211 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
211 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
# Factory critical-path execution — 2026-09-08
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Continued on [2026-09-09: issuer pin complete and custody reviews ready](2026-09-09-helixforge-issuer-pin.md).
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Implemented and published prerequisite corrections in ops-warden, key-cape,
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approval-engine and audit-core, followed by local runtime installation and an
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attended OpenBao capability preflight, then verified the actual upstream issuer. The canonical integration workplan and next
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admission sequence remain in
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[prj-helixforge-factory](/home/worsch/prj-helixforge-factory/operations/identity-admission.md).
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| Delivered | Evidence | Effect |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| Warden preserves explicit policy refusal | Code `31d9b66`; 429 tests passed, four integration tests excluded by the normal suite configuration; Ruff passed. Existing SSH probe still HTTP 200/ALLOW. Installed credential request now HTTP 403 / exit 4 before transport. | Replaces misleading “unavailable / fail-open” behavior with the actual caller/owner binding refusal. WARDEN-WP-0039-T03 owns that live admission. |
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| Installer refreshes the actual Warden package | `19bb75c`; initial `--force` reused a cached wheel, while `--reinstall-package ops-warden` installed the corrected source. Installed module and behavior checked. | A published fix now reaches the executing CLI. |
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| KeyCape requires genuine issuer denial | `dcebd46`; complete Go suite and vet passed. Negative checks reject timeouts, server errors, invalid tokens and unrelated refusals. Image pulled by immutable digest. | Prevents false successful scope/predecessor proofs. KEY-WP-0013-T06 is done. |
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| Approval audit scope is exact | Approval `b46b0f2`, Audit `bbe8c15`; 81 receiver and six sender checks passed. Exact `tenant:platform`, source approval-engine, write-only/load-bearing, explicit redact. | Resolves both tenant/redaction input waits and removes the proposed wildcard tenant scope. Credential and live admission remain open. |
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| KeyCape rollout is concrete | Pinned candidate plus two credential refs, `/readyz`, and single-instance replacement passed Railiance server dry-run. Rollback restores the compatible config/image pair. | The next attended rollout starts from a reviewed patch, with known configuration and credential prerequisites. No production deployment performed. |
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The human approver UI/callback is now its own KEY-WP-0013-T05 task. Its absence
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does not block the independent service registrations or approval service startup.
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It still blocks evidence requiring a real human approver. Together with the two
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audit inputs, three source-input waits are removed from the service-startup
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path; no live security gate is marked complete by that separation.
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The project now records thirteen source-pinned supplying records, including
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RPF-WP-0035-T05 / proposed CCR-2026-0017/0018 and WARDEN-WP-0039-T03.
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The two CCRs explicitly cover verifier-side delivery only. Client-side read
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lanes and linked approval audit receiver/sender custody remain distinct returns.
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The immediate sequence is: ensure the now-verified upstream issuer is pinned; obtain
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the named custody reviews and run the contained attended first provision;
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deploy and verify KeyCape; admit audit/consumer credentials; prove deployed
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approval claim/consume and native model credential delivery. Exact policy
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binding and required human-approval evidence remain explicit. Runtime placement
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preparation can proceed alongside this chain. The factory's exact operating
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grant and enforceable budget still precede paid execution.
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All four modified owner repos returned zero consistency failures. The checks
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retain historical/advisory warnings where applicable; canonical reconciliation
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then projected published source. Five new task assignees were empty despite
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source metadata and were corrected through the supported API with readback.
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HFACT-WP-0001-T02 retains that projection parity issue.
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[Published evidence](/home/worsch/prj-helixforge-factory/evidence/2026-09-08-critical-path.json)
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records revisions, validations and the dry-run. These changes reduce ambiguous
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handoffs and unreliable checks. Time saved and autonomous throughput are not
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measured. No secrets were provisioned, no new policy binding granted and no
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paid model run admitted; G0–G5 remain open and the fourteen-day window has not
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started.
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## Runtime installation and custody authority follow-through
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SAND-WP-0015-T06 is done. The existing pinned runtime is installed on
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`bnt-lap001` in its owner's mode-0700 content-addressed store. The installer
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checks the expected digest before writing, verifies the copied artifact,
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rejects unsafe ownership/permissions and changed destinations, and publishes
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atomically. Reusing an intact installation is idempotent. It is protected by
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the local owner boundary; it is not root-owned or a Railiance installation.
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Sand-boxer source `df5e941` passed the complete check: **188 tests and Ruff**.
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The installed-path namespace smoke started Claude 2.1.263, rein and the adapter;
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proved read-only runtime, private persistent HOME, isolated networking, clean
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worktree and teardown. It used no model credentials or provider request.
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Sand-boxer published main `3e49a98` and Glas `4499160` carry the receipt. T04 and
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GLAS-WP-0012-T02 still own execution configuration, real-model acceptance and
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Railiance placement. No repeat of the unchanged candidate build is needed.
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RPF-WP-0035-T05 now has a successful first-provision **capability** proof.
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Through the native founder-attended `openbao-platform-admin-login` envelope,
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the platform diagnostic checked create/update capability on all six exact
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policy, Kubernetes-role and KV data paths for CCR-2026-0017/0018. The successful
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session self-revoked and removed its helper. Source `a94d06d` preserves the
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metadata-only diagnostic and receipt. No secret value was read, custody seeded,
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policy/role changed or production workload deployed.
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The receipt preserves all attempts: the first direct launcher failed before
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the child command and left revocation unconfirmed; the second native-wrapper
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session revoked successfully but its query used unsupported multi-path syntax;
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the final six single-path queries passed and that session revoked successfully.
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The later success does not establish revocation for the first failed attempt.
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The project consumes both returns in its thirteen-record dependency view.
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Factory T03 and T04 remain waiting for their outstanding acceptance evidence;
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installation and authority discovery no longer appear as unresolved inputs.
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Source, Forgejo and the primary State Hub are reconciled at published revisions.
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This removes two concrete setup uncertainties and makes installation and the
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custody preflight reproducible. Throughput, hours saved and autonomous delivery
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remain unmeasured. The next sequence is actual upstream signed-token issuer
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proof, named CCR reviews, attended custody activation and compatible KeyCape
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rollout. Separate client/audit/native credential admission, the exact factory
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grant and enforceable spend limits still precede a real model run. G0–G5 and the
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fourteen-day observation window remain open.
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[Runtime and custody continuation receipt](2026-09-08-helixforge-factory/runtime-custody-continuation.json)
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retains source revisions, validations, projection readbacks and progress IDs.
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## Executable upstream issuer proof prepared
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KEY-WP-0013-T07 closes the missing diagnostic preparation. KeyCape source
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`6f33abd` adds a one-shot upstream verifier; source `1b9793f` pins the tested
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image and [execution packet](/home/worsch/key-cape/docs/upstream-issuer-proof.md).
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The probe verifies a real authorization-code response inside the adapter and
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emits only a verified issuer and check metadata. It issues no downstream token.
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The complete Go race suite and vet passed. Five packet/receipt tests and seven
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real Traefik 3.6.7 route cases passed; ordinary callbacks remain on their normal
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backend. Railiance server dry-run accepted the exact five-resource packet. The
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immutable container also produced the expected one-second idle-timeout receipt
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as UID 65534 with a read-only filesystem and no network.
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The temporary Job has a ten-minute deadline and no retry; its route, service
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and two network policies must carry the real Job UID for bounded cleanup. It
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uses only the existing config YAML, without the signing-key mount or a
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Kubernetes API token. That YAML contains credential data, so live execution
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requires the deployment owner's admission. KEY-WP-0013-T02 retains that decision,
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the actual signed issuer receipt, contained configuration pin and subsequent
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custody/rollout reviews. No live issuer result is inferred from preparation.
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This replaces an unspecified manual observation with a tested command and
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bounded execution packet. The current receipt is
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[key-cape/docs/evidence/upstream-issuer-probe.json](/home/worsch/key-cape/docs/evidence/upstream-issuer-probe.json).
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## Live issuer observation completed
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The user admitted the prepared ten-minute probe. At **2026-09-08 21:44:44 UTC**
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it verified an actual signed upstream token with issuer exactly
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**`https://auth.coulomb.social`**. Signature, audience, validity window and nonce
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checks passed. The pinned container exited 0. This closes the unknown-issuer
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observation in KEY-WP-0013-T02 and RPF-WP-0035-T05; the earlier preparation-only
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state above is superseded by this live return.
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Cleanup removed the dedicated route, Job/Pod, Service and both temporary network
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policies. Deletion used the recorded object UIDs; every temporary resource is
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absent. Normal KeyCape Deployment/config Secret metadata and image remained
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unchanged. The probe retained no token and issued no downstream credential.
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It did not prove downstream MFA/application login or activate custody.
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KeyCape `41f6916` and Platform `8f40d73` published the owner returns. Project
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`89041ec` consumes the live proof and records HFACT-DEC-2026-002 (Hub decision
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`1c0d9fd1-4790-4d9a-be6c-0ed4c4890549`). The concrete probe approval is resolved;
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its pending human-needed flag is cleared. HFACT-WP-0001-T03 remains wait for
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the configuration owner to ensure `authelia.issuer` equals the verified HTTPS
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value, named CCR-2026-0017/0018 reviews, and the admitted custody/compatible
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KeyCape rollout. Separate client-side/audit/native delivery remains open.
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The efficiency gain is one fewer unknown on the activation path and a retained
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repeatable check for relevant provider/configuration changes. No renewed token
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observation is needed for this unchanged proof context. Autonomous throughput,
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spend and the fourteen-day factory observation are still unproved.
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Final readback found stale KeyCape T02 and Platform T05 task descriptions despite
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applied repository reconciliation receipts. Both were repaired from the published
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source and verified. HFACT-WP-0001-T02 retains the underlying source/projection
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parity work; these repairs do not establish that automatic synchronization is fixed.
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[Live issuer and synchronization receipt](2026-09-08-helixforge-factory/live-upstream-issuer-continuation.json)
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records the proof, cleanup, source/Hub parity and progress IDs.
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### 2026-09-11 retry: sender credentials provisioned
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The user requested another attended login attempt. It succeeded: CCR21/22
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created independent version-1 custody and advanced the shared sender registry
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with CAS 7→8, preserving existing senders and fields. The seed wrapper exited 0
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and confirmed self-revocation for that session. This clears first provisioning
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for Approval Engine and Informed Decision.
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Platform's delivery helper now pins the reviewed manifests and verifies native
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reader/namespace restrictions, exact ESO projection and receiver-registry
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equality before reload. Seven delivery tests and 18 custody tests pass,
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including 11 actual disposable OpenBao cases. A fresh attended delivery login
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then failed before command handoff (exit 5; remote revocation unconfirmed), so
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no delivery or reload is claimed. RPF-WP-0035-T08 waits for delivery login and
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AUDIT-WP-0009-T09/T11 retain real producer acceptance. Do not repeat the approved
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CCRs or reseed their credentials.
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Factory attempts and paid calls remain zero. The immediate sequence remains
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delivery/receiver proof, native approval and Informed Decision policy/service/
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human admission, exact credential delivery and runtime/spend admission, then
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the single bounded reuse-surface worker attempt. CCR19's existing operator-group
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question remains separate; the customer UI product remains vergabe-teilnahme.
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The successful seed and failed delivery attempt are separate metadata receipts
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in the platform, Audit Core and factory project evidence directories.
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### 2026-09-11 08:27 UTC: native audit delivery completed
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The user was available for the renewed attended login. It succeeded; the
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reviewed delivery command completed in 28 seconds and Warden exited 0 with
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self-revocation confirmed for this session. Both independent version-1 sender
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credentials now reach only their intended ESO-owned producer Secrets. Native
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reader/path/namespace denials and the coding-agent boundary all passed.
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Temporary reader sessions were revoked and the denied namespace was removed.
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Audit Core reloaded only after its registry JSON matched authoritative version
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8. Receiver c82e0442 remains 1/1 Ready and reports operational/durable storage.
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RPF-WP-0035-T08 clears its human login wait and returns to progress for native
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producer acceptance. AUDIT-WP-0009-T09/T11 retain accepted/duplicate events,
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source/tenant/read refusals, independent readback and audit bearer-revocation
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proof. Reader-session revocation is a different control. Both CCRs stay applied
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until their full acceptance criteria are proved.
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This supersedes the earlier delivery wait; no provisioning or login retry is
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needed for the unchanged successful delivery. Attestation/offsite operation
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remains AUDIT-WP-0009-T12, and tamper_evidence=false remains the accurate claim.
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Factory attempts and paid calls are still zero. The next useful step is actual
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producer/receiver acceptance, followed by the existing service/policy/human
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admission chain and the bounded reuse-surface factory attempt.
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