tegwick
9370348d54
statehub register + repo-seed template scaffold (CLAUDE.md, .claude/rules/, registry/). INTENT.md and SCOPE.md rewritten from the generated stub to match net-kingdom's ratified tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md (Purpose, Responsibility Boundary, Non-Goals). topic_slug corrected from the auto-assigned custodian default to netkingdom, matching key-cape and user-engine. TEN-WP-0001 (bootstrap) complete: files reviewed/refined, stack decided (Python 3.12 + FastAPI, matching qonto-assistant's convention), first real workplan seeded. TEN-WP-0002 drafted: service skeleton, domain model (tenant/grouping/ capability-role/plan-grant), storage layer, and the three boundary-contract API surfaces (cache-read for key-cape, live-lookup for flex-auth with an explicit fail-closed requirement, write API behind a WriteAuthorizer seam since real flex-auth integration is a declared non-goal for this pass). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.5 KiB
Credential and access routing
Audience: Codex, Claude Code, Grok, and custodian agents that call llm-connect
for inference. Run this check before requesting secrets, API keys, SSH access,
login tokens, or database passwords — in any repo, not only ops-warden.
ops-warden issues SSH certificates only (warden sign, cert_command). Every
other credential need belongs to another subsystem. Do not message
ops-warden on State Hub expecting a secret value; the reply is a pointer, not a key.
Lookup (do this first)
warden route find "<describe your need>" --json
warden route show <catalog-id> --json
Requires the warden CLI from ~/ops-warden (uv tool install . or uv run warden).
| Agent runtime | How to orient |
|---|---|
| Codex / Grok (shell, HTTP State Hub) | warden route commands above; inbox to_agent=repo-seed is for coordination, not secret vending |
| Claude Code (MCP when available) | get_domain_summary("custodian") for workplans; still use warden route for credential ownership |
| llm-connect (inference service) | Never put secret retrieval in prompts; route custody to OpenBao/operator paths surfaced by warden route |
Quick routing table
| I need… | Owner | ops-warden executes? |
|---|---|---|
SSH cert (adm/agt/atm) |
ops-warden | Yes — warden sign |
| API key, DB password, provider token | OpenBao (railiance-platform) |
No — route only |
| Login / OIDC / MFA | key-cape / Keycloak | No — route only |
| Authorization decision | flex-auth | No — route only |
| activity-core → issue-core emission | activity-core + issue-core | No — warden route show activity-core-issue-sink |
| SSH tunnel | ops-bridge (+ cert_command from warden) |
No — route only |
Anti-patterns (do not do these)
POST /messages/toops-wardenasking forISSUE_CORE_API_KEY,OPENROUTER_API_KEY, etc.- Inventing
warden secret,warden login,warden bao,warden tunnel— they do not exist - Pasting secrets into Git, State Hub, workplans, logs, or chat
Other capabilities (reuse-surface)
Non-credential capabilities are usually discovered through reuse-surface federation
(reuse-surface registry / capability.* indexes). Credential routing is inlined in
every repo's agent instructions because it is high-frequency, high-risk, and easy to
get wrong.
Canon: ~/ops-warden/wiki/CredentialRouting.md · catalog ~/ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml