tegwick
dcd9f8dba6
Map descriptive personhood dimensions P1–P12, four kinds of personhood, and Character/Persona/Actor separations. Support H2/H8, judge TE-06, write phase-iii-personhood-synthesis.md, finish SOUL-WP-0004, and mark SOUL-WP-0005 ready.
6 KiB
6 KiB
Personhood Dimensions Map (Phase III)
Workplan: SOUL-WP-0004-T01
Date: 2026-08-12
Builds on: RN-003 §§24–28; SoulFrameIntroduction §§5–6; Phase I–II stack
1. Four kinds of personhood (must not collapse)
| Kind | Question | Typical sources / adjacent fields |
|---|---|---|
| Descriptive | What person-like capacities/structures does it exhibit? | psychology, cognitive science, AI character systems |
| Social | Is it treated as a social counterpart / person among us? | Mead; recognition theory; Phase II Social Beinghood |
| Moral | Does it warrant moral consideration / duties? | ethics of moral status; animal ethics; AI ethics |
| Legal | Does a legal system grant personality, rights, duties? | corporate personhood; civil codes; agency law |
Soul Frame default: “personhood” = descriptive unless qualified.
Architectural classification must not silently imply moral or legal status (ResearchProgram WS5).
2. Descriptive personhood profile (P1–P12)
Candidate dimensions (P1–P9 from RN-003; P10–P12 added for Phase III coverage):
| ID | Dimension | Question | Linked Soul Frame concepts |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 | Self-model | Model of self as distinct continuing entity? | SM2; identity |
| P2 | Other-model | Differentiated models of particular others? | SM3 |
| P3 | Relationship model | Histories/states of specific relationships? | SM5; Soul |
| P4 | Character | Persistent dispositions across contexts? | Character |
| P5 | Intentional organization | Behavior intelligible via extended intentions? | Mind; agency |
| P6 | Autobiographical integration | Events as its history? | continuity C4/C5 |
| P7 | Perspective | Entity-relative informational perspective? | first-person indexicality (without solving consciousness) |
| P8 | Commitments | Present actions bind future manifestations? | normative continuity |
| P9 | Social reciprocity | Recursive co-adaptation with others? | H4; Social Mind |
| P10 | Communicative competence | Can participate in shared symbol systems? | language; common ground |
| P11 | Responsibility-tracking | Can attributions of credit/blame stick diachronically? | identity + commitments |
| P12 | Value / preference structure | Stable cares, preferences, evaluative stance? | character; intentional organization |
Not a Boolean checklist. Profile scores; entities can be high on P10 and low on P4/P6 (stateless chatbot) or high on autonomy criteria and low on P1–P12 (daemon).
3. Independence of three axes (RN-003)
| Axis | Question |
|---|---|
| A — Autonomous individuality | Integrated self-maintaining individual? |
| B — Personhood (descriptive) | Someone-like qualities? |
| C — Social recognition | Modeled/treated as continuing counterpart? |
Illustrative profiles:
AUTONOMY PERSONHOOD RECOGNITION
Bacterium high low low
Human high high high
Self-maintaining daemon high low low
Stateless chatbot low high-ish high-ish
Persistent social AI medium high-ish high
This is why H2 holds: high personhood exposure ≠ Beinghood; high autonomy ≠ personhood.
4. APE vs Being
| APE | Being (Soul Frame v0.2 sense) | |
|---|---|---|
| Definition | Constructed to expose ≥1 personhood dimensions | Autonomous individual + enough personhood + addressability + recognition |
| Requirement | Intentional design for person-like interface | Systemic coherence + someone-like + social counterpart status |
| Stateless persona bot | often strong APE | not Being |
| Daemon | usually weak APE | autonomous individual, not Being |
| Persistent social AI | strong APE | candidate / proto-Being if continuity + recognition hold |
APE is a construction category; Being is an emergent status.
5. Literature anchors (descriptive / moral / legal separation)
Descriptive / philosophical person concepts
| Source | Role |
|---|---|
| Locke, Essay II.xxvii | person vs human organism; forensic/psychological strand |
| Strawson, Individuals / person as basic particular | persons as entities to which both mental and physical predicates apply (pointer) |
| Dennett, conditions of personhood essays | multi-condition lists; personhood as cluster |
| Frankfurt, second-order volitions | hierarchical desires; not exhaustive of personhood |
| Schechtman, Constitution of Selves | characterization vs reidentification questions |
Social personhood
| Source | Role |
|---|---|
| Mead 1934 | social self |
| Phase II recognition map | intentional vs social/normative recognition |
| Goffman, Presentation of Self | social presentation (also Persona) |
Moral personhood (boundary only — do not derive from architecture)
| Source | Role |
|---|---|
| Warren (moral status criteria tradition) | multi-criteria moral personhood lists — adjacent, not adopted as Soul Frame descriptive P-set |
| Animal / AI ethics surveys | show contested, independent of descriptive capacity lists |
Legal personhood (boundary only)
| Source | Role |
|---|---|
| Corporate legal personality | legal person ≠ descriptive person |
| Emerging AI legal personality debates | Phase V/XII map; not Phase III conclusions |
6. H2 assessment
H2: Personhood and Beinghood are distinct; substantial personhood without persistent Being is possible (and reverse).
| Support | RN-003 stateless chatbot vs daemon; three-axis profiles; APE category; Dennett-style cluster concepts |
| Conflict | Everyday language equates “person” with full moral/legal status |
| Evidence strength | moderate → strong (conceptual); empirical thresholds open |
| Status | supported (Phase III) |
7. Open questions
- Weighting of P1–P12 for “sufficient personhood” in Beinghood v0.2
- Minimal personhood for Social Beinghood vs full human-like profiles
- Whether P7 requires phenomenal consciousness (Soul Frame: no, by design)
- Moral/legal mapping tables (later workstreams)