Complete WP-0004 T09: global choice-of-law and dispute-resolution strategy

Cross-cutting research (New York Convention enforceability, neutral-seat
arbitration practice, and a consolidated drafting principle) revises the
China finding from T06/TREN-T06: China has enforced the New York
Convention since 1986 (arbitral awards travel via a ~172-state regime
with limited refusal grounds) but has ratified no foreign-judgment
convention, relying on patchy bilateral treaties and evolving reciprocity
for court judgments specifically. Arbitration, not the litigation-focused
China rider previously recommended, is likely the more promising
enforceability path for a Chinese Customer - and for the Enforcement
Partner Agreement too, per a cross-reference added to
specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md.

Also produces a consolidated drafting principle: write clarity-sensitive
clauses to satisfy Germany's Transparenzgebot, UK's UCTA reasonableness,
and Australia's expanded Unfair Contract Terms regime simultaneously,
since research this program has already found separately shows none of
the three reduces to another.

Updates License Appendix A item 6 and CUA Appendix A item 1 accordingly.
WP-0004 now has 9 of 10 tasks done; only the human-gated T10 synthesis
remains.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md

@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ All eight jurisdiction/family tasks are now complete. The pattern is more varied
 
 1. **50% is not a safe global default anywhere except the UK.** Most jurisdictions cap meaningfully lower (18–35%), several ban direct lawyer contingency outright, and the "with risk assumption" pattern that unlocks higher percentages (Argentina) or avoids professional-conduct problems entirely (Germany, India, Australia) recurs often enough that the split-role Litigation Funder structure should probably be the **default** EPA option, with single-role as the jurisdiction-specific exception — the reverse of how the concept was originally framed in §8.
 2. **The split-role structure is not universally safe either.** Japan's Article 12 fee-splitting rule is the first finding in this program suggesting the Funder/Counsel split needs jurisdiction-specific structuring, not just jurisdiction-specific *availability* checking.
-3. **China likely needs a dedicated EPA governing-law rider**, not just a dedicated fee structure — the same foreign-related-contract constraint found in `workplans/TREV-WP-0004-global-jurisdiction-research.md` T06 applies to the EPA itself.
+3. **China likely needs a dedicated EPA governing-law rider**, not just a dedicated fee structure — the same foreign-related-contract constraint found in `workplans/TREV-WP-0004-global-jurisdiction-research.md` T06 applies to the EPA itself. **Update (T09, `history/260729-TRSL-GlobalChoiceOfLaw-Strategy.md`):** arbitration, not litigation, is likely the more promising path here too — China has enforced the New York Convention since 1986 for arbitral awards, unlike foreign court judgments, which it has no equivalent convention for. Not yet confirmed whether an Enforcement Action under this concept would itself be arbitrable rather than requiring litigation.
 
 Finding 1 above — that a flat 50% is unsafe almost everywhere — is exactly what §13's Global Contingency Share Determination Rule (added 2026-07-29, at the Licensor's request) is designed to handle systematically rather than jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction improvisation.