migrations/0006_control_plane.sql: control_plane_audit_log (append-only,
no UPDATE/DELETE for trf_app) and control_plane_proposed_entries (the
Contributor tier's "propose, don't append" workflow from concept §2) -
review decisions go through a review_proposed_entry() SECURITY DEFINER
function, same governance-action pattern as
set_extension_status/revoke_credential, not a direct UPDATE.
src/target_revenue/control_plane.py is the enforcement layer concept
§2 called for: register_phase/append_development_credit require
Operator+; propose_ledger_entry requires Contributor+ and stores a
pending proposal without touching the real Ledger; approve_proposed_entry
(Operator+) appends it under the *reviewer's own* credential/attribution
(not the original proposer's - the reviewer is who's authorizing it into
the real Ledger, while the proposer stays on record in the proposal row
and audit log); reject_proposed_entry (Operator+) discards it. issue_/
revoke_user_credential (Admin+) wrap registry.py's T02 functions with
the same rights check and audit logging. Every action funnels through
record_audit_event, independent of the Trust Service's own signed
records.
tests/test_control_plane.py (12 tests): rights enforcement at each
tier boundary, the full propose -> approve -> appended-under-reviewer
flow, propose -> reject -> nothing appended, double-review rejection,
audit log content/attribution, DB-level UPDATE rejection on both new
tables. Full suite: 84 offline (unchanged), 53 with Docker (up from
41); no stray containers left running.
tegwick
885da0a1cb