secrets-engine/docs/service-auth.md
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Name the secrets-engine-openbao consumer custody coordinates.
Adds the consumer custody packet for KEY-WP-0037-T02 / RPF-WP-0035-T02,
strict value-free client-secret file checks with a check-secret-file CLI,
synthetic tests, and SECRETS-WP-0012 tracking founder decisions and the
attended delivery as needs_human wait tasks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 132360@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 769b1afd-4330-4c86-96b2-e510e26db42b
2026-10-06 13:39:29 +02:00

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KeyCape service-auth consumer boundary

secrets-engine now implements the consumer half of KeyCape's accepted secrets-engine-openbao service-auth contract. It performs one explicit HTTPS client_credentials exchange, keeps the resulting JWT in memory, and validates the non-cryptographic contract before any future OpenBao login:

  • subject service:secrets-engine, audience/client secrets-engine-openbao;
  • service principal in tenant:platform (platform infrastructure, tenant zero), role secrets-engine;
  • exact openbao:login scope and KeyCape AAL1 client-secret assurance;
  • RS256 declaration, bounded issue/expiry timestamps, maximum 15-minute life, and renewal when no more than three minutes remain;
  • no ID token, refresh token, implicit retry provider, or fallback identity.

The confidential-client secret must be an explicitly selected mode-0600 file outside every Git worktree. It is sent with HTTP Basic authentication and never placed in a request body, command argument, evidence record, or object representation.

Since 2026-10-06 the file must also be a canonical regular file (no symlink component) owned by the running user, in a parent directory owned by that user with mode 0700, and hold exactly one token. secrets-engine service-auth check-secret-file [--path P] [--json] reports those checks without the value. Consumer host, path, delivery and lifecycle coordinates: keycape-openbao-consumer-custody.md.

JWT payload parsing does not prove a signature. OpenBao must verify RS256 against the configured issuer before issuing a token. railiance-platform owns the exact OpenBao JWT auth mount/role, issuer keys, claim bindings, token policy, TTL/use limits, and cryptographic verification.

When SECRETS_ENGINE_OPENBAO_JWT_LOGIN names that contract, the CLI selects service-jwt and logs in for one command, then self-revokes the OpenBao token. Failure of that path never falls back to --bootstrap-token-file, BAO_TOKEN, or AppRole. Until the contract is published, --auth auto keeps those named providers and --auth service-jwt fail-closes. See openbao-jwt-login.md.

Canonical provider contract: key-cape/docs/openbao-service-auth-contract.md (reviewed 2026-08-23).

Approval identity is separate

Approval service authentication uses its own client-secret input, resource audience, exact tenant:platform and per-request read/consume scopes. Never put that credential into the OpenBao provider. Both providers now validate KeyCape’s actual level/methods assurance shape; the old aal/method fixture was incompatible with the issuer.