Remote repointing turned out to be larger than a config change. The port map is prose copied into ~120 AGENTS.md files with no generator behind it, and the Helm chart deploys no MCP server on central, so remote dev-hub exists only as a reverse tunnel to the workstation. Global agent instructions repointed to the in-cluster ClusterIP; the two reverse tunnels stay until T07 and T08 remove what depends on them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
321 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
321 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: CUST-WP-0067
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type: workplan
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title: "Resolve hub target ambiguity and restore repo onboarding to the authoritative hub"
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domain: infotech
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repo: the-custodian
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status: active
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owner: codex
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created: "2026-08-24"
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updated: "2026-08-24"
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quality_dor: DoR-Ok
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quality_dor_at: "2026-08-24"
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quality_dor_by: codex
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quality_dor_note: "Live divergence measured (122 cache / 78 central, strict subset, 0 central-only); root cause located in configuration (port collision plus 127.0.0.1 defaults in four call sites); recovery source confirmed on disk and pushed for 43 of 44 records; owner boundaries follow ADR-010 and hub-record-authority.yaml."
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state_hub_workstream_id: "16249302-2767-55df-aec0-d92c2751c225"
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---
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# Resolve hub target ambiguity and restore repo onboarding to the authoritative hub
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## Goal
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Make "the authoritative hub" a resolvable address rather than a policy claim, so
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that repository onboarding lands on central instead of a local cache that
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believes it is primary. Then recover the seven weeks of workstation-originated
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repo registrations that never reached central, and correct the ADR-010 framing
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that treats this class of gap as a refresh problem.
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## Context
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`ADR-010` documented two State Hub instances sharing port 8000, separated only
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by IP family, and named the consequence: every tool defaulting to `127.0.0.1`
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reaches the local instance while believing it is the primary. That condition was
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never remediated. As of 2026-08-24 it is still live:
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```text
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LISTEN 127.0.0.1:8000 uvicorn (pid 3258) local cache
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LISTEN [::1]:8000 ssh -L 8000:10.43.68.154:8000 central
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```
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The collision is declared in `~/.config/bridge/tunnels.yaml`, where the tunnel
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`state-hub-primary` takes `local_port: 8000` — the port the local uvicorn
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already holds. `ssh -L` binds both address families, the IPv4 bind loses to
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uvicorn, and the IPv6 bind succeeds, so `ExitOnForwardFailure=yes` does not
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fire. `_reject_duplicate_local_ports` in `ops-bridge` guards only bridge tunnel
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against bridge tunnel; it cannot see a non-bridge listener.
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Measured repository divergence, 2026-08-24:
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```text
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cache (127.0.0.1:8000) 122
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central ([::1]:8000) 78
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central-only 0
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cache-only 44
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```
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Central is a strict subset. That is not the shape ADR-010 anticipated. A refresh
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of the cache would delete the 44 rather than reconcile them, and central holds
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no path to re-derive records for repositories it has never been told exist.
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Onboarding by registration date shows a clean break:
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| Registered | central | cache-only |
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|---|---|---|
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| 2026-02 – 2026-06 | 74 | 0 |
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| 2026-07 | 1 | 24 |
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| 2026-08 | 3 | 20 |
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Central is otherwise live — `last_state_synced_at` runs to 2026-08-22, and the
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three August rows (`repo-manager`, `rail-kubernetes`, `fin-hub`) were registered
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from the railiance side. Only workstation-originated onboarding is lost.
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Nothing is unrecoverable: 43 of the 44 have a working copy on disk, all 43 have
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an `origin` remote and are pushed (`soul-frame` and `rein-openweights` are ahead
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of their remote), and 35 carry `.repo-classification.yaml`. `agent-harness` has
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no working copy and needs separate disposition.
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`hub-record-authority.yaml` assigns `managed_repos` to `repo-manager` as
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`file-derived`. Repo Manager owns the record type but exposes no command that
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onboards a repository into a hub, and `registrar-reconcile --confirm-primary`
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defaults its "primary" to `127.0.0.1:8000` — confirming projections against the
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cache and reporting success while central holds nothing.
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## Repair the crashing status printer
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```task
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id: CUST-WP-0067-T01
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status: done
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priority: low
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state_hub_task_id: "f3608db4-20a5-58fb-a965-885eb14858af"
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```
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`statehub status` raised `KeyError: 'in_progress'` at `custodian_cli.py:565`.
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The task vocabulary is `wait|todo|progress|done|cancel`; `in_progress` and
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`blocked` are not task statuses in this schema and the totals block never
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carried them. Fix the key names, tolerate the `workplans`/`workstreams` rename,
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and print the resolved API base so the operator can see which instance answered.
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**Done (2026-08-24):** `custodian_cli.py` `cmd_status` now reads
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`progress`/`todo`/`wait`, accepts either totals key for workplans, uses `.get()`
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defaults throughout, and prints `API base:` as its second line. Verified against
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the live API.
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## Retire the local hub instance and the reverse-tunnel relay
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```task
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id: CUST-WP-0067-T02
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status: progress
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "4093e928-d752-5a91-96c3-2e80f0e1dac5"
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```
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Decision, 2026-08-24: rather than making two hub instances coexist safely,
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retire the second one. The local `postgres:16-alpine` + uvicorn instance is what
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impersonates central, and it is redundant — `ADR-010` decision 3 already states
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that local work requires no hub at all, and Repo Manager already maintains a
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file-derived local index (`index_store.py`, `rmgr cache status` / `cache
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rebuild`). Two caching layers exist and one of them is a database pretending to
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be the primary.
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With the local instance gone, `state-hub-primary` binds `127.0.0.1:8000`
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unchanged and every existing `http://127.0.0.1:8000` default becomes correct
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without editing a single call site. The port collision cannot recur because only
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one process binds the port.
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Retire the reverse tunnels too. `state-hub-railiance01` forwards a remote box's
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`:18000` back to this workstation's `:8000`, so a remote agent following the
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documented port map reaches the workstation rather than the primary — which on
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railiance01 is its own machine. That topology assumed the workstation was the
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hub; it has not been since the primary moved.
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Sequence matters: export the cache-only records first, stop serving second,
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discard the cache data only after T05 proves central holds everything.
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Acceptance: no local hub process listening; `127.0.0.1:8000` answers from
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central; MCP `dev-hub` resolves to central; reverse `state-hub-*` tunnels removed
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or repointed; the cache-only recovery export is committed.
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**Progress (2026-08-24):** `docs/recovery/cache-only-repos-2026-08-24.json`
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captures all 44 cache-only repository records with working-copy presence,
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classification file presence, and HEAD sha — the recovery source for T05.
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`ops-bridge` now pins local forwards to `127.0.0.1` (commit `2213847`), so a
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contested port fails loudly instead of silently landing on `[::1]`.
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The local hub instance is retired: `make api` (uvicorn on `127.0.0.1:8000`) is
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stopped, `state-hub-primary` restarted onto the freed IPv4 address, and the
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orphaned `[::1]` forward removed. Exactly one process now binds 8000 and it is
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the tunnel to central — `/repos/` returns 78 there, not the cache's 122, and
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`statehub status` reports central's 10 active workplans rather than 27. The MCP
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server on `:8001` needed no change: it targets `http://127.0.0.1:8000` and now
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proxies central. No call site was edited; retiring the impersonator made the
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existing defaults correct.
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The Postgres container is deliberately left running with its data intact. It is
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the recovery source of last resort until T05 proves central holds all 44, per
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the sequencing above.
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**Remaining:** the reverse relay tunnels `state-hub-railiance01` and
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`state-hub-mcp-railiance01` still route remote agents back to this workstation.
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Retiring them requires editing `~/.config/bridge/tunnels.yaml`, which is outside
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any repo and was blocked in-session; the change and its sequencing constraint
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are recorded in `docs/recovery/tunnels-yaml-proposed-changes-CUST-WP-0067.md`.
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Remote agents and the documented port map must be repointed *before* removal.
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## Make the hub target explicit and unspoofable
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```task
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id: CUST-WP-0067-T03
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status: todo
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "29977448-1a74-5a4d-b729-974c15b6bbde"
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```
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Retiring the local instance removes today's impersonator but not the ability for
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a future one to appear. Give the hub an instance identity it can assert — role
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served from the health or summary endpoint — and make
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`registrar-reconcile --confirm-primary` refuse anything that does not assert
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`primary`.
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`_check_primary` currently asserts only `status == ok` and `db == connected`.
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Both instances passed it. It is a liveness check wearing an authority check's
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name, and it is what allowed a cache to certify itself as the registrar.
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Acceptance: `--confirm-primary` fails against a non-primary instance and names
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what it reached; a hub reports its role; `statehub status` shows role alongside
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the API base.
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## Give Repo Manager a real onboarding write path
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```task
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id: CUST-WP-0067-T04
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status: todo
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "ffa141d5-331d-543d-8b87-516f27973a22"
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```
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Repo Manager owns `managed_repos` as `file-derived` in
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`hub-record-authority.yaml` and exposes no command for it. Add onboarding that
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follows `ADR-010` decision 5: write `.repo-classification.yaml` in the target
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repository, commit, push, and have central derive the record. Central must not
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accept a push of derived state, so the command makes the source file correct and
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reachable, then triggers and verifies derivation.
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Resolve the bootstrap gap explicitly — central derives from repositories it
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already knows about, so a never-registered repository is never scanned. The
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onboarding path must be able to introduce a repository central has not seen.
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Acceptance: onboarding a fresh repository from the workstation produces a central
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record with no manual step; re-running is idempotent.
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## Onboard the 44 cache-only repositories to central
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```task
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id: CUST-WP-0067-T05
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status: todo
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "078159e6-5ecd-5f9d-b3ec-1fabf60955f7"
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```
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Runs after T04. With the cache retired this is no longer a convergence of two
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hubs — it is onboarding 44 repositories to central from their files, which is
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T04 applied to the recovery export.
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Ten of the 44 lack `.repo-classification.yaml` and need one authored with the
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owner rather than guessed; classification is not mechanical, per
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`CUST-WP-0065-T01`. Push `soul-frame` and `rein-openweights` first — both are
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ahead of their remote, and central derives from what it can fetch.
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`agent-harness` has no working copy: decide restore-from-remote or drop and
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record it. Do not preserve it as a hub-only record.
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Acceptance: every record in the recovery export exists on central or carries a
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written disposition; only then may the local cache database be discarded.
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## Correct the ADR-010 framing and record the retirement
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```task
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id: CUST-WP-0067-T06
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status: todo
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "007bfcf1-3b17-5d4a-b16a-b80ebf273934"
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```
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`ADR-010` decision 2 says a divergent database is a merge problem and a stale
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cache is a refresh problem. For `managed_repos` neither held: the gap was a
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strict subset in the cache's favour, and refreshing would have destroyed rather
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than reconciled. Record that third shape — cache-only records whose
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authoritative source exists but was never introduced to central — with
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re-derivation from source as its remedy.
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Record the mechanical cause, which the ADR observed but did not diagnose: an
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unbound `ssh -L` binds every loopback family, so the IPv4 bind losing to a local
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listener still leaves a working `[::1]` forward and `ExitOnForwardFailure` never
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fires. The ADR treated the shared port as the hazard; the missing bind address
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was what made it silent.
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Note also that ADR-010 reads as though its remediation landed. It did not — the
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condition it measured was still live seven weeks later. Supersede decision 2 for
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this record class and record the local-instance retirement as the outcome.
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Acceptance: ADR-010 revised with a dated superseding note linked to this
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workplan; `ops-bridge` and the port map documented as the structural fix.
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## Repoint the fleet's copied port map
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```task
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id: CUST-WP-0067-T07
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status: todo
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priority: high
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```
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The remote port map is not configuration. It is prose copied into roughly 120
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`AGENTS.md` files across both machines, with no template or generator behind it
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— a grep for the block finds only the files themselves and past agent session
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logs. That is how one wrong topology propagated fleet-wide and survived the
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primary moving off the workstation.
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Every copy still tells a remote agent to reach the hub at `127.0.0.1:18000`,
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which forwards back to the workstation. The global agent instructions are
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already repointed to the in-cluster address (2026-08-24); these copies are not,
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and they outrank nothing but are read first in their own repos.
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Two things are needed, and the second matters more than the first:
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1. A scripted, reviewable repoint of the block across all affected repos on both
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machines — mechanical, but 120 repos times commit and push, so it needs a dry
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run and a diff sample reviewed before it runs.
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2. A single source for the block, so the next topology change is one edit rather
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than 120. Repo Manager already owns repository representation and `scaffold`;
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this belongs there. Without it this task recurs verbatim.
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Retiring `state-hub-railiance01` is blocked on this: the tunnel is what those
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120 files currently depend on.
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Acceptance: no `AGENTS.md` instructs a remote agent to use `127.0.0.1:18000`;
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the block has one authoritative source; a spot check on both machines confirms
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the rendered guidance matches the live topology.
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## Deploy an MCP server on central
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```task
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id: CUST-WP-0067-T08
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status: todo
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priority: medium
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```
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The Helm chart deploys a single container serving HTTP on 8000. No MCP server
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runs on central, so `dev-hub` for remote agents exists only as a reverse tunnel
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to the workstation's MCP — which now proxies central, making the path
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remote → workstation → central for a service on the remote's own machine.
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The work is small: the same image already contains `mcp_server/server.py`, run
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with `MCP_TRANSPORT=sse MCP_PORT=8001` and `API_BASE` pointed at the in-cluster
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service. It needs a Deployment, a Service, and chart values.
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Until this lands, remote agents should prefer the REST surface; the session
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protocol documents a `curl` form for every operation, so this is a degraded
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convenience rather than a blocker. Retiring `state-hub-mcp-railiance01` is
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blocked on this task.
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Acceptance: an MCP endpoint reachable from the node without traversing the
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workstation; remote `dev-hub` registration points at it; the reverse MCP tunnel
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removed.
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