statehub register + repo-seed template scaffold (CLAUDE.md, .claude/rules/, registry/). INTENT.md and SCOPE.md rewritten from the generated stub to match net-kingdom's ratified tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md (Purpose, Responsibility Boundary, Non-Goals). topic_slug corrected from the auto-assigned custodian default to netkingdom, matching key-cape and user-engine. TEN-WP-0001 (bootstrap) complete: files reviewed/refined, stack decided (Python 3.12 + FastAPI, matching qonto-assistant's convention), first real workplan seeded. TEN-WP-0002 drafted: service skeleton, domain model (tenant/grouping/ capability-role/plan-grant), storage layer, and the three boundary-contract API surfaces (cache-read for key-cape, live-lookup for flex-auth with an explicit fail-closed requirement, write API behind a WriteAuthorizer seam since real flex-auth integration is a declared non-goal for this pass). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| id | type | title | domain | repo | status | owner | topic_slug | created | updated |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TEN-WP-0002 | workplan | Service skeleton, domain model, and the three boundary-contract APIs | infotech | tenant-engine | ready | codex | netkingdom | 2026-07-23 | 2026-07-23 |
Service skeleton, domain model, and the three boundary-contract APIs
First real implementation workplan. Builds the tenant-engine skeleton
against net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md:
tenant/grouping/capability-role/plan-grant domain model, an audited grant
trail, and the three API surfaces the contract defines — cache-read
(key-cape), live-lookup (flex-auth), and write (grant/revoke/plan
mutation). Guardrail/quota policy stays a reserved, unimplemented namespace
per ADR-0014 — not in scope here.
Depends on: net-kingdom canon — iam-profile_v0.3.md,
tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md, ADR-0013, ADR-0014 (all
ratified). Non-goals: payment processing, pricing-model definitions
(adaptive-pricing's job), real flex-auth integration (the write/live
APIs get a policy-hook interface, not a working flex-auth client — that's
a follow-up once flex-auth has a reachable endpoint), guardrail/quota
enforcement.
Task: Service skeleton
id: TEN-WP-0002-T01
status: todo
priority: high
Python 3.12 + FastAPI, matching qonto-assistant's layout convention:
pyproject.toml, Makefile (install-dev, test, lint, run), package
layout separating domain/ (pure), store/ (persistence), api/ (FastAPI
routers), from day one — not refactored in later.
Done when: make test runs an empty/smoke suite; make run starts a bare
FastAPI app with a /health endpoint.
Task: Domain model — tenant, grouping, capability role, plan grant
id: TEN-WP-0002-T02
status: todo
priority: high
Pure domain types, no framework dependency:
Tenant: id, identifier (tenant:<grouping>:<name>or reservedtenant:platform/tenant:coulomb), grouping (ADR-0013 enum, nullable for the two reserved identifiers).CapabilityRole: enumPLTF/IAM/VEN/CUS.RoleGrant: tenant_id, role, grant_reason (plan_assignment/manual_grant/platform_default), plan_id (nullable), granted_by, granted_at, revoked_at (nullable), correlation_id — the audited record shape from the boundary contract's Tenant Role & Plan Grant Contract.PlanAssignment: tenant_id, plan_id (references anadaptive-pricingplan id — stored as an opaque string, never resolved or duplicated locally), assigned_at.
Validation rules encoded as domain invariants, not just API-layer checks:
- grouping must be one of ADR-0013's twelve values, or the tenant identifier
must be exactly
tenant:platform/tenant:coulomb(grouping-less); - a
trial-grouped tenant may hold any role withgrant_reason: platform_defaultand noplan_id(ADR-0014) — this must be representable, not blocked by a plan-required constraint; - non-
trialroles other thanplatform_defaultrequire aplan_idwhengrant_reason: plan_assignment; - revoking a grant sets
revoked_at, never deletes the record (audit trail).
Done when: unit tests cover valid/invalid grouping values, the trial/ no-plan-required exception, and grant/revoke as append-only operations.
Task: Storage layer
id: TEN-WP-0002-T03
status: todo
priority: high
In-memory store behind a TenantStore protocol/interface (mirrors
qonto_client.QontoClientProtocol's pattern in qonto-assistant), so a
real backend can be swapped in later without touching domain/ or api/.
Every mutation emits a domain event (tenant created, role granted, role
revoked, plan assigned) per the boundary contract's Audit Correlation
Contract — the event bus itself can be a simple in-process list for now.
Done when: unit tests cover create/read/grant/revoke/assign-plan through the store interface, plus event emission for each mutation.
Task: Cache-read API (for key-cape)
id: TEN-WP-0002-T04
status: todo
priority: high
GET /tenants/{tenant_id}/roles — returns current, non-revoked capability
roles for a tenant. This is the endpoint key-cape calls at token-issuance
time to source the cached tenant_roles claim (IAM Profile v0.3). No
authorization gate of its own beyond service-to-service auth (out of scope
here — see Non-Goals); this endpoint's whole purpose is to be cheap and
fast, per the boundary contract's performance model.
Done when: integration test hits the endpoint against the in-memory store and returns the expected role set for a seeded tenant.
Task: Live-lookup API (for flex-auth) — fail closed
id: TEN-WP-0002-T05
status: todo
priority: high
GET /tenants/{tenant_id}/roles/live — same data as the cache-read
endpoint, but explicitly documented and tested as the path flex-auth must
call before authorizing aal2-class actions. The distinction from T04 is
operational intent (freshness guarantee, called synchronously on a
privileged-decision path), not payload shape.
Per the boundary contract's performance model: fail closed, never open. If the store is unavailable, this endpoint must return an error response that a policy caller would treat as "deny", not a default-allow or an empty role list indistinguishable from "no roles granted".
Done when: a test simulates store unavailability and asserts the endpoint
signals failure distinctly from "zero roles", not silently as 200 + [].
Task: Write API — grant, revoke, assign-plan
id: TEN-WP-0002-T06
status: todo
priority: medium
POST /tenants (create), POST /tenants/{id}/roles/grant,
POST /tenants/{id}/roles/revoke, POST /tenants/{id}/plan — all mutating
endpoints from the boundary contract's Write API. Per the contract,
tenant-engine does not self-authorize these writes; flex-auth is meant
to gate them. Since a reachable flex-auth integration is explicitly a
non-goal here, implement a WriteAuthorizer protocol/interface point (one
class, default-deny stub) so every mutation already flows through a single
seam — swapping in a real flex-auth client later touches one file, not
every endpoint.
Done when: unit tests confirm every write endpoint calls the
WriteAuthorizer seam and is denied by the default-deny stub; a
test-only authorizer override proves the seam actually gates the mutation
when swapped.
Task: Closure review
id: TEN-WP-0002-T07
status: todo
priority: low
Confirm T01–T06 done; run make test/make lint; verify the three API
surfaces match the boundary contract's Ownership Model and Source-of-Truth
Matrix with no drift. Note follow-ups: real flex-auth WriteAuthorizer
integration, key-cape wiring to actually call the cache-read endpoint at
issuance, guardrail/quota policy design (ADR-0014's reserved item), and
Binky Hedgehog GmbH as the first real tenant record once key-cape's
KEY-WP-0004 reaches that point. Run statehub fix-consistency.