soul-frame/sources/bibliography.md
tegwick 3fbcca209d Complete Phase I foundations (SOUL-WP-0002)
Integrate research/foundations notes 001–005 into Terminology, Claims,
bibliography, concept notes, thought experiments, and open questions. Write
phase-i-foundations-synthesis.md, finish SOUL-WP-0002, and mark SOUL-WP-0003
ready for interaction research.
2026-08-12 00:55:09 +02:00

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# Annotated Bibliography
Sources summarized in relation to Soul Frame terminology.
**Phase I note:** Detailed cluster bibliographies live in
`research/foundations/001-references.md` through `004-references.md` and
Research Note 005/006 reference files. This file is the **consolidated index**
of foundational entries required for workplan completion and paper prep.
Classification tags:
- `foundational` — primary works establishing major theoretical concepts
- `contemporary` — rigorous recent research
- `applied` — architectures, standards, implementations
- `legal` — legislation, case law, legal scholarship, regulation, ethics
- `cultural` — literature, film, games, theatre, conceptual explorations
---
## Entry template
```text
Citation:
Tags:
Relevant Soul Frame concepts:
Summary:
Agreements with Soul Frame:
Disagreements / tensions:
Adjacent terminology:
Source notes path:
```
---
## A. Systems theory, cybernetics, closure
### SF-R001 — Ashby 1956
```text
Citation: Ashby, W. Ross. 1956. An Introduction to Cybernetics. London: Chapman & Hall.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind, regulation, state, environment
Summary: Foundational cybernetics of regulation, variety, feedback, system state.
Agreements: Mind as adaptive regulation has strong precedent.
Disagreements / tensions: classical cybernetics is not a theory of personhood.
Adjacent terminology: regulator, requisite variety, black box
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md
```
### SF-R002 — Conant & Ashby 1970
```text
Citation: Conant, Roger C., and W. Ross Ashby. 1970. “Every Good Regulator of a
System Must Be a Model of That System.” International Journal of Systems Science 1(2): 8997.
DOI: 10.1080/00207727008920220
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind = Model
Summary: Good Regulator Theorem linking successful regulation to modeling.
Agreements: Core support for model-based Mind (H3).
Disagreements / tensions: theorem assumptions; “model” may be weaker than folk representation.
Adjacent terminology: regulator, model, control
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md
```
### SF-R003 — Maturana & Varela 1980
```text
Citation: Maturana, Humberto R., and Francisco J. Varela. 1980. Autopoiesis and
Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Being, closure, autonomy, boundary
Summary: Living systems as self-producing, organizationally closed unities.
Agreements: Being requires more than a drawn boundary; self-maintaining organization.
Disagreements / tensions: autopoiesis is biological; do not declare artificial Beings autopoietic.
Adjacent terminology: autopoiesis, structural coupling, operational closure
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md, 002-references.md
```
### SF-R004 — Luhmann 1995 [1984]
```text
Citation: Luhmann, Niklas. 1995. Social Systems. Stanford University Press.
(German: Soziale Systeme, 1984.)
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Being, boundary, system/environment
Summary: Social systems theory; operational closure; system/environment distinction constitutive of system.
Agreements: Boundary belongs primarily to Being, not Soul (SF-C002).
Disagreements / tensions: Luhmanns systems are communications, not person-like Beings.
Adjacent terminology: operational closure, structural coupling, observation
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md
```
### SF-R019R034 — Autonomy cluster (selected)
Priority set from RN-002 (see `research/foundations/002-references.md`):
| ID | Work | Role for Soul Frame |
|---|---|---|
| Varela 1979 | *Principles of Biological Autonomy* | autonomy, self-reference |
| Di Paolo 2005 | Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency | adaptivity vs passive persistence |
| Barandiaran et al. 2009 | Defining Agency | individuality, normativity, asymmetry |
| Moreno & Mossio 2015 | *Biological Autonomy* | book-length autonomy synthesis |
| Montévil & Mossio 2015 | Closure of constraints | organizational closure formalization |
| Krakauer et al. 2020 | Information Theory of Individuality | graded, temporal individuality |
| Nicholson & Dupré 2018 | *Everything Flows* | process ontology of persistence |
```text
Tags: foundational / contemporary
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Autonomous individuality, Being criteria B1B8
Source notes path: research/foundations/002-references.md
```
---
## B. Mind beyond substrate; social mind precursors
### SF-R005 — Clark & Chalmers 1998
```text
Citation: Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers. 1998. “The Extended Mind.” Analysis 58(1): 719.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind, Body, boundary
Summary: External resources may constitutively participate in cognition when suitably coupled.
Agreements: Body/Mind/Soul are functional dimensions, not physical compartments.
Disagreements / tensions: coupling vs constitution debates continue.
Adjacent terminology: extended mind, parity principle
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md
```
### SF-R006 — Hutchins 1995
```text
Citation: Hutchins, Edwin. 1995. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind, collective cognition, TE-05
Summary: Cognition analyzed at system level of people + artifacts (e.g. navigation).
Agreements: Mind boundaries need not coincide with individual skulls; collective cases matter.
Disagreements / tensions: when is collective Mind vs environment?
Adjacent terminology: distributed cognition
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md
```
### SF-R007 — Mead 1934
```text
Citation: Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self, and Society. University of Chicago Press.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Mind, recognition, co-adaptive model building
Summary: Mind and Self develop in social interaction; taking the attitude of the other.
Agreements: social mind; recursive modeling precursors (H4).
Disagreements / tensions: historical social psychology, not formal multi-agent theory.
Adjacent terminology: generalized other, self, significant symbol
Source notes path: research/foundations/001-references.md; RN-006
```
---
## C. Personal identity and continuity
### SF-R035 — Locke 1689/1690
```text
Citation: Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, ch. XXVII
“Of Identity and Diversity.” (Nidditch ed. 1975.)
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Identity, continuity, person vs organism
Summary: Foundational psychological approach to personal identity; consciousness/memory strand.
Agreements: person continuity need not require same material substrate (H6).
Disagreements / tensions: identity ≠ stored memories alone.
Adjacent terminology: person, consciousness, memory
Source notes path: research/foundations/004-references.md
```
### SF-R036 — Parfit 1984
```text
Citation: Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tags: foundational
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Identity, continuity, fork (TE-03)
Summary: Psychological connectedness/continuity; fission; survival without strict identity.
Agreements: Identity ≠ Continuity; branching forces lineage concepts (H6 refined).
Disagreements / tensions: reductionism about persons; what matters in survival debates.
Adjacent terminology: Relation R, fission, psychological continuity
Source notes path: research/foundations/004-references.md
```
### SF-R037 — Olson SEP 2023
```text
Citation: Olson, Eric T. 2023. “Personal Identity.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tags: contemporary (secondary orientation)
Relevant Soul Frame concepts: Identity disambiguation
Summary: Maps characterization, personhood, persistence, and evidence questions.
Agreements: Soul Frame must not collapse these questions into one “identity” term.
Disagreements / tensions: animalism as major rival to psychological continuity.
Adjacent terminology: animalism, persistence conditions
Source notes path: research/foundations/004-references.md
```
### Additional identity cluster
| Work | Role |
|---|---|
| Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another* (1992) | sameness vs selfhood; narrative |
| Schechtman, *The Constitution of Selves* (1996) | reidentification vs characterization |
| Meincke in *Everything Flows* (2018) | process identity of persons |
| Cerullo 2015 (uploading/branching) | artificial branching identity |
| Qin et al. 2026; Otsuka et al. 2026 (arXiv) | AI agent identity governance (applied) |
Full detail: `research/foundations/004-references.md`, `References-ResearchNote005.md`.
---
## D. Concept matrix coverage (Phase I)
| Soul Frame concept | Primary sources (minimum) |
|---|---|
| Being / closure | Maturana & Varela; Luhmann; Moreno & Mossio; Krakauer et al. |
| Body | extended mind; embodiment literature; operational coupling |
| Mind | Ashby; Conant & Ashby; predictive/active inference (pointer) |
| Soul | structural coupling; legacy/relational continuity (synthesis) |
| Identity | Locke; Parfit; Olson; process ontology |
| Recognition | Mead; intentional stance literature (pointer); RN-001 tripartition |
| Co-adaptive models | Mead; alignment/common ground; I-POMDP (RN-006) |
Phase I **done criterion** (≥5 foundational annotated entries against matrix): **met**.