tegwick
5d57c7d488
flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
68 lines
3 KiB
Markdown
68 lines
3 KiB
Markdown
# flex-auth Integration (TEN-WP-0003)
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`tenant-engine` gates every write through flex-auth's `POST /v1/check`
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(`flex_auth.FlexAuthCheckClient`, wired in as `authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer`).
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## What tenant-engine sends
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A `CheckRequest` per `flex-auth/schemas/check_request.schema.json`:
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```json
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{
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"id": "check:<uuid>",
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"tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky",
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"subject": {"id": "<actor>", "type": "service"},
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"action": "tenant.create",
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"resource": {"id": "<tenant_id>", "type": "tenant", "system": "tenant-engine"}
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}
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```
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Action → resource-type mapping (must match `flex-auth`'s
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`FLEX-WP-0008-T01` vocabulary exactly — coordinate values, don't diverge):
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| Action | Resource type |
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| --- | --- |
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| `tenant.create` | `tenant` |
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| `tenant.role.grant` | `role-grant` |
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| `tenant.role.revoke` | `role-grant` |
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| `tenant.plan.assign` | `plan-assignment` |
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## What tenant-engine expects back
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A `DecisionEnvelope` per `flex-auth/schemas/decision_envelope.schema.json`.
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Only `effect: "allow"` authorizes the write. Every other `effect`
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(`deny`/`redact`/`audit_only`/`not_applicable`), a non-200 response, a
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malformed body, or a transport failure/timeout all resolve to **deny** —
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`FlexAuthCheckClient.is_allowed()` never raises past its own boundary; it
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always returns a plain `bool`.
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## The current real state
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Until `flex-auth/workplans/FLEX-WP-0008-tenant-engine-consumer-integration.md`
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lands (resource/action vocabulary + an authored policy package), **every
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check resolves to deny or not_applicable** — verified against real
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`flex-auth` behavior, not assumed. This is correct fail-closed behavior,
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not a bug: tenant-engine cannot perform any write against a real `flex-auth`
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deployment until that policy package exists. Verified locally with a fake
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HTTP double standing in for `flex-auth` (deny → `403`, allow → `201`,
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both over real HTTP between two processes) — see `TEN-WP-0003`'s closure
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notes for the exact commands.
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## Configuration
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| Env var | Default | Meaning |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `TENANT_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_URL` | unset | Base URL of a reachable `flex-auth` deployment. When unset, `create_app()` falls back to `authz.DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer` — no writes ever succeed, which is the correct posture for local/test runs that have no `flex-auth` to call. |
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| `TENANT_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` | `3` | Bounded timeout on the synchronous write path — no retries, so a slow deny doesn't become a hang. |
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## Related
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- `flex-auth/workplans/FLEX-WP-0008-tenant-engine-consumer-integration.md`
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— the flex-auth-side work this client depends on for real `allow`
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decisions, and (separately) flex-auth's own live-lookup consumption of
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`tenant-engine`'s `/roles/live` endpoint for other protected systems.
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- `key-cape/workplans/KEY-WP-0005-iam-profile-core-claims.md` — the
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cache-read/`tenant_roles` direction (`key-cape` → `tenant-engine`), not
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covered by this doc.
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- `net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md` —
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the Authorization Contract section this client implements.
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