soul-frame/sources/bibliography.md

# Annotated Bibliography

Sources summarized in relation to Soul Frame terminology.

**Phase I note:** Detailed cluster bibliographies live in
`research/foundations/001-references.md` through `004-references.md` and
Research Note 005/006 reference files. This file is the **consolidated index**
of foundational entries required for workplan completion and paper prep.

Classification tags:

- `foundational` — primary works establishing major theoretical concepts
- `contemporary` — rigorous recent research
- `applied` — architectures, standards, implementations
- `legal` — legislation, case law, legal scholarship, regulation, ethics
- `cultural` — literature, film, games, theatre, conceptual explorations

---

## Entry template

```text
Citation:
Tags:
Relevant Soul Frame concepts:
Summary:
Agreements with Soul Frame:
Disagreements / tensions:
Adjacent terminology:
Source notes path:
```

---

## A. Systems theory, cybernetics, closure

### SF-R001 — Ashby 1956

```text
Citation: Ashby, W. Ross. 1956. An Introduction to Cybernetics. London: Chapman & Hall.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind, regulation, state, environment
Summary: Foundational cybernetics of regulation, variety, feedback, system state.
Agreements: Mind as adaptive regulation has strong precedent.
Disagreements / tensions: classical cybernetics is not a theory of personhood.
Adjacent terminology: regulator, requisite variety, black box
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md
```

### SF-R002 — Conant & Ashby 1970

```text
Citation: Conant, Roger C., and W. Ross Ashby. 1970. “Every Good Regulator of a
  System Must Be a Model of That System.” International Journal of Systems Science 1(2): 89–97.
  DOI: 10.1080/00207727008920220
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind = Model
Summary: Good Regulator Theorem linking successful regulation to modeling.
Agreements: Core support for model-based Mind (H3).
Disagreements / tensions: theorem assumptions; “model” may be weaker than folk representation.
Adjacent terminology: regulator, model, control
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md
```

### SF-R003 — Maturana & Varela 1980

```text
Citation: Maturana, Humberto R., and Francisco J. Varela. 1980. Autopoiesis and
  Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
  DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Being, closure, autonomy, boundary
Summary: Living systems as self-producing, organizationally closed unities.
Agreements: Being requires more than a drawn boundary; self-maintaining organization.
Disagreements / tensions: autopoiesis is biological; do not declare artificial Beings autopoietic.
Adjacent terminology: autopoiesis, structural coupling, operational closure
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md, 002-references.md
```

### SF-R004 — Luhmann 1995 [1984]

```text
Citation: Luhmann, Niklas. 1995. Social Systems. Stanford University Press.
  (German: Soziale Systeme, 1984.)
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Being, boundary, system/environment
Summary: Social systems theory; operational closure; system/environment distinction constitutive of system.
Agreements: Boundary belongs primarily to Being, not Soul (SF-C002).
Disagreements / tensions: Luhmann’s systems are communications, not person-like Beings.
Adjacent terminology: operational closure, structural coupling, observation
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md
```

### SF-R019–R034 — Autonomy cluster (selected)

Priority set from RN-002 (see `research/foundations/002-references.md`):

| ID | Work | Role for Soul Frame |
|---|---|---|
| Varela 1979 | *Principles of Biological Autonomy* | autonomy, self-reference |
| Di Paolo 2005 | Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency | adaptivity vs passive persistence |
| Barandiaran et al. 2009 | Defining Agency | individuality, normativity, asymmetry |
| Moreno & Mossio 2015 | *Biological Autonomy* | book-length autonomy synthesis |
| Montévil & Mossio 2015 | Closure of constraints | organizational closure formalization |
| Krakauer et al. 2020 | Information Theory of Individuality | graded, temporal individuality |
| Nicholson & Dupré 2018 | *Everything Flows* | process ontology of persistence |

```text
Tags: foundational / contemporary
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Autonomous individuality, Being criteria B1–B8
Source notes path: research/foundations/002-references.md
```

---

## B. Mind beyond substrate; social mind precursors

### SF-R005 — Clark & Chalmers 1998

```text
Citation: Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers. 1998. “The Extended Mind.” Analysis 58(1): 7–19.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind, Body, boundary
Summary: External resources may constitutively participate in cognition when suitably coupled.
Agreements: Body/Mind/Soul are functional dimensions, not physical compartments.
Disagreements / tensions: coupling vs constitution debates continue.
Adjacent terminology: extended mind, parity principle
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md
```

### SF-R006 — Hutchins 1995

```text
Citation: Hutchins, Edwin. 1995. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind, collective cognition, TE-05
Summary: Cognition analyzed at system level of people + artifacts (e.g. navigation).
Agreements: Mind boundaries need not coincide with individual skulls; collective cases matter.
Disagreements / tensions: when is collective Mind vs environment?
Adjacent terminology: distributed cognition
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md
```

### SF-R007 — Mead 1934

```text
Citation: Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self, and Society. University of Chicago Press.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind, recognition, co-adaptive model building
Summary: Mind and Self develop in social interaction; taking the attitude of the other.
Agreements: social mind; recursive modeling precursors (H4).
Disagreements / tensions: historical social psychology, not formal multi-agent theory.
Adjacent terminology: generalized other, self, significant symbol
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md; RN-006
```

---

## C. Personal identity and continuity

### SF-R035 — Locke 1689/1690

```text
Citation: Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, ch. XXVII
  “Of Identity and Diversity.” (Nidditch ed. 1975.)
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Identity, continuity, person vs organism
Summary: Foundational psychological approach to personal identity; consciousness/memory strand.
Agreements: person continuity need not require same material substrate (H6).
Disagreements / tensions: identity ≠ stored memories alone.
Adjacent terminology: person, consciousness, memory
Source notes path: research/foundations/004-references.md
```

### SF-R036 — Parfit 1984

```text
Citation: Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Identity, continuity, fork (TE-03)
Summary: Psychological connectedness/continuity; fission; survival without strict identity.
Agreements: Identity ≠ Continuity; branching forces lineage concepts (H6 refined).
Disagreements / tensions: reductionism about persons; what matters in survival debates.
Adjacent terminology: Relation R, fission, psychological continuity
Source notes path: research/foundations/004-references.md
```

### SF-R037 — Olson SEP 2023

```text
Citation: Olson, Eric T. 2023. “Personal Identity.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tags: contemporary (secondary orientation)
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Identity disambiguation
Summary: Maps characterization, personhood, persistence, and evidence questions.
Agreements: Soul Frame must not collapse these questions into one “identity” term.
Disagreements / tensions: animalism as major rival to psychological continuity.
Adjacent terminology: animalism, persistence conditions
Source notes path: research/foundations/004-references.md
```

### Additional identity cluster

| Work | Role |
|---|---|
| Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another* (1992) | sameness vs selfhood; narrative |
| Schechtman, *The Constitution of Selves* (1996) | reidentification vs characterization |
| Meincke in *Everything Flows* (2018) | process identity of persons |
| Cerullo 2015 (uploading/branching) | artificial branching identity |
| Qin et al. 2026; Otsuka et al. 2026 (arXiv) | AI agent identity governance (applied) |

Full detail: `research/foundations/004-references.md`, `References-ResearchNote005.md`.

---

## D. Concept matrix coverage (Phase I)

| Soul Frame concept | Primary sources (minimum) |
|---|---|
| Being / closure | Maturana & Varela; Luhmann; Moreno & Mossio; Krakauer et al. |
| Body | extended mind; embodiment literature; operational coupling |
| Mind | Ashby; Conant & Ashby; predictive/active inference (pointer) |
| Soul | structural coupling; legacy/relational continuity (synthesis) |
| Identity | Locke; Parfit; Olson; process ontology |
| Recognition | Mead; intentional stance literature (pointer); RN-001 tripartition |
| Co-adaptive models | Mead; alignment/common ground; I-POMDP (RN-006) |

Phase I **done criterion** (≥5 foundational annotated entries against matrix): **met**.

---

## E. Phase II — Cognitive science (model-based mind)

### SF-R070 — Clark 2016 (predictive processing)

```text
Citation: Clark, Andy. 2016. Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the
  Embodied Mind. Oxford University Press.
Tags: contemporary / foundational for PP
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind, Body, model
Summary: Predictive processing account of perception and action.
Agreements: Mind as hierarchical generative modeling guiding action (H3).
Disagreements / tensions: neural-centric packaging; extended-mind pluralism needed.
Adjacent terminology: prediction error, generative model
Source notes path: research/cognitive-science/mind-as-model-map.md
```

### SF-R071 — Hohwy 2013

```text
Citation: Hohwy, Jakob. 2013. The Predictive Mind. Oxford University Press.
Tags: contemporary
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind
Summary: Systematic philosophy of predictive mind.
Agreements: internal generative models as cognitive core.
Disagreements / tensions: more internalist than distributed/social Mind accounts.
Adjacent terminology: prediction error minimization
Source notes path: research/cognitive-science/mind-as-model-map.md
```

### SF-R072 — Friston active inference (pointer)

```text
Citation: Friston, Karl. Active inference / free-energy principle literature
  (e.g. Friston 2010 and subsequent reviews).
Tags: contemporary
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind, Body, closure (Markov blankets — caution)
Summary: Agents as inference engines minimizing free energy via generative models.
Agreements: unified model of perception and action.
Disagreements / tensions: Markov blanket ≠ Being (RN-002); over-extension risk.
Adjacent terminology: free energy, generative model, Markov blanket
Source notes path: research/cognitive-science/mind-as-model-map.md;
  research/foundations/002-references.md (Kirchhoff et al.; Bruineberg et al. critique)
```

### SF-R073 — Baker, Saxe & Tenenbaum 2009

```text
Citation: Baker, Chris L., Rebecca Saxe, and Joshua B. Tenenbaum. 2009.
  “Action Understanding as Inverse Planning.” Cognition 113(3): 329–349.
Tags: contemporary
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Other-Model, Mind, co-adaptive model building
Summary: Infer goals/beliefs from observed action under approximate rationality.
Agreements: Other-Model as inverse inference from behavior.
Disagreements / tensions: rational-agent priors; incomplete for character/relation models.
Adjacent terminology: inverse planning, theory of mind
Source notes path: research/foundations/References-ResearchNote006.md
```

---

## F. Phase II — Social cognition & co-adaptation

Full annotated set: `research/foundations/References-ResearchNote006.md` (SF-R057+).

Priority sources for H4:

| ID | Work | Role |
|---|---|---|
| SF-R057 | Premack & Woodruff 1978 | Theory of Mind / Other-Model |
| SF-R058 | Mead 1934 | Social self; reflected models |
| SF-R059–060 | Clark et al. | Common ground / grounding |
| | Pickering & Garrod 2004 | Interactive alignment |
| | Tomasello et al. 2005 | Shared intentionality (strong case, not definition) |
| | De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007/2010 | Participatory sense-making |
| | Gmytrasiewicz & Doshi 2005 | Recursive multi-agent models |
| SF-R073 | Baker et al. 2009 | Inverse planning |

---

## G. Phase II — Recognition & sociology

### SF-R080 — Dennett intentional stance (pointer)

```text
Citation: Dennett, Daniel C. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, 1987
  (and related essays).
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Recognition (intentional), Being, APE
Summary: Predict systems by attributing beliefs and desires.
Agreements: intentional recognition without solving consciousness.
Disagreements / tensions: over-generation / false positives for Beinghood.
Adjacent terminology: intentional system, design stance, physical stance
Source notes path: research/sociology/recognition-and-social-beinghood.md
```

### SF-R081 — Honneth recognition theory (pointer)

```text
Citation: Honneth, Axel. The Struggle for Recognition (and related works).
Tags: foundational / contemporary
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Recognition (social/normative), Social Beinghood
Summary: Recognition as condition of practical identity and social freedom.
Agreements: social/normative recognition deeper than mere identification.
Disagreements / tensions: moral theory must not be smuggled into descriptive Beinghood.
Adjacent terminology: recognition, respect, social freedom
Source notes path: research/sociology/recognition-and-social-beinghood.md
```

### SF-R082 — Schilbach et al. 2013

```text
Citation: Schilbach et al. 2013. “Toward a Second-Person Neuroscience.”
  Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(4): 393–414.
Tags: contemporary
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: intersubjectivity, interaction, Social Mind
Summary: Social cognition in real second-person interaction, not only spectator ToM.
Agreements: interaction process first-class; co-adaptation not private inference only.
Disagreements / tensions: neuroscience scope vs informational Being generality.
Adjacent terminology: second-person, intersubjectivity
Source notes path: research/foundations/References-ResearchNote006.md
```

---

## H. Phase III — Personhood, character, persona

### SF-R090 — Locke person (forensic/psychological)

```text
Citation: Locke, John. Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II.xxvii.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Personhood, Identity
Summary: Person vs organism; consciousness/forensic strands of personal identity.
Agreements: person concepts need not track biological human substance.
Disagreements / tensions: memory-centric readings too narrow (Phase I).
Adjacent terminology: person, man, substance
Source notes path: research/personhood/personhood-dimensions-map.md
```

### SF-R091 — Schechtman characterization vs reidentification

```text
Citation: Schechtman, Marya. 1996. The Constitution of Selves. Cornell UP.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Personhood, Character, Identity, Narrative
Summary: Separates reidentification (same entity?) from characterization (what is the person like?).
Agreements: narrative/character answers ≠ numerical identity (RN-004).
Disagreements / tensions: narrative self-constitution not sufficient for forks.
Adjacent terminology: narrative identity, self-constitution
Source notes path: research/character-persona/character-persona-performance-map.md
```

### SF-R092 — Goffman presentation of self

```text
Citation: Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Persona, Recognition, Social personhood
Summary: Front-stage/back-stage; impression management; roles in interaction.
Agreements: Persona as situated performance/projection (H8).
Disagreements / tensions: performance ≠ deception by default.
Adjacent terminology: role, front, impression management
Source notes path: research/character-persona/character-persona-performance-map.md
```

### SF-R093 — Dennett conditions of personhood (pointer)

```text
Citation: Dennett, Daniel C. essays on conditions of personhood / intentional systems.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Personhood (descriptive), APE
Summary: Multi-condition / cluster approaches to personhood.
Agreements: personhood as multidimensional profile, not single mark (H1/H2).
Disagreements / tensions: lists vary; moral uptake must stay separate.
Adjacent terminology: intentional system, person
Source notes path: research/personhood/personhood-dimensions-map.md
```

### SF-R094 — Personality psychology (pointer)

```text
Citation: Trait and social-cognitive personality traditions (e.g. Big Five family;
  Mischel/CAPS-style situation×disposition approaches).
Tags: contemporary / foundational psychology
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Character, State, Behavior
Summary: Dispositions stable yet context-sensitive.
Agreements: Character as dispositional structure; not fixed script.
Disagreements / tensions: traits ≠ full moral character; shallow trait vectors in AI.
Adjacent terminology: trait, disposition, situationism
Source notes path: research/character-persona/character-persona-performance-map.md
```