security-canon/SCOPE.md
tegwick eeb3e88af7 Close the bootstrap and vocabulary workplan
All tasks resolved: T01, T02, T03, T04, T06 and T07 done, T05 cancelled. The
workplan delivered the governed repository, the Mode of Authority vocabulary at
v0.2.0, the federation interface card, three decisions, the concept-placement
record and the reference-impact survey.

It also concluded that the migration it was preparing should not happen. The
material this canon was meant to receive is load-bearing where it sits, and
SecurityCanon's real contribution is an architecture-layer vocabulary that
InfoTechCanon does not have, so it is an extension canon rather than a
destination for extracted material. Nothing moves; the boundary holds by
declared imports, twelve InfoTechCanon concepts pinned and nine owned here.

SCOPE.md carries the three open questions to their answers rather than leaving
them carried, and points at the placement record and the survey.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
2026-09-20 22:48:23 +02:00

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4 KiB
Markdown

# SCOPE
Reviewed: 2026-09-20 (Europe/Berlin), after [SEC-ADR-001](docs/adr-001-securitycanon-boundary.md).
## Current repository scope
Bootstrap. The repository carries governance files — INTENT, SCOPE, AGENTS,
repo classification — the [SEC-ADR-001](docs/adr-001-securitycanon-boundary.md)
boundary decision, the Mode of Authority review in `history/`, and one active
workplan. The only content is the Mode of Authority v0.1 research draft, not yet
promoted into a canon artifact. There is no service code, and by decision there
will be none.
## Ownership and boundaries
Following [INTENT.md](INTENT.md), SecurityCanon occupies the Taxonomy layer and
owns security concept definitions and their cross-canon mappings. It imports
shared roots from InfoTechCanon and does not redefine them.
Out of scope, with the owner named:
- the CARING access governance standard and its Kubernetes RBAC benchmark,
the access-control model, and the identity model — **InfoTechCanon**, by
SEC-ADR-001 D1 and D3
- any CLI, HTTP API, or validation service — **InfoTechCanon's service surface**,
by SEC-ADR-001 D4; integration is via the canon-federation interface card
- security architecture and standards of record for the estate — NetKingdom
- authorization decisions — flex-auth
- login, OIDC, MFA — key-cape / Keycloak
- secret custody and credential issuance — OpenBao, ops-warden
- adversarial evidence and findings practice — whitehat-security
- shared artifact/ownership/mapping/profile mechanisms — InfoTechCanon
- consumer runtime state, enforcement, observation, and adoption evidence — the consumers
## Planned scope
The near-term deliverable is the architecture-layer vocabulary, not a migration.
| Deliverable | Task |
| --- | --- |
| Mode of Authority promoted to a checkable Tier-1 artifact | `SECURITY-WP-0001-T06` |
| Terminology separation from CARING and the access-control model | `SECURITY-WP-0001-T07` |
| Federation interface card declaring Auth Mode as an export | `SECURITY-WP-0001-T04` |
| Orientation surfaces: vocabulary card, design heuristic, disambiguation page | `SECURITY-WP-0001-T06` |
InfoTechCanon artifacts this canon **references rather than absorbs**:
| Path in info-tech-canon | Relationship |
| --- | --- |
| `infospace/standards/caring/` | implementation layer; imports the vocabulary |
| `infospace/models/access-control/` | owns Subject, Principal, IdentityReference |
| `infospace/models/identity/` | shared root; stays upstream |
| `infospace/models/security/` | boundary under review in `SECURITY-WP-0001-T02` |
| `infospace/models/devsecops/` | boundary under review in `SECURITY-WP-0001-T02` |
Open questions, answered under SECURITY-WP-0001 and no longer carried:
- the security and DevSecOps models stay in InfoTechCanon. Both were the only
remaining migration candidates and neither cleared the bar of demonstrably
helping both canons (SECURITY-DEC-2026-003);
- the small-saas profile's security artifacts stay whole in InfoTechCanon. A
SecurityCanon example references them by id across the federation interface
rather than relocating them;
- the Actor/Subject naming question, analysed in
[the implications note](docs/260920-actor-subject-implications.md) and decided
under `SECURITY-WP-0001-T07`: the on-behalf-of dimension is `AuthorityContext`
and no upstream concept is redefined.
Concept placement across the boundary — one owning canon and one import
direction per shared concept — is recorded in
[concept-placement.md](infospace/interfaces/concept-placement.md), with the
supporting survey of InfoTechCanon's existing authority vocabulary in
[infotechcanon-authority-survey.md](infospace/mappings/infotechcanon-authority-survey.md).
## Exclusions and evolution
No service surface is in scope, now or later: SEC-ADR-001 D4 settles that
SecurityCanon reuses InfoTechCanon's service rather than shipping its own. A
check that does not exist is a change request against InfoTechCanon.
A dedicated identity or personhood canon may eventually be right. It is deferred
and belongs to no current workplan.