tenant-engine/INTENT.md
tegwick 5d57c7d488 TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth
flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real
POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json,
decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not
guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes;
every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves
to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed().

authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer
Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's
planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table).
DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is
configured.

config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern.
docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule,
and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands).

60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate
processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double
produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201.

Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a
complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration --
what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape
emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing
tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than
quietly worked around).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00

133 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown

---
repo: tenant-engine
updated: "2026-07-23"
---
# INTENT
## Purpose
`tenant-engine` exists to be the single, canonical source of truth for what a
**tenant** is on the NetKingdom platform — its existence, its onboarding
grouping, its capability roles, and its plan/subscription assignment —
separate from who its *users* are (`user-engine`), who *authenticates* it
(`key-cape`/Keycloak), who *authorizes* actions against it (`flex-auth`), and
what it *pays* for a given plan (`adaptive-pricing`).
Full ownership boundary, formally: `net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md`.
## Why This Exists
No service in the fleet currently owns tenant-as-an-entity facts as a
queryable resource. `user-engine`'s own boundary contract explicitly scopes
it to *consuming* tenant identifiers and *storing records scoped by* a
tenant — not owning the tenant record itself. The IAM Profile defines the
*shape* of the `tenant` claim, not a live directory of which tenants exist,
what they're allowed to do, or what plan they're on.
That gap became concrete during Binky Hedgehog GmbH's onboarding as the
platform's first tenant outside `tenant:coulomb`
(`key-cape/workplans/KEY-WP-0004-binky-hedgehog-tenant-onboarding.md`): a
tenant's **capability roles** (`PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS`, non-exclusive — a
tenant can hold several at once, and its roles can change independently of
how it was onboarded) needed a real owner, a real carrying mechanism, and a
real governance model (role grants are usually a consequence of a paid
plan). See `net-kingdom/docs/adr/ADR-0013-tenant-onboarding-grouping-taxonomy.md`
and `ADR-0014-tenant-capability-roles-and-tenant-engine-ownership.md`.
## Primary Utility
`tenant-engine` provides:
- **Tenant records**: existence, identifier, and onboarding grouping
(`trial`/`friendly`/`single`/`small`/`medium`/`large`/`enterprise`/
`consumer`/`family`/`community`/`association`/`agentic`, per ADR-0013).
- **Capability role grants**: `PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS`, with an audited
grant/revoke trail linking most grants to a plan-assignment change.
- **Plan/subscription assignment**: which `adaptive-pricing` plan a tenant
currently holds, referenced by id — never a duplicated copy of plan terms.
- **A cache-read API** `key-cape` calls at token-issuance time to source the
optional `tenant_roles` token claim (IAM Profile v0.3).
- **A live-lookup API** `flex-auth` calls synchronously for privileged,
high-stakes decisions — the case where a cached claim isn't trustworthy
enough (a stale `VEN` grant surviving a plan cancellation is not an
acceptable risk for money-movement or credential-vending actions).
- Reserved, not yet implemented: **guardrail/quota policy** (spend limits,
entity/action counts) — `trial`-grouped tenants default to a **zero**
spend budget; design is future work.
## Intended Users
- `key-cape` / Keycloak, at token issuance time (cache-read API).
- `flex-auth`, at authorization-decision time (live-lookup API, and the
target of write-authorization for grant/revoke/plan mutations).
- Operators and tenant administrators, indirectly, through whatever admin
surface eventually consumes `tenant-engine`'s APIs (not yet built).
- `adaptive-pricing`, as the source `tenant-engine` references for plan
*definitions* (not the other way around).
## Strategic Role
`tenant-engine` sits **beside** `user-engine`, not inside it — a deliberate
bounded-context split, not an oversight. `user-engine`'s aggregate root is
the *person*; `tenant-engine`'s is the *tenant*. Consumers that only need a
fast, security-critical tenant-role lookup (`flex-auth` on every privileged
decision, `key-cape` on every token issuance) should never need to depend on
`user-engine`'s much larger surface (registration flows, factor models,
family dataspace onboarding) to get it. This matches the fleet's existing
convention of many small, single-purpose `-engine`/`-core` services rather
than one large one.
## Responsibility Boundary
`tenant-engine` owns tenant-as-an-entity facts. It never re-derives or
duplicates facts another system already owns.
### tenant-engine Owns
- Tenant existence, identifier, and onboarding grouping.
- Capability role grants and their audit trail.
- Plan/subscription assignment (by reference, not by copying plan terms).
- Reserved: guardrail/quota policy, once designed.
### Other Systems Own
| Concern | Owner |
| --- | --- |
| OIDC discovery, login, token issuance | `key-cape`, Keycloak |
| Tenant identifier format and role vocabulary | NetKingdom (IAM Profile, ADR-0013, ADR-0014) |
| Users, profiles, memberships | `user-engine` |
| Authorization decisions | `flex-auth` |
| Pricing-model / plan definitions | `adaptive-pricing` |
| Runtime secrets | OpenBao / `secrets-engine` |
| Payment processing | Not yet identified — `tenant-engine` records plan assignment, not payment execution |
## Non-Goals
- Not an identity provider. Never issues, verifies, or refreshes tokens.
- Not a policy decision point. Never makes an authorization decision itself
— it answers queries `flex-auth` issues.
- Not a billing processor. Records plan assignment, not payment execution.
- Not a pricing-model engine. References `adaptive-pricing` plan ids.
- Not the user/membership domain. Never stores user accounts or profiles.
## Governing Principle
This repository should stay focused on the purpose above. Work that changes
its authority, ownership boundaries, or operational promises should be
captured in a workplan before implementation, and should stay consistent
with `net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md`
if the two drift, the canon contract wins and this file should be corrected.
## Related
- `docs/flex-auth-integration.md` — how the write API's `WriteAuthorizer`
seam is implemented against a real `flex-auth`
- `net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md` — the
formal ownership contract
- `net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.3.md` — the `tenant_roles`
claim and carrying mechanism this service implements
- `net-kingdom/docs/adr/ADR-0013-tenant-onboarding-grouping-taxonomy.md`
- `net-kingdom/docs/adr/ADR-0014-tenant-capability-roles-and-tenant-engine-ownership.md`
- `key-cape/workplans/KEY-WP-0004-binky-hedgehog-tenant-onboarding.md` — the
first tenant this service will record