tegwick
3fbcca209d
Integrate research/foundations notes 001–005 into Terminology, Claims, bibliography, concept notes, thought experiments, and open questions. Write phase-i-foundations-synthesis.md, finish SOUL-WP-0002, and mark SOUL-WP-0003 ready for interaction research.
666 lines
18 KiB
Markdown
Executable file
666 lines
18 KiB
Markdown
Executable file
# References — Research Note 006
|
||
## Cluster C: Social Mind and Co-Adaptive Model Building
|
||
|
||
This bibliography supports **Research Note 006 — Social Mind and Co-Adaptive Model Building**.
|
||
|
||
It covers the main research traditions used to develop the Soul Frame concepts of:
|
||
|
||
- Other-Model
|
||
- Reflected-Self Model
|
||
- Relationship Model
|
||
- Shared Situation Model
|
||
- Common-Ground Model
|
||
- Generalized Social Model
|
||
- recursive social modeling
|
||
- participatory sense-making
|
||
- mutual recognition
|
||
- and Co-Adaptive Model Building
|
||
|
||
The numbering continues the Soul Frame research bibliography.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R057 — Premack, David, and Guy Woodruff. 1978.
|
||
|
||
**“Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?”**
|
||
*Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 1(4): 515–526.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1017/S0140525X00076512`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- theory of mind
|
||
- attribution of mental states
|
||
- beliefs
|
||
- intentions
|
||
- goals
|
||
- knowledge
|
||
- other-modeling
|
||
- perspective separation
|
||
|
||
This paper is a foundational source for the modern theory-of-mind research tradition.
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
It provides a clear precedent for the **Other-Model**:
|
||
|
||
> a model through which one Being attributes action-relevant internal states to another Being in order to understand or predict behavior.
|
||
|
||
Soul Frame generalizes this beyond beliefs and intentions to include:
|
||
|
||
- character,
|
||
- capabilities,
|
||
- preferences,
|
||
- uncertainty,
|
||
- relationship state,
|
||
- and context.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R058 — Mead, George Herbert. 1934.
|
||
|
||
**Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist.**
|
||
Edited by Charles W. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- social formation of Mind
|
||
- taking the attitude of the other
|
||
- reflexivity
|
||
- self-model
|
||
- social self
|
||
- generalized other
|
||
- community expectations
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
Mead provides one of the strongest historical precedents for the proposition that a Self-Model is partly shaped by models of how others respond to and understand the self.
|
||
|
||
This supports the Soul Frame concept of the:
|
||
|
||
> **Reflected-Self Model**
|
||
|
||
and motivates the **Generalized Social Model** for expectations associated with groups, institutions, communities, and roles.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R059 — Clark, Herbert H., and Deanna Wilkes-Gibbs. 1986.
|
||
|
||
**“Referring as a Collaborative Process.”**
|
||
*Cognition* 22(1): 1–39.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1016/0010-0277(86)90010-7`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- collaborative communication
|
||
- grounding
|
||
- shared reference
|
||
- common ground
|
||
- interaction history
|
||
- conventions
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
The paper demonstrates that successful reference in dialogue is collaboratively established rather than fully specified by one participant and passively decoded by another.
|
||
|
||
This provides an important precedent for:
|
||
|
||
> **Common Ground as a co-constructed interactional achievement.**
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R060 — Clark, Herbert H., and Susan E. Brennan. 1991.
|
||
|
||
**“Grounding in Communication.”**
|
||
In Lauren B. Resnick, John M. Levine, and Stephanie D. Teasley, eds., *Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition*, pp. 127–149. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1037/10096-006`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- grounding
|
||
- common ground
|
||
- evidence of understanding
|
||
- collaborative communication
|
||
- repair
|
||
- coordination costs
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
Clark and Brennan provide the central precedent for Soul Frame's **Common-Ground Model** and for treating grounding as an active loop:
|
||
|
||
```text
|
||
proposal
|
||
↓
|
||
interpretation
|
||
↓
|
||
evidence of understanding
|
||
↓
|
||
confirmation / correction
|
||
↓
|
||
common-ground update
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R061 — Pickering, Martin J., and Simon Garrod. 2004.
|
||
|
||
**“Toward a Mechanistic Psychology of Dialogue.”**
|
||
*Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 27(2): 169–190.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1017/S0140525X04000056`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- interactive alignment
|
||
- dialogue
|
||
- linguistic coordination
|
||
- reciprocal adaptation
|
||
- shared representations
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
Interactive alignment provides a strong mechanism-level precedent for part of **Co-Adaptive Model Building**.
|
||
|
||
Soul Frame is intentionally broader:
|
||
|
||
\[
|
||
CoAdaptation \not\Rightarrow Alignment
|
||
\]
|
||
|
||
because Beings may co-adapt through:
|
||
|
||
- disagreement,
|
||
- competition,
|
||
- conflict,
|
||
- deception,
|
||
- negotiation,
|
||
- or role differentiation.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R062 — Tomasello, Michael, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne, and Henrike Moll. 2005.
|
||
|
||
**“Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition.”**
|
||
*Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 28(5): 675–691.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1017/S0140525X05000129`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- shared intentionality
|
||
- joint attention
|
||
- collaborative activity
|
||
- cultural cognition
|
||
- common ground
|
||
- joint goals
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
This source helps distinguish:
|
||
|
||
- coordination,
|
||
- common ground,
|
||
- joint action,
|
||
- and shared intention.
|
||
|
||
Soul Frame treats shared intentionality as one important configuration of Social Mind rather than the foundation of all social cognition.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R063 — Sebanz, Natalie, Harold Bekkering, and Günther Knoblich. 2006.
|
||
|
||
**“Joint Action: Bodies and Minds Moving Together.”**
|
||
*Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 10(2): 70–76.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.009`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- joint action
|
||
- coordination
|
||
- action prediction
|
||
- timing
|
||
- representation of others' actions
|
||
- shared tasks
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
This work motivates the **Shared Situation Model**:
|
||
|
||
> a model of the situation in which several Beings jointly participate, including roles, timing, actions, constraints, and expected outcomes.
|
||
|
||
The Shared Situation Model is distinct from an Other-Model.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R064 — De Jaegher, Hanne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. 2007.
|
||
|
||
**“Participatory Sense-Making: An Enactive Approach to Social Cognition.”**
|
||
*Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 6(4): 485–507.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- participatory sense-making
|
||
- interaction autonomy
|
||
- coordination
|
||
- enactive social cognition
|
||
- meaning generation
|
||
- interaction process
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
This is one of the most important Cluster C sources.
|
||
|
||
It challenges a purely observer-centered model in which A privately infers B's hidden states and instead makes the **interaction process itself** explanatorily relevant.
|
||
|
||
This strongly motivates:
|
||
|
||
> **Interaction(A,B)** as a first-class Soul Frame object.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R065 — De Jaegher, Hanne, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, and Shaun Gallagher. 2010.
|
||
|
||
**“Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition?”**
|
||
*Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 14(10): 441–447.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1016/j.tics.2010.06.009`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- interactionist social cognition
|
||
- constitutive social interaction
|
||
- embodied coordination
|
||
- limits of pure mindreading models
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
This paper supports the Cluster C refinement:
|
||
|
||
> **Social Mind should not be reduced to private inference about hidden mental states.**
|
||
|
||
Interaction itself can carry cognitive work and change what each participant is able to understand.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R066 — Baker, Chris L., Rebecca Saxe, and Joshua B. Tenenbaum. 2009.
|
||
|
||
**“Action Understanding as Inverse Planning.”**
|
||
*Cognition* 113(3): 329–349.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.005`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- inverse planning
|
||
- Bayesian theory of mind
|
||
- goal inference
|
||
- belief inference
|
||
- prediction of action
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
This provides a computational formulation of the **Other-Model**:
|
||
|
||
```text
|
||
beliefs + goals
|
||
↓
|
||
planning
|
||
↓
|
||
action
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
with the observer attempting the inverse:
|
||
|
||
```text
|
||
observed action
|
||
↓
|
||
infer beliefs + goals
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Soul Frame treats inverse planning as one mechanism of social modeling, not as a complete theory of Social Mind.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R067 — Gmytrasiewicz, Piotr J., and Prashant Doshi. 2005.
|
||
|
||
**“A Framework for Sequential Planning in Multi-Agent Settings.”**
|
||
*Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research* 24: 49–79.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1613/JAIR.1579`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- I-POMDPs
|
||
- recursive beliefs
|
||
- nested agent models
|
||
- decision-making under uncertainty
|
||
- multi-agent planning
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
Interactive POMDPs provide a formal precedent for:
|
||
|
||
```text
|
||
A models B
|
||
|
||
A models B's model of A
|
||
|
||
A models B's model
|
||
of A's model of B
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
They also expose the computational limits of unrestricted recursive modeling.
|
||
|
||
This supports:
|
||
|
||
> **recursive model depth should be bounded and context-dependent.**
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R068 — Bratman, Michael E. 1992.
|
||
|
||
**“Shared Cooperative Activity.”**
|
||
*The Philosophical Review* 101(2): 327–341.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.2307/2185537`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- shared cooperative activity
|
||
- mutual responsiveness
|
||
- joint intention
|
||
- compatible subplans
|
||
- commitment
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
Bratman helps distinguish:
|
||
|
||
> **mere coordination**
|
||
|
||
from:
|
||
|
||
> **cooperative activity organized around shared intention and reciprocal responsiveness.**
|
||
|
||
Soul Frame retains the broader category of Co-Adaptive Model Building because social interaction also includes non-cooperative modes.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R069 — Schilbach, Leonhard, Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, Alan Costall, Gary Bente, Tobias Schlicht, and Kai Vogeley. 2013.
|
||
|
||
**“Toward a Second-Person Neuroscience.”**
|
||
*Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 36(4): 393–414.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1017/S0140525X12000660`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- second-person cognition
|
||
- direct engagement
|
||
- real-time interaction
|
||
- social neuroscience
|
||
- distinction between observing and interacting
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
This work supports the view that:
|
||
|
||
> **being engaged with another Being is cognitively different from merely observing that Being.**
|
||
|
||
It strengthens the case for treating real-time interaction as a constitutive input to Social Mind.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R070 — Fiske, Alan P. 1992.
|
||
|
||
**“The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality: Framework for a Unified Theory of Social Relations.”**
|
||
*Psychological Review* 99(4): 689–723.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1037/0033-295X.99.4.689`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- relationship schemas
|
||
- social coordination
|
||
- communal sharing
|
||
- authority ranking
|
||
- equality matching
|
||
- market pricing
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
Soul Frame does not currently adopt Fiske's four categories as canonical.
|
||
|
||
The important precedent is:
|
||
|
||
> **Beings model not only properties of other individuals but the relational structure organizing their interaction.**
|
||
|
||
This supports the first-class **Relationship Model**.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R071 — Rabinowitz, Neil C., Frank Perbet, H. Francis Song, Chiyuan Zhang, S. M. Ali Eslami, and Matthew Botvinick. 2018.
|
||
|
||
**“Machine Theory of Mind.”**
|
||
In *Proceedings of the 35th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2018)*.
|
||
|
||
arXiv:`1802.07740`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- machine theory of mind
|
||
- learned models of other agents
|
||
- latent character inference
|
||
- behavioral prediction
|
||
- artificial other-modeling
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
ToMnet demonstrates that machine systems can learn predictive representations of other artificial agents from observed behavior.
|
||
|
||
This is an important technical precedent for treating **Other-Model Quality** as a capability distinct from general language competence.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## SF-R072 — Shum, Michael, Max Kleiman-Weiner, Michael L. Littman, and Joshua B. Tenenbaum. 2019.
|
||
|
||
**“Theory of Minds: Understanding Behavior in Groups Through Inverse Planning.”**
|
||
*Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence* 33(1): 6163–6170.
|
||
|
||
**DOI:** `10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33016163`
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame relevance
|
||
|
||
- group behavior
|
||
- latent relationships
|
||
- social structure inference
|
||
- inverse planning
|
||
- multi-agent modeling
|
||
|
||
### Soul Frame connection
|
||
|
||
This work provides a computational precedent for inferring not only individual goals but **relationships among interacting agents**.
|
||
|
||
It supports the Soul Frame distinction:
|
||
|
||
\[
|
||
OtherModel \neq RelationshipModel
|
||
\]
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
# Source-to-Claim Map
|
||
|
||
| Soul Frame claim | Principal references |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| Other-modeling is a distinct social-cognitive capability | SF-R057, SF-R066, SF-R071 |
|
||
| Mental-state attribution can support behavior prediction | SF-R057, SF-R066 |
|
||
| Recursive models of other agents can be formalized | SF-R067 |
|
||
| Recursive social modeling must be practically bounded | SF-R067 |
|
||
| Self-models can be shaped by models of others' attitudes | SF-R058 |
|
||
| Community expectations can become part of self-related cognition | SF-R058 |
|
||
| Communication establishes common ground collaboratively | SF-R059, SF-R060 |
|
||
| Grounding is an active process of evidence and repair | SF-R060 |
|
||
| Dialogue can produce multi-level alignment | SF-R061 |
|
||
| Alignment is one result of interaction, not equivalent to all co-adaptation | SF-R061 plus Soul Frame synthesis |
|
||
| Joint action requires modeling shared tasks and other participants | SF-R063 |
|
||
| Shared intentionality is stronger than simple coordination | SF-R062, SF-R068 |
|
||
| Interaction itself can contribute constitutively to social cognition | SF-R064, SF-R065, SF-R069 |
|
||
| Social Mind should not be reduced to private mindreading | SF-R064, SF-R065, SF-R069 |
|
||
| Relationships require models distinct from models of individuals | SF-R070, SF-R072 |
|
||
| Latent relationship structures can be computationally inferred | SF-R072 |
|
||
| Artificial systems can learn predictive models of other agents | SF-R071 |
|
||
| Common ground does not require identical private representations | SF-R059, SF-R060 |
|
||
| Social interaction may create persistent conventions | SF-R059, SF-R060 |
|
||
| Co-adaptation can include competitive as well as cooperative interaction | SF-R067, SF-R068 plus Soul Frame synthesis |
|
||
| Interaction should be represented as a first-class state-bearing process | SF-R064, SF-R065 plus Soul Frame synthesis |
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
# Research Traditions Crosswalk
|
||
|
||
| Soul Frame concept | Research tradition | Key sources |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| Other-Model | Theory of Mind | SF-R057 |
|
||
| Other-Model | Bayesian inverse planning | SF-R066 |
|
||
| Machine Other-Model | Machine Theory of Mind | SF-R071 |
|
||
| Recursive Other-Model | I-POMDP / recursive agents | SF-R067 |
|
||
| Reflected-Self Model | Symbolic interactionism | SF-R058 |
|
||
| Generalized Social Model | Mead's generalized other | SF-R058 |
|
||
| Common-Ground Model | Collaborative communication | SF-R059, SF-R060 |
|
||
| Interaction Adaptivity | Interactive alignment | SF-R061 |
|
||
| Shared Situation Model | Joint action | SF-R063 |
|
||
| Shared Intention | Shared intentionality / joint activity | SF-R062, SF-R068 |
|
||
| Interaction Process | Participatory sense-making | SF-R064, SF-R065 |
|
||
| Second-person engagement | Second-person neuroscience | SF-R069 |
|
||
| Relationship Model | Relational-model theory | SF-R070 |
|
||
| Relationship inference | Computational social cognition | SF-R072 |
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
# Core Reading Set for Cluster C
|
||
|
||
For a compact canonical Cluster C foundation, prioritize these **nine** sources:
|
||
|
||
1. **Premack & Woodruff (1978)** — Theory of Mind
|
||
2. **Mead (1934)** — Mind, Self, and Society
|
||
3. **Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs (1986)** — Collaborative reference
|
||
4. **Clark & Brennan (1991)** — Grounding and common ground
|
||
5. **Pickering & Garrod (2004)** — Interactive alignment
|
||
6. **De Jaegher & Di Paolo (2007)** — Participatory sense-making
|
||
7. **Baker, Saxe & Tenenbaum (2009)** — Inverse planning
|
||
8. **Gmytrasiewicz & Doshi (2005)** — Recursive agent modeling
|
||
9. **Schilbach et al. (2013)** — Second-person cognition
|
||
|
||
Together they establish the conceptual path:
|
||
|
||
```text
|
||
other-model
|
||
↓
|
||
reflected self
|
||
↓
|
||
recursive modeling
|
||
↓
|
||
grounding
|
||
↓
|
||
alignment
|
||
↓
|
||
interaction dynamics
|
||
↓
|
||
second-person engagement
|
||
↓
|
||
co-adaptive model building
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Tomasello, Sebanz et al., Bratman, Fiske, Rabinowitz et al., and Shum et al. then deepen the shared-intention, joint-action, relationship, and artificial-agent branches.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
# Epistemic Classification
|
||
|
||
## Foundational / established primary works
|
||
|
||
- SF-R057 Premack & Woodruff
|
||
- SF-R058 Mead
|
||
- SF-R059 Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs
|
||
- SF-R060 Clark & Brennan
|
||
- SF-R061 Pickering & Garrod
|
||
- SF-R062 Tomasello et al.
|
||
- SF-R063 Sebanz et al.
|
||
- SF-R064 De Jaegher & Di Paolo
|
||
- SF-R065 De Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher
|
||
- SF-R066 Baker, Saxe & Tenenbaum
|
||
- SF-R067 Gmytrasiewicz & Doshi
|
||
- SF-R068 Bratman
|
||
- SF-R069 Schilbach et al.
|
||
- SF-R070 Fiske
|
||
|
||
## Established technical / computational precedents
|
||
|
||
- SF-R071 Rabinowitz et al.
|
||
- SF-R072 Shum et al.
|
||
|
||
These technical sources demonstrate implementable forms of other-modeling and relationship inference but should not be treated as complete theories of human or artificial Social Mind.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
# Terminological Lessons for Soul Frame
|
||
|
||
The literature supports keeping the following structures distinct:
|
||
|
||
```text
|
||
SELF MODEL
|
||
what A represents about A
|
||
|
||
OTHER MODEL
|
||
what A represents about B
|
||
|
||
REFLECTED-SELF MODEL
|
||
what A represents about B's model of A
|
||
|
||
RELATIONSHIP MODEL
|
||
what A represents about A↔B
|
||
|
||
SHARED SITUATION MODEL
|
||
what A represents about the situation involving A and B
|
||
|
||
COMMON-GROUND MODEL
|
||
what A treats as sufficiently mutually established
|
||
|
||
GENERALIZED SOCIAL MODEL
|
||
what A represents about group, role, institutional, or cultural expectations
|
||
|
||
INTERACTION PROCESS
|
||
the dynamic sequence through which A and B mutually alter one another
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
These distinctions are central to the Soul Frame definition of **Social Mind**.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
# Working Definition Supported by Cluster C
|
||
|
||
> **Social Mind is the capacity of a Mind to participate in co-adaptive interaction by maintaining and revising differentiated models of self, other Beings, relationships, and shared situations—including, where useful, models of how other Beings model itself—and by using interaction itself as a source and medium of model formation.**
|
||
|
||
And:
|
||
|
||
> **Co-Adaptive Model Building is the recurrent interaction process through which Beings mutually influence and revise action-guiding models of self, other, relationship, and shared situation, while those models shape actions that alter both the interaction and the evidence available for subsequent modeling.**
|
||
|
||
These are Soul Frame syntheses built from the preceding research traditions rather than definitions adopted from any single source.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
# Research Status
|
||
|
||
Cluster C currently supports three particularly important conclusions:
|
||
|
||
1. **Other-modeling is necessary but insufficient for mature Social Mind.**
|
||
2. **Interaction itself must be treated as cognitively and relationally significant.**
|
||
3. **Relationship and common-ground models are distinct from models of individual Beings.**
|
||
|
||
These conclusions should next be adversarially tested before the candidate dimensions are promoted into `SocialMindCriteriaV0.1.md`.
|