target-revenue/history/260729-TREN-Synthesis.md

TREN Feasibility Synthesis (WP-0005 T10)

Document status: Research artifact, Stage 0/1 (workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md T10) Not legal advice. Synthesizes T01–T09. Adopts alpha/beta working defaults per maintainer decision 2026-07-29 (full specialist legal review deferred until out of beta; see history/260729-TRSL-Jurisdiction-Synthesis.md §3 for what this does and does not mean, which applies equally here).

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1. Consolidated feasibility matrix

Jurisdiction	Structure	Jurisdiction Percentage Cap	Note
Germany	Split-role required	0% (no lawful outcome-contingent fee for this engagement type)	§4a's three gates don't fit this fact pattern
France	Likely single-role, structured	N/A — fixed-fee-plus-uncapped-result-fee required, not a bare percentage	Second EU data point
United States	Single-role (tier 1: 50% lawful directly)	N/A — tier 1 applies	Copyright registration is the practical precondition
United Kingdom	Single-role (tier 1: 50% lawful directly)	N/A — tier 1 applies	Only jurisdiction where 50% is exactly the statutory ceiling
Argentina	Single-role	35% ordinarily (Buenos Aires City); up to 50% only if counsel assumes case-cost risk	50% reachable via a risk-assumption variant, not the default
India	Split-role required	0% (flat prohibition, no exception gates)	Cleanest confirmation of the split-role model
China	Single-role, sliding scale	18% (<1M CNY) → 15% (1–5M) → 12% (5–10M) → 9% (10–50M) → 6% (>50M)	Larger claims get a smaller ceiling — counterintuitive, must be encoded as a schedule, not one number
South Africa	Single-role	25% (or 2× normal fee if lower)	Hard statutory cap, confirmed via the Contingency Fees Act
OHADA zone	Unresearched	Unresearched	Do not assume the French pattern applies
Singapore	Single-role only for arbitration/SICC/mediation	Not stated as a percentage; 0% for ordinary litigation	Route Singapore Enforcement Actions to arbitration/SICC where possible
Japan	Broadly permitted, but split-role has its own risk	No fixed cap	Article 12 bans fee-splitting with non-lawyers — needs bespoke structuring even for the fallback
Australia	Split-role by default (funding-market maturity, not fee-ban)	0% outside Victoria class actions	Different reason for split-role than Germany/India

2. Proposed resolutions to concept §13.2 (Jurisdiction Percentage Cap)

Adopted 2026-07-29: the table above is now the authoritative Jurisdiction Percentage Cap reference for the eight researched jurisdictions/families, to be published by the Enforcement Registry per §13.2. China's is a schedule, not a single figure — the Enforcement Registry must publish it as such, not collapse it to one number.

3. Proposed resolutions to concept §13.5 (open questions)

1. Funding source for the Standard Financing Amount. Adopted for alpha/beta: the Licensor funds it directly out of pocket. A pooled fund contributed to by successful Phases is a reasonable future design but is unnecessary complexity while pilot-stage Enforcement Actions are expected to be rare or nonexistent — revisit once real Enforcement Actions actually occur.
2. FX reference methodology. Adopted as the actual rule (no longer just a working assumption): the exchange rate prevailing on the announcement date (31 July), published alongside the announcement.
3. Reimbursement of advanced financing from Recovery. Adopted for alpha/beta: yes, where a Recovery occurs, the Trust Service's advanced Standard Financing Amount is reimbursed from the Platform Share before Development Credit allocation, ahead of the Phase's own Development Credit. This does not reintroduce outcome-contingency for the lawyer's own fee (still non-contingent either way per §13.1 tier 3) — it only affects whether the Trust Service recoups its own outlay, a bookkeeping question distinct from what makes the underlying fee lawful.
4. 18-month look-back window. Adopted as the actual rule: cases settled within the 18 months immediately preceding the mid-year calculation date.
5. Split-role interaction in tier 3 jurisdictions. Adopted as the working answer: in a tier 3 jurisdiction, the "split-role" structure collapses to a single non-contingent Local Counsel engagement, financed in part by the Standard Financing Amount — a separate Litigation Funder entity is not required by default unless a specific case's economics call for one.

4. Japan: the split-role compliance risk is not resolved, only flagged more precisely

T08 found Japan's Article 12 (no fee-splitting between a lawyer and a non-lawyer) threatens the split-role fallback itself, not just the single-role default. This synthesis does not resolve that — it is exactly the kind of jurisdiction-specific professional-conduct question that requires actual Japanese counsel, not a framework-level default. Recommendation: do not pursue an Enforcement Action in Japan under either structure until specifically reviewed, even during alpha/beta — this is a different category of risk than "we haven't finalized the liability cap wording," because it goes to whether the engagement is even lawful at all, not how favorable its terms are.

5. Enforcement Partner Agreement — status

The EPA outline in history/260729-TREN-MechanismDesign.md §5 remains the reference outline. No further drafting occurs in this synthesis — a full EPA draft (analogous to the License/CUA V1C1 documents) is a future deliverable, appropriately sequenced after workplans/TREV-WP-0008-governance-and-pilot-rollout.md T01 resolves who the Licensor actually is, since the EPA's "Licensor" party needs a real answer before its own text can be drafted meaningfully.

6. What this synthesis does not do

Consistent with history/260729-TRSL-Jurisdiction-Synthesis.md §3: this closes the research and design question of how the Contingency Share / Standard Financing Amount mechanism should work, for alpha/beta operation. It does not mean any Enforcement Action should actually be pursued yet — the Enforcement Network remains a designed-but-unused mechanism until a real Alleged Violation occurs and the Licensor (per specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §7 step 2, §13.0) decides to press it.