-closed until approval-engine and access-engine actually serve the durable objects.
Normative protocol: gate-house/docs/contracts/approval-consumption.md
(GH-DEC-2026-003). Implementation surface:
approval-engine/docs/approval-consumption.md. This document records how
secrets-engine, as the PEP for OpenBao writes, consumes that protocol. It
does not redefine it.
Sequence
1. PIP GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim
2. PDP access-engine Check / decide → ALLOW
3. PEP POST /v1/approvals/{id}/consume → CAS
4. PEP OpenBao call → only after consume succeeds
Each artifact is validated by the layer that owns its data
(GH-DEC-2026-005). There is no single bundled object:
| Step | Artifact | Owner | Validated by |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | approval-claim | approval-engine | approval_claim.validate_approval_claim |
| 2 | DecisionEnvelope | flex-auth | authorization.validate_decision_envelope |
The claim carries the approval fact: issuer, valid_now, consumption state,
binding digest, freshness, reason_code. The envelope carries the decision:
effect, exact CheckRequest binding, canonical request digest, lifetime, and the
policy package/version pin. Neither republishes the other's data.
ActionAuthorization is deferred and was never ratified
(FLEX-DEC-2026-006). It cannot be served from a step-1 call, and nothing here
validates it. A ratified post-decision form remains a deferred option.
There are two different digests over the same proposed action, and they are never compared to each other:
claim.binding.digest— approval-engine native,sha256over canonical JSON of{action, actor, principal, purpose, target}.decision.binding.request_digest— flex-auth canonical CheckRequest digest.
claim.binding.pdp_digest is the only comparison usable today, and its
absence fails the action closed. The claim's binding.action and
binding.target speak approval-engine's vocabulary (secrets.kv.destroy,
{"id": ..., "stage": ...}) while ours speaks the catalog's (destroy,
catalog:<id>), and no mapping between them is published. flex-auth makes no
cross-check either and states the correspondence is ours. Computing a native
digest from our own vocabulary would compare two different languages and never
match, so this engine does not compute one. Closing that gap needs a published
mapping co-authored by approval-engine and flex-auth; it is a prerequisite for
SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 making destroy reachable.
What is hashed in the flex-auth digest
tenant, subject, action, resource, context — and nothing else.
id is correlation only, policy_version lives in provenance, and
caring_context is hashed separately. Including any of them yields a digest
that matches no issued decision. digest_material enforces the exclusion and
tests/test_decision_replay.py pins it against two real envelopes.
A consumer re-hashing the original unenriched request will not match a decision that turned on registry attributes: the binding is the evaluator's statement of what it hashed, so recompute from the binding tuple.
The approval-engine object id is never inferred from a State Hub decision UUID.
It comes from catalog approval.authorization_id, and is the value in the
{id} path segment echoed back as approval_id.
There is no authority constant. The engine previously required
provenance.authority == "state-hub", which contradicted its own source: State
Hub is a read model and holds no runtime approval authority, so that check
failed closed against every correctly issued record. The approval fact's
authority is approval-engine (checked as issuer); the decision's is flex-auth.
Every live privileged production handler passes _require_lane_approval,
which calls require_production_consume before OpenBaoClient.resolve.
Dry-run and plan do not consume. Build/test remain fail-open relative to
approval-engine. The three-factor unsafe-demo exception is not a consume
path.
Fail closed
| Condition | Result |
|---|---|
| No served consume binding | refuse; no OpenBao |
| URL/token/authorization id all unset | binding is None → refuse; no OpenBao |
| Partially configured join (missing subject or policy pin) | raise; never degrade to "unconfigured" |
| Claim digest, action, or field set mismatch | refuse; no OpenBao |
Missing SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_URL or token file |
refuse; no OpenBao |
| HTTP 409 / different digest | refuse; no OpenBao |
| Same digest after consume | idempotent success; OpenBao may proceed |
| 401/403/404/503/unreachable | refuse; no OpenBao |
| Side effect fails after consume | approval is spent; no unconsume |
The consume response is mutation evidence (status=consumed plus the
presented digest). It is not a permission. Evidence records approval id,
digest, idempotence, and consumed-at only. No token, secret, or accessor.
Required configuration
The join is absent by default, so an unconfigured engine behaves exactly as it did before. Production additionally needs:
| Variable | Meaning |
|---|---|
SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_URL |
approval-engine base URL (claim + consume) |
SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_TOKEN_FILE |
mode-0600 credential, outside Git |
SECRETS_ENGINE_AUTHORIZATION_SUBJECT_ID / _SUBJECT_TYPE |
the acting principal |
SECRETS_ENGINE_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY_PACKAGE / _VERSION |
the live pin (step 2) |
SECRETS_ENGINE_PDP_URL / _PDP_TOKEN_FILE |
the per-consumer access-engine pin |
The distinct-approver threshold is no longer a consumer-side check. The claim
does not expose approver entries; approval-engine folds that requirement into
valid_now, which is true only when enough distinct authenticated approvers
have been recorded and the object is not consumed, superseded, revoked, or
expired.
There is deliberately no default policy pin. The reserved coordinate is
secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle / v1, but that is a reservation, not
a publication (FLEX-DEC-2026-005) and must not be configured until
FLEX-WP-0021-T02 publishes the package. docs/gated-actions.md supplies the
action vocabulary that package is built from.
Step 2 additionally needs the flex-auth-secrets-engine Service DNS. No
estate-wide PDP exists by design — flex-auth runs per-consumer cluster-local
pins — and that pin has not been created, so the PDP call is not wired yet.
What this does not do
- It does not enable live production. Unreachable-engine stance still
fail-closes production until an access-engine decision record is served
(
SECRETS-WP-0007-T04/SECRETS-WP-0008-T02). - It does not render or cache an authorization decision.
- It does not infer consumption from a decision record or from local evidence.