Reuse the gated-executor approval pattern: ssh-keygen -Y signatures over exact bytes, verified against a runtime-unwritable allowed_signers anchor with a fixed namespace per purpose. load_trust now refuses responder trust without a founder admission; the KeyCape selector preflight gains --admission for one exact, bounded recovery attempt. WP14 re-pointed to CUST-WP-0082-T06 and split founder key admission into human-gated T04; WP15 T04 now requires the signed admission. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 809600@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 40ba228f-c8a0-4ec9-bb29-3129951afdc4
3 KiB
Founder admission (SSH signature over exact bytes)
Two inputs need authority from outside this process: the Access Engine
responder trust file (SECRETS-WP-0014) and a KeyCape recovery attempt
(SECRETS-WP-0015). The runtime itself must not be able to grant either. Both
now use the approval pattern the estate already accepted in gated-executor
(GEXEC-WP-0001, installed on railiance01 2026-10-20). The founder signs exact
bytes with the passphrase-protected key, and the verifier trusts only an
allowed_signers file that the runtime account cannot write.
Implementation: src/secrets_engine/founder_admission.py. No new approval
service, network call or key type is involved. ssh-keygen -Y works offline,
so the recovery case still works when KeyCape/OpenBao are down.
Anchor
/etc/secrets-engine/admission/ root:root 0755
/etc/secrets-engine/admission/allowed_signers root:root 0644
SECRETS_ENGINE_ADMISSION_ANCHOR may name another directory. The checks stay
the same either way: the directory and file are not symlinks, not group/world
writable, and not owned by the running UID unless that UID is root. The signer
principal is read from the signature (find-principals), and it must match
exactly one allowed_signers entry.
Namespaces are fixed per purpose, so a signature for one purpose cannot admit
another. That includes a gexec action approval (gexec-approval).
| Purpose | Namespace | Signed file | Signature |
|---|---|---|---|
| PDP responder trust | secrets-engine-pdp-trust |
pdp-trust.json |
pdp-trust.json.sig |
| Recovery attempt | secrets-engine-recovery-attempt |
attempt admission JSON | <file>.sig |
Admit or rotate responder trust
ssh-keygen -Y sign -f ~/.ssh/<founder-key> -n secrets-engine-pdp-trust pdp-trust.json
load_trust verifies the signature over the same bytes it parses. Any edit
needs a new signature, so rotation means a newly signed file. Overlap is two
keys in one signed file, and removal is a signed file without the old key.
Neither the file's presence nor a loopback URL counts as admission.
Admit one recovery attempt
{"schema": "secrets-engine.recovery-attempt-admission.v1",
"selector_sha256": "sha256:<exact selector file bytes>",
"source_sha256": "sha256:<service_auth.py>",
"issuer": "https://kc.coulomb.social",
"case": "secrets15-nk49-readiness",
"not_before": "YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ", "not_after": "YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ"}
ssh-keygen -Y sign -f ~/.ssh/<founder-key> -n secrets-engine-recovery-attempt attempt.json
tools/check-keycape-recovery-selector.py --selector docs/keycape-recovery-selector.json \
--source-sha256 sha256:<...> --admission attempt.json
The window may be at most 24 hours. A pass reports
founder_admitted_attempt_not_native_acceptance. That status proves the
founder admitted this exact attempt. It does not prove the attempt ran, that it
ran only once, or that the native result passed. Single-use consumption and
cleanup stay with the bounded NK-WP-0049 execution process.