Maintainer decision (2026-07-29): full specialist legal review of the
TRSL/CUA is postponed until the framework moves out of beta, given
limited legal/commercial exposure during build/alpha. WP-0004-T10 and
WP-0005-T10 synthesize their jurisdiction research into adopted alpha/beta
working defaults (governing law -> arbitration at a neutral seat,
liability cap, data protection minimal-collection practice, and the
Enforcement Network's fee mechanics) rather than full resolution, and are
accepted on that basis. Propagates the decision to the License/CUA V1C1
Appendix A tables and status banners, SCOPE.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, the
WP-0008-T05 go-live gate, and README.md.
Cross-cutting research (New York Convention enforceability, neutral-seat
arbitration practice, and a consolidated drafting principle) revises the
China finding from T06/TREN-T06: China has enforced the New York
Convention since 1986 (arbitral awards travel via a ~172-state regime
with limited refusal grounds) but has ratified no foreign-judgment
convention, relying on patchy bilateral treaties and evolving reciprocity
for court judgments specifically. Arbitration, not the litigation-focused
China rider previously recommended, is likely the more promising
enforceability path for a Chinese Customer - and for the Enforcement
Partner Agreement too, per a cross-reference added to
specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md.
Also produces a consolidated drafting principle: write clarity-sensitive
clauses to satisfy Germany's Transparenzgebot, UK's UCTA reasonableness,
and Australia's expanded Unfair Contract Terms regime simultaneously,
since research this program has already found separately shows none of
the three reduces to another.
Updates License Appendix A item 6 and CUA Appendix A item 1 accordingly.
WP-0004 now has 9 of 10 tasks done; only the human-gated T10 synthesis
remains.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per maintainer correction: the previous "Standard Bounty Amount" was still
paid only on success, meaning it remained outcome-contingent and would not
actually escape prohibitions worded around outcome-contingency generally
(India's Rule 20: "a fee contingent on the results of litigation") rather
than percentage-proportionality specifically (Germany's quota-litis-style
rules). Renamed to "Standard Financing Amount" and restructured as a fixed
sum paid or made available regardless of the Enforcement Action's outcome
- a grant toward litigation cost, not a contingent fee in any form.
specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §13 rewritten as a sequential rule
rather than "higher of two comparable numbers" (contingent percentages and
non-contingent financing are not commensurable, and treating them as
interchangeable is exactly what would make the financing look like a
disguised contingent fee):
1. 50% Contingency Share where lawful at that level.
2. Else the jurisdiction's own lower lawful outcome-contingent cap.
3. Else - no lawful outcome-contingent fee exists at all - no
Contingency Share; the Licensor's own non-contingent fee arrangement
with its lawyer governs what's owed win or lose, and the Trust
Service's Standard Financing Amount offsets that cost regardless of
outcome. Fee risk is genuinely higher here, by design: this is what
it means for the risk-shifting a contingent fee normally provides to
be unavailable, not an oversight to paper over.
New §13.0 makes explicit (per maintainer instruction) that nothing in this
rule creates a right for the Trust Service, an Enforcement Partner, or a
Litigation Funder to initiate a case - pressing charges remains
exclusively the Licensor's decision. The rule only makes a ready,
low-friction default (published caps, financing, EPA template) available
once that decision is made.
Added new core term §5.9 Standard Financing Amount; updated §5.5-5.7, §6's
lifecycle step, §9's EPA outline, and the concise definition to match.
Updated WP-0005 T10's synthesis scope and README accordingly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per maintainer request, replaces the flat "working default 50%" Contingency
Share with a systematic per-jurisdiction rule, directly responding to
WP-0005's finding that 50% is unsafe almost everywhere except the UK:
1. 50% applies if lawful in the jurisdiction.
2. Otherwise, the higher of:
(A) the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap - the actual local statutory
maximum, published by the Enforcement Registry as background
information for prospective Enforcement Partners; or
(B) a Standard Bounty Amount - a fixed sum (not a percentage),
defaulting to $1,000 local-currency-equivalent, recalculated
annually to 50% of the trailing-18-month average unpaid-fees
amount where more than 10 settled cases exist (a sample-size floor
to avoid thin-sample noise), announced by 31 July, effective the
following 1 January, always capped at the specific case's own
unpaid fees.
Flags, as the highest-priority open question this rule itself introduces:
whether a fixed, non-percentage bounty actually escapes contingency-fee
prohibitions worded around outcome-contingency generally (India's Rule 20:
"contingent on the results of litigation") rather than percentage-
proportionality specifically (Germany's quota-litis-style rules) - the
Standard Bounty Amount may not solve what it was designed to solve in
exactly the jurisdictions that motivated it, and this is not yet verified.
Added as new specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §13 (Concise Definition
renumbered §14; no other section numbers changed, so existing cross-
references to §5.5/§6/§8/§9/§11 from workplans and history/ artifacts
remain valid). Updated §5.5, §5.7, and §8's key findings to point to the
new rule. Folded the rule's population and open questions into
WP-0005-T10's synthesis scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Executes all remaining shared jurisdictions across both workplans:
Germany/EU (deepened contract-law angle), US (deepened), UK (deepened),
Argentina, India, China, Africa (South Africa + OHADA), and Asia-Pacific
(Singapore, Japan, Australia) - 13 new history/ research artifacts.
Highest-priority findings:
- Australia's Unfair Contract Terms regime (expanded Nov 2023) covers
standard-form contracts with any business under 100 employees/$10M
turnover by default - the CUA is exactly such a contract, and most
realistic Customers fall within this threshold. Unlike every other
jurisdiction's consumer carve-out, this is not an edge case.
- China requires a "foreign-related" contract even to select foreign
governing law, subject to a vague public-interest override even then -
confirms a dedicated China rider is needed for both the License/CUA and
the Enforcement Partner Agreement, not a shared global clause.
- India flatly prohibits advocate contingency fees (no exception gates,
stricter than Germany) while explicitly permitting third-party
litigation funding - the cleanest confirmation yet that the Litigation
Funder/Local Counsel split-role model is both necessary and legal there.
- Japan's Article 12 fee-splitting rule means even the split-role
fallback needs jurisdiction-specific structuring - the first case where
the workaround itself, not just the original mechanism, has an open
compliance question.
- Contingency Share ceilings vary widely where available: UK 50% (exact
match), South Africa 25%, Argentina 35% (50% only with risk assumption),
China 18% down to 6% on a sliding scale that shrinks as claims grow.
- Recurring cross-jurisdictional pattern (Germany, EU, US via CCPA,
Argentina): B2B governing-law/liability clauses are respected, but an
individual/sole-proprietor Customer's consumer-protection status is the
operative risk everywhere, not a one-off edge case.
Updates specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §8.1 with a full 12-jurisdiction
findings table and three cross-cutting conclusions. Updates both V1C1
documents' Appendix A items (governing law, liability cap, data
protection) with the most consequential findings. Both workplans now have
only their human-gated synthesis tasks (T09-T10 / T10) remaining.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduces specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md: independent, locally-licensed
Enforcement Partners pursue unauthorized Commercial Use (License §3
violations) in their home jurisdiction for a Contingency Share of Recovery,
so enforcement scales the way the framework's monetization already does -
through aligned incentive rather than central litigation capacity. New
terminology (Alleged Violation, Enforcement Action, Recovery, Contingency
Share, Platform Share, Enforcement Registry, Enforcement Partner Agreement)
plus a proposed enforcement-recovery Monetization Extension so Recovery
flows into Development Credit through the existing accounting model rather
than a parallel bucket.
Flags the mechanism's central risk up front rather than assuming it away:
lawyer contingency fees are not legal everywhere. Backed by
workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md (10 tasks); four
executed this session with live web research:
- Germany/EU: RVG §4a permits contingency fees only in three narrow gates,
none fitting this fact pattern well - single-role Enforcement Partner is
very likely not viable; France permits a fixed-fee-plus-uncapped-result-
fee structure instead; EU litigation-funding regulation is proposed
(2022 EP resolution) but not yet adopted.
- US: contingency fees broadly permitted; practical precondition is timely
copyright registration of the Milestone Release to unlock statutory
damages/fee-shifting; Copyright Claims Board flagged as a lower-cost venue.
- UK: Damages-Based Agreements cap fees at 50% for this case category -
the concept's originally-proposed 50% Contingency Share lands exactly on
this real statutory ceiling, the first jurisdiction where the figure is
precisely validated rather than arbitrary.
- Mechanism design: synthesizes the above into a single Enforcement Partner
Agreement template with jurisdiction-conditional role structure
(single-role vs. Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split), with a payment-
flow diagram showing the Development Credit allocation is unaffected by
which structure applies.
Six of ten WP-0005 tasks remain open (Argentina, India, China, Africa,
Asia-Pacific, and the human-gated synthesis). Cross-referenced from README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
