tenant-engine/workplans/TEN-WP-0002-domain-model-and-scaffold.md
tegwick 9370348d54 Bootstrap repo: State Hub registration, agent docs, TEN-WP-0001/0002
statehub register + repo-seed template scaffold (CLAUDE.md, .claude/rules/,
registry/). INTENT.md and SCOPE.md rewritten from the generated stub to
match net-kingdom's ratified tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md
(Purpose, Responsibility Boundary, Non-Goals). topic_slug corrected from
the auto-assigned custodian default to netkingdom, matching key-cape and
user-engine.

TEN-WP-0001 (bootstrap) complete: files reviewed/refined, stack decided
(Python 3.12 + FastAPI, matching qonto-assistant's convention), first real
workplan seeded.

TEN-WP-0002 drafted: service skeleton, domain model (tenant/grouping/
capability-role/plan-grant), storage layer, and the three boundary-contract
API surfaces (cache-read for key-cape, live-lookup for flex-auth with an
explicit fail-closed requirement, write API behind a WriteAuthorizer seam
since real flex-auth integration is a declared non-goal for this pass).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 21:56:07 +02:00

6.9 KiB
Raw Blame History

id type title domain repo status owner topic_slug created updated
TEN-WP-0002 workplan Service skeleton, domain model, and the three boundary-contract APIs infotech tenant-engine ready codex netkingdom 2026-07-23 2026-07-23

Service skeleton, domain model, and the three boundary-contract APIs

First real implementation workplan. Builds the tenant-engine skeleton against net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md: tenant/grouping/capability-role/plan-grant domain model, an audited grant trail, and the three API surfaces the contract defines — cache-read (key-cape), live-lookup (flex-auth), and write (grant/revoke/plan mutation). Guardrail/quota policy stays a reserved, unimplemented namespace per ADR-0014 — not in scope here.

Depends on: net-kingdom canon — iam-profile_v0.3.md, tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md, ADR-0013, ADR-0014 (all ratified). Non-goals: payment processing, pricing-model definitions (adaptive-pricing's job), real flex-auth integration (the write/live APIs get a policy-hook interface, not a working flex-auth client — that's a follow-up once flex-auth has a reachable endpoint), guardrail/quota enforcement.

Task: Service skeleton

id: TEN-WP-0002-T01
status: todo
priority: high

Python 3.12 + FastAPI, matching qonto-assistant's layout convention: pyproject.toml, Makefile (install-dev, test, lint, run), package layout separating domain/ (pure), store/ (persistence), api/ (FastAPI routers), from day one — not refactored in later.

Done when: make test runs an empty/smoke suite; make run starts a bare FastAPI app with a /health endpoint.

Task: Domain model — tenant, grouping, capability role, plan grant

id: TEN-WP-0002-T02
status: todo
priority: high

Pure domain types, no framework dependency:

  • Tenant: id, identifier (tenant:<grouping>:<name> or reserved tenant:platform/tenant:coulomb), grouping (ADR-0013 enum, nullable for the two reserved identifiers).
  • CapabilityRole: enum PLTF/IAM/VEN/CUS.
  • RoleGrant: tenant_id, role, grant_reason (plan_assignment / manual_grant / platform_default), plan_id (nullable), granted_by, granted_at, revoked_at (nullable), correlation_id — the audited record shape from the boundary contract's Tenant Role & Plan Grant Contract.
  • PlanAssignment: tenant_id, plan_id (references an adaptive-pricing plan id — stored as an opaque string, never resolved or duplicated locally), assigned_at.

Validation rules encoded as domain invariants, not just API-layer checks:

  • grouping must be one of ADR-0013's twelve values, or the tenant identifier must be exactly tenant:platform/tenant:coulomb (grouping-less);
  • a trial-grouped tenant may hold any role with grant_reason: platform_default and no plan_id (ADR-0014) — this must be representable, not blocked by a plan-required constraint;
  • non-trial roles other than platform_default require a plan_id when grant_reason: plan_assignment;
  • revoking a grant sets revoked_at, never deletes the record (audit trail).

Done when: unit tests cover valid/invalid grouping values, the trial/ no-plan-required exception, and grant/revoke as append-only operations.

Task: Storage layer

id: TEN-WP-0002-T03
status: todo
priority: high

In-memory store behind a TenantStore protocol/interface (mirrors qonto_client.QontoClientProtocol's pattern in qonto-assistant), so a real backend can be swapped in later without touching domain/ or api/. Every mutation emits a domain event (tenant created, role granted, role revoked, plan assigned) per the boundary contract's Audit Correlation Contract — the event bus itself can be a simple in-process list for now.

Done when: unit tests cover create/read/grant/revoke/assign-plan through the store interface, plus event emission for each mutation.

Task: Cache-read API (for key-cape)

id: TEN-WP-0002-T04
status: todo
priority: high

GET /tenants/{tenant_id}/roles — returns current, non-revoked capability roles for a tenant. This is the endpoint key-cape calls at token-issuance time to source the cached tenant_roles claim (IAM Profile v0.3). No authorization gate of its own beyond service-to-service auth (out of scope here — see Non-Goals); this endpoint's whole purpose is to be cheap and fast, per the boundary contract's performance model.

Done when: integration test hits the endpoint against the in-memory store and returns the expected role set for a seeded tenant.

Task: Live-lookup API (for flex-auth) — fail closed

id: TEN-WP-0002-T05
status: todo
priority: high

GET /tenants/{tenant_id}/roles/live — same data as the cache-read endpoint, but explicitly documented and tested as the path flex-auth must call before authorizing aal2-class actions. The distinction from T04 is operational intent (freshness guarantee, called synchronously on a privileged-decision path), not payload shape.

Per the boundary contract's performance model: fail closed, never open. If the store is unavailable, this endpoint must return an error response that a policy caller would treat as "deny", not a default-allow or an empty role list indistinguishable from "no roles granted".

Done when: a test simulates store unavailability and asserts the endpoint signals failure distinctly from "zero roles", not silently as 200 + [].

Task: Write API — grant, revoke, assign-plan

id: TEN-WP-0002-T06
status: todo
priority: medium

POST /tenants (create), POST /tenants/{id}/roles/grant, POST /tenants/{id}/roles/revoke, POST /tenants/{id}/plan — all mutating endpoints from the boundary contract's Write API. Per the contract, tenant-engine does not self-authorize these writes; flex-auth is meant to gate them. Since a reachable flex-auth integration is explicitly a non-goal here, implement a WriteAuthorizer protocol/interface point (one class, default-deny stub) so every mutation already flows through a single seam — swapping in a real flex-auth client later touches one file, not every endpoint.

Done when: unit tests confirm every write endpoint calls the WriteAuthorizer seam and is denied by the default-deny stub; a test-only authorizer override proves the seam actually gates the mutation when swapped.

Task: Closure review

id: TEN-WP-0002-T07
status: todo
priority: low

Confirm T01T06 done; run make test/make lint; verify the three API surfaces match the boundary contract's Ownership Model and Source-of-Truth Matrix with no drift. Note follow-ups: real flex-auth WriteAuthorizer integration, key-cape wiring to actually call the cache-read endpoint at issuance, guardrail/quota policy design (ADR-0014's reserved item), and Binky Hedgehog GmbH as the first real tenant record once key-cape's KEY-WP-0004 reaches that point. Run statehub fix-consistency.