tegwick a852d3f1ff feat(mvp): working secrets-engine CLI for the whynot-design npm publish lane

Implements SECRETS-WP-0002 end to end as a uv-managed Python package:

- catalog: non-secret lane registry + strict validator (build/test/prod)
- stage roles + OpenBao ACL policies; guards refuse wildcards, sys/, identity/,
  admin names, and cross-stage paths before any backend call
- plan/apply: dry-run-first, idempotent policy + approle apply, decision-gated
- decisions: State Hub lookup with local-fixture fallback; non-secret evidence
  to JSONL + hub progress, scrubbed of any value
- provision/verify: mode-0600 file import + generated test values; positive/
  negative checks that never print the value
- exec delivery: `exec --catalog ... -- npm publish` injects the token via a
  temp .npmrc for the child only, cleaned up on exit/failure/interrupt
- ops-warden routing contract + hardening backlog docs
- 34 tests incl. live OpenBao integration; scripts/demo-e2e.sh runs the full
  chain against a throwaway bao dev server

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-28 12:28:45 +02:00

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Hardening Backlog — Exit From Bootstrap Mode

The MVP runs in bootstrap mode: stage roles may be driven by temporary root-created OpenBao tokens read from mode-0600 files. That is acceptable setup material, not the steady state. This backlog tracks the work to retire it.

The MVP is honest about this: bootstrap mode is a documented, bounded phase with explicit revocation tasks — not a hidden permanent security posture.

H0 — Revoke outstanding bootstrap tokens (always-on hygiene)

Every minted bootstrap token has a revocation task. Track each here:

Token file	Stage	Minted	TTL	Revoked?
`~/.secrets-engine/bootstrap/prod.token`	prod	(n/a — demo uses dev server)	1h	n/a

Revoke: bao token revoke -accessor <accessor> then shred -u <file>.

H1 — Replace bootstrap token files with OIDC / service auth

Stand up an OpenBao auth method (OIDC or AppRole bound to a workload identity) for each stage role.
secrets-engine logs in via that method instead of reading a token file.
Remove --bootstrap-token-file from the steady-state path (keep only for true break-glass, heavily audited).

H2 — Response-wrapped handoff

Add a wrapped delivery mode using OpenBao response wrapping for operator handoff flows where exec-time injection does not fit.

H3 — Production dual-control

Require two-person approval (approval.model: dual-control) for prod value provisioning before automating raw-value writes beyond the pilot.

H4 — Rotation & lifecycle states

Implement rotate, and explicit compromised / deactivated lane states with evidence, beyond the current revoke (metadata delete).

H5 — Audit report command

secrets-engine audit <catalog-id> summarizing non-secret evidence (decision, applies, provisions, verifications, execs, revokes) for a lane.

H6 — API service mode

Expose the stabilized CLI semantics as a local service API for ops-warden, CI, agents, and a future UI — after the CLI contract is proven.

Exit criteria for "bootstrap mode is over"

No steady-state flow reads a bootstrap token file.
Every stage role authenticates through OIDC/service auth.
Production provisioning beyond the pilot requires dual-control.
Rotation and deactivation are first-class, evidenced operations.

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