secrets-engine/workplans/SECRETS-WP-0008-layer-model-lifecycle-conformance.md

id	type	title	domain	repo	status	owner	topic_slug	created	updated	state_hub_workstream_id
SECRETS-WP-0008	workplan	Evolve the Lifecycle engine to the accepted security layer model	infotech	secrets-engine	active	grok	custodian	2026-08-29	2026-09-06	9c9e5164-b2f5-5ea2-a557-5368d65e9fe0

SECRETS-WP-0008 - Evolve the Lifecycle engine to the accepted security layer model

Goal

Close the gaps between the 2026-08-29 layer declaration (Engine / Lifecycle) and the obligations the accepted NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.7 places on a PEP-shaped Lifecycle engine.

Source review: history/2026-08-29-layer-model-scope-intent-review.md. Declaration surface already landed this session: INTENT.md frontmatter, layer.yaml, pep-stance.yaml, and tests/test_layer_conformance.py.

This workplan does not restart CLI hardening owned by SECRETS-WP-0007. It adds the layer-model remainder: stance binding, decision-record consumption, audit-core evidence, and the two proposed engine surfaces.

Non-goals

• Taking ops-warden's SSH access lane or becoming a credential broker.
• Rendering or caching authorization decisions.
• Observation in production or automatic containment (companion §10: both are at zero estate-wide).
• Service mode, runtime tenancy, or a second custody backend.
• Reopening live production on State Hub status or local fixtures.

Coordination

• SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 owns the consumer validator and the fail-closed production gate until a durable ActionAuthorization object is served.
• SECRETS-WP-0007-T05 owns delivery-session self-revocation and the KeyCape scaffold; this workplan owns the layer-model "no standing credential" bar.
• railiance-platform owns production OpenBao and the JWT role.
• access-engine / State Hub own serving the decision record.
• audit-core owns evidence custody.
• ops-warden owns the SSH Staff PEP and must assent any SSH-CA API contract.
• kings-guard owns secret-abuse posture and must assent the evidence surface.
• gate-house owns statute §13.1 inventory of PEP stance maps.

Tasks

Publish stance application as shipped behaviour

id: SECRETS-WP-0008-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "945735c6-2d3d-5f72-baf0-692e6b210889"

Completed 2026-08-29. _require_lane_approval loads pep-stance.yaml. SHIPPED_STANCE is pinned equal to the published map. Fail-closed production evidence records stance_stage, stance_failure_mode, and omits stance_decision_id unless a decision was rendered.

pep-stance.yaml is published and tests pin prod: fail_closed to _require_lane_approval. The gate is still hardcoded, and a refusal is recorded as a DecisionError rather than named stance fields.

Load the published map as the source of shipped defaults. When the unreachable-engine residue is applied, record at least stage, failure mode, and decision id present only where a decision was rendered. Keep the three-factor unsafe-demo exception out of the stance table. Assert map equality in tests/test_layer_conformance.py the way ops-warden's stance test does.

Acceptance:

• _require_lane_approval (or its successor) reads pep-stance.yaml.
• Changing the YAML without changing the code fails the test, and the reverse.
• Fail-closed production evidence includes named stance fields, never a secret.
• Build/test remain fail-open relative to access-engine and still require the existing lane-approval check; that residue stays documented as a gap until T02.

Consume access-engine decision records

id: SECRETS-WP-0008-T02
status: wait
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "3eb9cff8-1441-5437-9e92-a2b655c82d04"

Progress 2026-09-02. Gate House notice 632bdad9 (GH-DEC-2026-003): this engine is the PEP for FLEX-WP-0017-T05 / OpenBao writes. The shared consume function now lives in src/secrets_engine/approval_consume.py and every live privileged production handler reaches it through _require_lane_approval before OpenBaoClient.resolve. Conflict, unavailability, or a missing binding fail closed with no OpenBao call. Production still also fail-closes on the unpublished durable ActionAuthorization / consume-binding serving path, so this task remains wait.

Correction 2026-09-06. See SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 for the full note. Summary: the consume-before-OpenBao gate was real, but the PIP claim + validate join was a return None stub and validate_action_authorization had no production caller, so this task's "blocked on the durable serving path" framing hid an unimplemented local seam. The join is now implemented and tested; the remaining blocker is genuinely external (approval-engine claim endpoint and access-engine Check, both unreachable as of 2026-09-06).

Progress 2026-09-07. Step 2 is no longer blocked and is proved against a real decision. The 2026-09-06 note above says "approval-engine claim endpoint and access-engine Check, both unreachable"; the second half of that is now out of date and is corrected here rather than left to read as current.

access-engine Check is reachable through the owner-documented access path (loopback kubectl port-forward to the named pod plus a bounded TokenRequest token; docs/pdp-access-path.md). A real CheckRequest for glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic returned decision:0f9c98f14545c42d, allow, catalog_lane_policy_matched, under package secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v2 with binding.tenant: tenant:platform.

Two defects surfaced only because the request was real, both now fixed:

• Our CheckRequest carried no tenant, which v2 treats as a wrong_tenant denial rather than an omission (80eafaf).
• validate_decision_envelope required byte-equality between the binding and our unenriched request, which no real decision can satisfy because the evaluator normalizes and enriches from its registry before hashing. Corrected to the published consumer rule in 10baad9.

So the acceptance line "wrong digest, expired lifetime, superseded status, or missing record fail closed before OpenBao" is now exercised against a genuine envelope: the unrefreshed live decision is refused on lifetime, and a restated resource.attributes.stage, a foreign subject.tenant, or an unexpected enrichment field are each refused.

What remains is step 1 only. approval-engine must serve the claim endpoint; APPROVAL-WP-0002-T03 is still wait with no deployed base URL, so resolve_consume_binding returns None and production stays fail-closed. That is one external dependency rather than the two this task previously named.

Also recorded, and not a blocker for this task: flex-auth's response channel is unauthenticated (FLEX-DEC-2026-010). Fail-closed protects against a PDP that is absent, not one that lies. Until FLEX-WP-0024 ships detached signatures, the enforced loopback address shape is what stands in for responder authenticity.

Blocked on the durable ActionAuthorization serving path owned with SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 / State Hub / access-engine.

Once that object is served, a protected side effect holds a decision record identifying the request it was rendered for. Replay is permitted iff the canonical request digest matches and the lifetime holds. Do not cache the verdict. Do not treat State Hub status, a local fixture, or catalog admission as the decision.

Acceptance:

• Every live privileged production handler passes one shared consume function.
• Wrong digest, expired lifetime, superseded status, or missing record fail closed before OpenBao.
• Evidence carries the decision id; a fail-closed residue still records the stance instead.
• Local fixtures cannot authorize steady-state production.

Emit evidence under the §9.6 bound

id: SECRETS-WP-0008-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "0b54cedf-9335-5fa0-bdcb-1efa9a9cd98d"

Completed 2026-08-29. evidence-classification.yaml is the declaration. Load-bearing records are queued in evidence_dir/outbox/ before JSONL. secrets-engine evidence heartbeat emits a positive claim. Drain never sits on a mutation path and an audit-core outage leaves the queue in place.

Classify each privileged action as load-bearing or attributive. Today's trail is attributive local JSONL plus best-effort State Hub notes; completeness is already not claimed and must stay that way until the destination is audit-core.

Load-bearing classes (at least live destroy, production revoke/suspend of a control, and dual-control provision once those are enabled) require atomic emission via a local outbox and a declared cadence or heartbeat. Do not place a synchronous audit-core dependency inside the state-change transaction. Attributive classes may keep the current non-blocking trade if that trade stays declared.

Acceptance:

• A machine-readable classification exists next to the declaration.
• No control in this repository branches on presence or absence of a local evidence record.
• Load-bearing emission is queued locally; an audit-core outage does not block a revocation.
• Documentation uses the sound claim: the archive proves records it holds were not altered or truncated after arrival.

Accept the SSH-CA signing engine surface

id: SECRETS-WP-0008-T04
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "581aeee3-3d99-5034-992b-7d42e6542a19"

Completed 2026-08-29. Contract published at docs/ssh-ca-signing-contract.md. No OpenBao SSH-CA write was added. layer.yaml owner_status remains proposed.

ops-warden's ssh-ca-signing-write gap names this engine as intended owner. Accept the engine API, decline the Staff lane. Publish a contract ops-warden can call after an access-engine decision: sign a short-lived certificate for an adm/agt/atm actor under the caller's request, present no additional authority, reconstruct as the caller's action.

Do not implement a replacement client until ops-warden assents the contract. Do not unpark the standalone warden-sign AppRole as break-glass.

Acceptance:

• A non-secret contract document in docs/ states request, decision binding, lifetime, evidence, and non-responsibilities.
• ops-warden has a recorded chance to assent or contest.
• No OpenBao SSH-CA write is added to this CLI ahead of that assent.
• layer.yaml owner_status remains proposed until the surface ships.

Accept the secret-use evidence surface

id: SECRETS-WP-0008-T05
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "3100d28c-9494-5b21-9d5a-af583cd8aa55"

Completed 2026-08-29. Contract published at docs/secret-use-evidence-contract.md. layer.yaml owner_status remains proposed. route/audit are still not this surface.

2026-09-02: kings-guard assented in its own voice (message 75ebd2cc-a166-4676-94aa-deef2791c0c9). It will not consume the surface as an observation input until the surface ships and publishes its cadence declaration. No Tooling contact will be opened to fill that wait.

2026-09-02 later: shipped secrets-engine secret-use snapshot. Cadence is the declared 1d heartbeat on the snapshot envelope. owner_status stays proposed until kings-guard admits the snapshot as an observation input. route/audit remain distinct operator summaries.

kings-guard's secret-abuse posture is fixture-driven because no engine exposes lease, revocation, mount, rotation, and delivery-session metadata. route and audit are operator summaries over local JSONL and are not that surface.

Publish a read-only engine contract of non-secret metadata, bounded by §9.6: it cannot prove omission at source. Coordinate destination with audit-core. Do not give kings-guard a vault client, and do not return values.

Acceptance:

• Contract lists fields, freshness, and the evidence bound.
• kings-guard has a recorded chance to assent or contest.
• No secret material, token, or accessor is in the surface.
• layer.yaml owner_status remains proposed until the surface ships.

No standing engine credential

id: SECRETS-WP-0008-T06
status: wait
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "d7bc8bdc-a0f8-5058-a640-374ef9859148"

Progress 2026-09-02. Named engine auth is shipped: service-jwt, bootstrap, and env are exclusive providers. --auth service-jwt exchanges the KeyCape service JWT and logs in through OpenBaoClient.login_jwt (JSON file, never argv), then self-revokes. A JWT selection refuses --bootstrap-token-file and does not read BAO_TOKEN on failure. --bootstrap-token-file is a named break-glass provider with auth_break_glass evidence.

The platform-owned OpenBao JWT mount/role is still unpublished, so auto keeps bootstrap/env and this task remains wait. Companion §7 / statute §3.4: an agent holds no long-lived credential of its own. Authority is per task, time-bounded, and attributable to the principal it acts for.

Bootstrap token files remain break-glass, heavily evidenced, never an implicit fallback from service identity.

Acceptance:

• Steady-state CLI/API auth is the reviewed service identity, not --bootstrap-token-file.
• Bootstrap is a named break-glass provider with distinct evidence.
• No fallback from JWT/service-auth failure into bootstrap or AppRole.
• Issued delivery sessions continue to self-revoke as in WP-0007-T05.

Exit criteria

• The published PEP stance is the shipped default and stance application is recorded by name.
• Production live side effects require an access-engine decision record, or remain fail-closed with a recorded stance.
• Evidence classification and destination match §9.6; completeness is not claimed.
• SSH-CA and secret-use surfaces are either contracted with the declaring repositories or explicitly declined in this repository's own voice.
• Bootstrap is not the steady-state engine credential.
• layer.yaml / pep-stance.yaml / INTENT frontmatter stay in one voice.
• No raw secret values in Git, State Hub, chat, prompts, workplans, evidence, or argv.