the-custodian/docs/security-collaboration-review-2026-10-10.md

# Security collaboration and work consolidation — 10 October 2026

Work: CUST-WP-0078. Founder requested intent-based collaboration review and
autonomous completion in build mode. Root and three workers reviewed thirteen
repos; existing unrelated dirty files were preserved. This report is coordination
evidence, not a new canon ruling or live-action grant.

Current checkpoint (11 October): **47 open plans / 103 unfinished tasks** across
the same thirteen repos. CUST76 and the bounded collaboration review are finished;
implementation continues under the named owner plans. KEY39 source design is now
accepted in Informed Decision. Canonical digest repair, typed plan compilation and
a closed service-input candidate are committed. The service pilot can progress
separately from the human-login track; full execution integration and native proof
remain. Earlier dated holds below are history; the final checkpoint sections and
[source-wave inventory](evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/source-wave-checkpoint-2026-10-11.json)
record the current source state.

## Intended collaboration

| Owner | Product and responsibility | Boundary and collaborating owners |
| --- | --- | --- |
| net-kingdom | Security canon, profiles, case types, responsibility and trust-state contracts | Defines what a case means; does not absorb platform implementation. Bootstrap runtime residue remains explicitly recorded in INTENT. |
| gate-house | Doctrine, invariant interpretation and amendment review | Resolves architecture conflicts; does not authenticate, mint credentials or decide operational access. |
| key-cape | Authentication, issuer claims, OIDC and MFA | Identity and assurance are inputs to access-engine, not permissions. Provider/custody and relying-party admission remain distinct. |
| user-engine | User facts, account/recovery/MFA journeys and user-facing catalogue | Catalogue readback is advisory; protected applications still enforce decisions. Never infer enrollment or permission from a return URL. |
| tenant-engine | Tenant facts and tenant governance within the platform ceiling | Supplies scoped facts/guardrails; cannot widen platform authority or become a second PDP. |
| access-engine | Bound operational policy decisions and protected-system registry | Sole PDP; consumes authoritative identity and PIP facts. Availability errors are not authorization decisions. |
| secrets-engine | Credential lifecycle and approved delivery over OpenBao custody | Uses named service identity and exact native lanes; does not become the identity issuer or general secret exporter. |
| ops-mason | Reviewed structural construction plans and materialization | Builds against accepted types and owner contracts; structural readiness must precede follow-through, not wait for the action it enables. |
| ops-warden | Access discovery, owner routing, SSH issuance and case follow-through | A catalog entry is a route, not a credential or grant. Executes only declared interfaces under the caller's actual lane. |
| railiance-platform | OpenBao custody, concrete policies/readers/broker lanes and platform runtime ownership | Native scope/negative/revocation proofs belong here and with the consumer; not with a generic coordination window. |
| kings-guard | Independent operational evidence/completeness observation and proposed containment | Staff acts through engine APIs; does not configure Tooling or actuate containment directly. |
| informed-decision | Revision-bound research, presentation, human disposition and outcome retrieval | Agents draft; humans bind. Approval Engine owns approval state, Access Engine permission, Audit Core independent custody. |
| policy-nexus | Durable publication of owner canon and ADRs | Guardrails originate in owner sources. Publication does not ratify or enforce; this is not another PDP. |

The useful execution chain is: accepted architecture/type → accepted case →
ops-mason structural materialization → ops-warden owner-bound follow-through →
native consumer/negative/recovery receipts → independent evidence and monitoring.
Each receipt must say whether it proves source preparation, an executed action,
or native acceptance. A completed producer does not require an open producer
plan merely because its consumer is unfinished.

## Baseline and consolidation

The authoritative source snapshot found **49 open workplans, including one
residual, and 105 unfinished task blocks** across the thirteen repos. It counts
only proposed/ready/active/blocked/backlog plans and every task block, including
multiple blocks under a section. Historical `done`/`completed` frontmatter is
not counted as fresh demand. Snapshot:
[source-baseline.json](evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/source-baseline.json).

| Plan | Disposition | Continuing obligation |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FLEX-WP-0035 | Finish delivered producer, all tasks already done and both pins Ready on the immutable October 10 image | USER-WP-0026-T03 and USER-WP-0028-T02 own real consumer integration/readback. |
| RPF-WP-0054 | Finish verified create-only mint lane; T07 cancelled as transfer, not implemented | RPF-WP-0055 retains later rotation as unpromoted residual; MASON-WP-0010/WARDEN-WP-0044 retain the real Forgejo case. |
| RPF-WP-0050 | Finish bounded preparation; cancel obsolete historical-window orchestration | RPF-WP-0035-T02 and USER-WP-0035-T02 retain native acceptance. Requester delivery RPF-WP-0051 is already finished; its own issuer-rotation residual remains RPF-IN-0004. |
| NK-WP-0042 | Finish planning; cancel the duplicate attended gate | USER-WP-0027-T04 / USER-WP-0028-T03 retain the real U05–U08 journey and decision cef97ccd. NET-IN-0003 retains demand-deferred arbitrary-client step-up interoperability. IAM v0.4 stays proposed. |

These are source-backed completions or explicit scope transfers. Neither an
unperformed provisioning session nor an unaccepted browser/MFA journey is marked
done. Residual work is still visible in total counts and is not implemented.

## Source defects advanced

1. **Tenant isolation in user-engine's advisory readback cache.** The cache key
   omitted tenant although the policy request includes it. A session switching
   tenant reused another tenant's cached allow. The key now includes tenant;
   the new regression fails against the original source and the twenty-test
   suite passes with the fix. This does not change protected-app enforcement.
2. **Access Engine's required audit-commit boundary.** GH-DEC-2026-024 rejects
   release of uncommitted load-bearing effects, including restrictive ones.
   Source now withholds every effect when required commitment fails, retains
   HTTP 503, and inserts Explain history only after successful commitment.
   Single, batch, list, readback and HTTP failure tests pass, including race
   checks. Native sender custody and rollout remain FLEX-WP-0031 work. An
   open-for-scope consumer may respond to 503 by proceeding; withholding is
   therefore not a promise of downstream denial. Review consumer stance before
   activation.
3. **Actual user-engine readback packaging.** rapp-user-engine has a separate
   candidate renderer for only Deployment and runtime NetworkPolicy: dedicated
   projected audience/token, exact readback URL, and namespace AND pod egress.
   Existing default production pins/config remain until a source-bound image
   is published and the concrete release is approved. Eleven package checks
   pass. USER-WP-0026-T03 keeps the real native acceptance gate.
4. **Case type drift and missing executable interfaces.** The accepted Forgejo
   case is `oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1`, but broker generation hard-coded
   `@1.0`. The broker now pins exactly `@1.1`; ten fake-backend CLI regression tests pass while preserving materialized, CAS, digest and identity guards.
   Warden's type fields also contain prose, not executable interfaces; they
   cannot safely be converted to shell commands. The proposed owner adapter,
   receipt, uncertainty and created-only rollback contract is held in
   ops-warden/docs/security-case-execution-proposal.md. A pure Warden receipt-state prototype passes fourteen tests; it has no command dispatch or live adapter. NetKingdom returned an exact-source conditional owner review. Structural materialization must precede mint; the Mason/Warden circle needs real receipts, not a state-label shortcut.

## Remaining critical paths

| Path | Next actual owner return | Completion proof |
| --- | --- | --- |
| First known SecurityCase | Align accepted version and structural materialization semantics; provide exact owner adapters/receipts; resolve CCR-0042 consumer binding | Mint, delivery, env/group/client registration, consumer group denial, confirmed session cleanup and scoped rollback. NK-WP-0048-T06 / MASON-WP-0010-T03 / WARDEN-WP-0044-T03. |
| Service-JWT lifecycle | KEY-WP-0039 negative-claim session plus MASON-WP-0009/platform capability-denial receipts; service-JWT opt-in | RPF-WP-0035-T02 complete only after positive AND negative/lifetime/revocation proofs; then SECRETS-WP-0008-T06 switches the real engine path. No bootstrap fallback. |
| MFA and Fluid member verification | Existing founder-approved tegwick/coulomb-social U05–U08 session; owner management handoff; real member verification | USER-WP-0027/0028 acceptance, then MASON-WP-0005-T05 and Fluid salt CAS proof. MFA optional pilot is not arbitrary-client step-up. |
| Audit and monitoring | Honest emission semantics, exact sender/cadence/window mapping and admitted native receivers | FLEX-WP-0031 / AUDIT-WP-0013 native custody and reconciliation; Qonto runtime then KG-WP-0005-T03 independent operational completeness. Do not make transport custody wait on observer acceptance. |
| Execution attribution | Railiance names exact emitting component, source, tenant/scope and idempotency/wire binding | AUDIT-WP-0014-T01 already accepts custody. NK-WP-0040-T02 remains wait for emitter agreement before canonical schema; actual emission/readback follows. |
| Layer v0.8 | All three exact A11 r2 / A12 r3 owner reviews are applied; Gate House T09 is done. The complete v0.8 cut is proposed, digest `103a635f19ab9fe53094d69c3eeebcccd8e87ac9588846167e7e204a7c6de167`. | NetKingdom acceptance and eight owner checker updates remain; v0.7 governs until that actual flip. |

Other platform waits have independent purposes: backup/restore and trust-root
exercises, ArgoCD adoption, primary archive caller admission, receiver ownership,
legacy npm HOLD and old-cluster cleanup. Do not bundle these into a generic
"security ready" declaration. Enterprise federation NK-WP-0011 has no current
ADR-0009 adoption demand: keep it dormant rather than build Keycloak merely to
reduce a count. Tenant TEN-WP-0012 stays an unpromoted residual.

## Decisions and guardrails

Use the already deployed initial informed-decision lifecycle: State Hub's
admitted workload registers the hashed packet, publishes to the explicit admin
audience, requests revision-specific review, and queues the exact returned
envelope in its private dispatcher. No broader caller admission, legacy manual
sitting load or new service is needed. A queued envelope proves submission,
not acceptance. Human outcome retrieval does not authorize a later rollout.

The next architectural decision is the **closed owner adapter / receipt seam
for known SecurityCase execution**, including structural materialization before
follow-through, no shell evaluation of prose, uncertainty blocking replay, and
owner-created-only rollback. The packet must state exact revisions and owner
review findings. It grants no live command, credential widening or automatic
type acceptance. Concrete rollout decisions follow source/image/revision proof.

Existing published guardrails remain the source of governing rules:
[security layer v0.7](https://policy.coulomb.social/standards/security-layer-model/v0.7/index.html)
and the published Railiance/NetKingdom security-layer interaction ADR. New
accepted guardrails belong in owner canon/ADRs, registered and rendered through
policy-nexus with status/revision. A pending v0.8 or proposed execution contract
must remain visibly proposed. No new runtime evaluator is placed in nexus.

No live security control has been relaxed by this wave. Fixes remain source
changes until their owner-approved release, and existing build-mode exceptions
remain on docs/security-close-down-checklist.md.

## Evidence and handoff

Owner reviews, hash-checked application manifests and source validation receipts
are retained under
[2026-10-10-security-consolidation](evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/).
Existing source hashes were checked before writes to avoid concurrent edits.
Final sync, count, decision and verification receipts are recorded there as
they complete. Remaining native obligations stay in the exact owner tasks
above; this coordination wave does not copy those tasks into a new backlog.

## October 11 verified runtime repair and synchronization

The informed-decision consumer had drifted behind Access Engine's lifecycle
policy: a v1 pin against the shipped v2 provider made native authoring fail closed
with HTTP 503. The founder explicitly approved config-only revision
`7db8485ffecdebfabd77a9daec085553c74bf0bf`. ArgoCD manually synced exactly the
new immutable ConfigMap and Deployment, with no pruning. Sync succeeded,
Application health is Healthy, Deployment generation 24 is observed and Ready,
and `/readyz` returns 200. The runtime pin is now v2/da01e045; the existing
7f5c6cb image remains unchanged. Source purpose validation is separately tested
and remains INFD-WP-0009-T04's image-release obligation.

Owner source synchronization passed for NetKingdom, Access Engine, User Engine,
rapp-user-engine, Warden, King's Guard, Approval Engine, Railiance Master and
Gate House. Platform closures synchronized, but its full consistency result
still reports three preexisting populated historical projections without source
files. Their task/history records were preserved; no empty retirement was
used to conceal the mismatch.

At the October 10 submission checkpoint, both native review handoffs were
**delivered and intake-ready**. Confirmed human acceptance is recorded in the
October 11 continuation below:

- [Security layer v0.8, revision 2](https://decisions.coulomb.social/decisions/infd-20261010-security-layer-v08?version=2); [human review](https://decisions.coulomb.social/review?memo_id=review-9c37deae-bffc-4fdf-a40e-0d601fd28ee6).
- [Known SecurityCase execution design, revision 1](https://decisions.coulomb.social/decisions/infd-20261010-security-case-execution?version=1); [human review](https://decisions.coulomb.social/review?memo_id=review-677ed6f8-6614-4a64-99ca-5ef3d377a753).

The first memo's published version1 remains retained. Review validation rejected
a prose action field and unsupported severity; revision2 corrects them to the
existing intake contract. Full repository/intake validation passed before the
retry. No uncertain approval was reposted.

Source count at the previous synchronization checkpoint across the same thirteen repos: **47 open plans, 45
nonresidual plus two residual; 103 unfinished task blocks**. Against baseline,
four plans closed, one rotation residual and one real runtime-repair plan were
created. This is a reduction of two total plans and three nonresidual plans,
not a claim that forty-seven implementation plans are complete.
[source-after.json](evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/source-after.json)
retains the per-owner records. The earlier CUST-WP-0076 closure is outside this
thirteen-repo count.


## October 11 accepted architecture and verified source continuation

Both native decisions now have revision-bound human **ACCEPT** dispositions,
`submission_state: confirmed` and `stale: false`. Layer memo version 2 is bound to
approval `8432d0dc-adc0-42d0-9a5b-6b71ff492e15`; execution memo version 1 to
`e46b149b-ec3c-4b3b-98a7-dcb4934448ca`. Full receipts are retained in
[human-acceptance-receipts.json](evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/human-acceptance-receipts.json).
These decisions accept architecture and source work; they grant no later live
credential or deployment change.

NetKingdom accepted the v0.8 cut in source commit
`0e17d956ab45f8c4a0163b70749490c414e54e67`. Acceptance metadata changes preserve
the approved normative body. Its accepted artifact SHA256 is
`3d8298560069ef471fba28d2b1245fb2309328f231dad1a667cdf0ce5a5a7c8b`;
the checker companion is explicitly derived. Eight owner checkers now pin that
accepted source. Actual owner checks passed: Warden 31, Secrets 40, Tenant 16,
King's Guard 37, User 33, Zone 33, Maturity 32, plus Access Engine Go package and
CLI checks. Meaningful regressions cover non-ASCII layer folding, nested pins,
provenance/version distinctions and declaration disagreement. Whitehat retains
its honest nonclaim in dated evidence rather than embedding observer state in a
layer declaration. GateHouse GH-WP-0004-T10/T11 are done; T06's real declaration
obligation remains open. Source conformance is not native estate acceptance.

PolicyNexus registers accepted v0.8 and marks the v0.7 canonical page superseded.
PNEX-WP-0005 owns actual publication, source-bound build and rollback. Its clean
local candidate renders 73 published documents, with 183 inventory records and
92 metadata-pending records. Thirteen newly discovered records were recorded as
metadata-pending; no existing disposition changed. Two stale Custodian ADRs now
carry dated technical annotations preserving their original architectural
decisions and authorship; exact accepted-1 Markdown and served HTML are retained.
Thirty publisher tests passed. Comparison against the actual served v0.7
immutable HTML then exposed a provenance-dependent rebuild difference despite
unchanged Markdown. Publication remains open while that exact-byte preservation
is repaired and verified; a clean build alone did not establish immutable history.

Warden now has an independently reviewed durable execution kernel and 51 passing
actual owner tests. It journals intent before dispatch, blocks replay after
uncertain interruption, separates grant and parent-session revocation, binds
receipts to each operation and attempt, constrains adapter inputs and output,
and limits rollback to owner-proven created objects. Review found real output,
revocation and receipt-freshness defects even after early tests passed; failed
and refined evidence remains one trial. No production adapter, native verifier
or ordered-run CLI is registered. WARDEN-WP-0044-T03 remains progress, with
MASON-WP-0010-T03 and actual Forgejo materialization still required.

KeyCape's negative JWT probe now verifies one intended claim defect, refuses
credential redirects, requires a pre-expiry positive control and confirmed
revocation, and does not print tokens. Seventeen regression tests passed and the
exact owner review completed KEY-WP-0039-T01. T02 still requires the attended
native claim/lifetime session and actual role-leeway readback; MASON-WP-0009's
separate operator/ESO/capability-denial evidence is not replaced by these tests.

The User Engine base refresh removed three CRITICAL and reduced 88 HIGH findings
to 44 unfixed HIGH findings, without suppression. Source commit
`1bb7cacc98479f56f6b1c28c000479efd260a944` passed 323 owner tests with eight
optional skips and 20 installed readback tests. CI published
`main-1bb7cac`; the actual registry image
`sha256:f239bbf332b8eb87320c86390fddca1dcb4f7c628a7af75e79dee8058d446a7b`
has the exact revision label and matches 47 application inputs and 45 installed
package files. Its CI journeys job failed with missing test/runtime dependencies;
source-only workflow repair `ac8b04edc7ae51492ee2e19e1ff075cf37e6708b` now
passes native journeys task 11455, container-smoke 11454 and host-smoke 11453.
The repair leaves all 49 tracked runtime inputs byte-identical to the published
image source. USER-WP-0026
native readback acceptance and informed disposition of remaining HIGH findings
remain open. No live User Engine rollout has occurred.

INFD-WP-0009-T04 has a separately prepared narrow purpose-validation overlay,
installed/container/recovery checks and a scan with zero HIGH/CRITICAL findings.
It remains unpublished and undeployed. The approved config-only repair does not
authorize this image change.

Current source count across the same thirteen repos is **48 open plans: 46
nonresidual and two residual, with 102 unfinished task blocks**. Four original
plans closed; a rotation residual, actual runtime repair and actual PolicyNexus
publication demand were recorded. The continuing source snapshot is
[source-current-2026-10-11.json](evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/source-current-2026-10-11.json).
This count reflects real demand and handoffs rather than relabeling native work
as complete. Source changes outside the initial thirteen owners are tracked in
their own records and do not silently expand this comparison.


The full publisher history audit extended the preservation requirement beyond
v0.7: of 72 currently served immutable pages, the intermediate candidate retained
three byte-exact, rewrote 65 and omitted four prior revision paths. All 72 source
Markdown hashes were independently verified against their recorded owner Git
commits. Complete explicit history retention is being implemented before any
hosting approval request. The accepted v0.8 and source fixes are useful progress;
the intermediate clean release check was not a complete publication transition
proof.


The complete committed publisher candidate passed CI run77 at65862b1. Installed
readback verifies73 source hashes and preserves72 immutable pages; image labels,
source-lock, inventory and manifest agree. Its scan found2 CRITICAL and39 HIGH
findings, all with fixes available. That failed runtime-security gate is retained
while the official runtime base and exact fixed packages are refreshed; it is
not a hosting-ready release. Independent publication review preserves exact
owner status and all original ADR decisions.

Mason source preparation now passes40 actual owner tests. It distinguishes the
structural footprint from a legitimately changed full follow-through digest,
validates the real hashed Forgejo bundle against current templates, preserves
typed object identity through created/preexisting evidence and rollback, and
previews only the status-change hash binding after independent owner proof.
MASON-WP-0010-T03 remains progress. CCR-0042 binding, authenticated native
observations and acknowledged production adapters still own completion.

Publication tracking is PNEX-WP-0005. Initial new-plan ID0004 collided with the
existing finished fleet-standards/source-auth plan; only the new demand was
renumbered. Historical IDs/tasks/UUIDs were preserved. Failed receiving and
review refinements remain evidence rather than being erased or counted as new
successes.


## Actual approved User Engine rollout and publication artifact return

Human ACCEPT for infd-20261011-user-engine-readback-r2@1 was confirmed at
00:48:11Z, approval0dd18a5a-5555-461e-8470-931d530435cf. Fresh exact identities,
resource versions, provider/readiness/ownership, strict server dry-run/diff and
3460m/4000m CPU headroom passed before the two-object apply. User Engine became
Ready1 with generation73 observed73 at00:52:49Z on immutablef239. Native readyz200,
admitted registry transport, policy allow/deny/stale-MFA fixtures, bounded expiry,
unavailable refusal and tenant-cache separation pass. Existing enforcement
health200 and unknown-action denial pass; its old purpose-bearing request returns
200/deny rather than current-source protocol refusal. No allow, cross-provider
token isolation, real human login or MFA proof is inferred.

The actual database has zero application bindings: USER-WP-0026-T03 and
USER-WP-0028-T02 remain open until supported authenticated catalogue registration
and three-way owner proof. The scoped deployment did not grant catalogue writes.
Canonical Rapp source now reproduces exactly the approved Deployment/NP; full
28-object render comparisons preserve every other object and backup/restore
images. RAPP-USER-ENGINE-WP-0004 records actual execution and continuing catalogue
work; RISK-F-0016 retains the44HIGH/8CVE unresolved findings and actual temporary
human risk disposition, with review byOctober18 or approved rollback. No automatic
expiry controller or RiskNexus grade is asserted.

Publisher runtime repair b64a0c5 passed CIrun78. Actualimage4e0db6a57eb00f577159aa6ee10f910dd67b03fd0541c6ce849f5426fdb99d06
has zero all-severity scan findings across70 packages; rawsource-lock,73 exact
owner hashes/current pages and72 historical HTTP pages independently verified.
PNEX-WP-0005-T02 is done. Its actual hosting packet remains in technical owner
review; oldHelmrevision8 still serves. Future preflight guards are being refined
to seal complete live identities/defaulted specs and public HTTPS origin checks
before a new human hosting decision is submitted. Earlier vulnerable candidates
and failed review/checks remain retained.


## Native catalogue and first-case owner follow-through

User Engine's actual admitted read-only preflight confirms that `informed-decision`
and its application binding are absent. Its supported `register_application`
library method enforces the ordinary authenticated actor/PDP path, but no native
management invocation bridging a verified operator into that method exists.
Owner source commit `1eefbfc` retains exact canonical metadata, the route discovery,
absent/conflict checks and a proposed administrative alternative. This is
preparation: no fabricated actor, grant, catalogue insertion or maintenance
exception was executed. USER-WP-0026/0028 remain their acceptance owners.

Platform source commit `6b1c1c7` clarifies CCR42's real identity blocker. Both native
Forgejo and its runner use `forgejo/default`; granting that identity would reach
both. RAPPS-WP-0016 intends ESO delivery, while the current type only templates
the KeyCape ESO role. A dedicated consumer delivery role requires explicit
owner refinement and review. The five-object structural proof remains usable;
the changed full execution render requires exact rereview. The existing
ORGREF-WP-0002 project driver owns the cross-owner follow-through; no duplicate
plan or foreign task list was created. Native structural receipts, adapters,
contained execution and real login/MFA remain open.


## Exact Policy Nexus hosting proposal ready for human disposition

Owner package commit `28b60d2` and RailianceApps candidate commit `6953a23`
retain the independently agreed exact R1 hosting packet (manifest SHA256
`a70fb22f75871a08358f1cdee2410797cb0a2f01c2001f0012d16866b20e28a8`).
The original review gaps and failed probes remain separate from the final
agreement. Actual package checks pass: nine packaging tests and Helm lint; ten
new guard/public verification tests and independent negative probes pass.
No production selection or live hosting changed.

Native memo `infd-20261011-policy-nexus-hosting-r1@1` is registered, published
and intake-ready, review
[review-28d16691-3277-461e-aec6-53ad7a0538c7](https://decisions.coulomb.social/review?memo_id=review-28d16691-3277-461e-aec6-53ad7a0538c7).
The user elected to review there; that response itself is no deployment approval.
The supervised record retains the exact packet before human submission.
Fresh sealed UID/defaulted configuration, admission/diff, capacity, context and
management-owner checks remain mandatory before any confirmed approved rollout.


Gate House's actual T06 doctrine preparation is now source commit `f5e9365`.
It proposes carrying the deterministic Staff/evidence tension explicitly and
adding the requested Informed Decision catalogue row, while reporting the
remaining emission guarantees as owed. This is an unsigned source proposal,
not an accepted standard revision or a ruling. T06 is in progress; accepted
v0.8 remains byte-identical.

Informed Decision purpose-hardening publication preparation uses only the
existing admitted owner CI registry lane, exact immutable base7f5 and one
policy module. Source workflow `f66de50` reached CI but failed on its copied
module mode: private build umask made the file unreadable by inherited UID10001.
The narrowly proven `COPY --chmod=0644` repair is commit `acecad8`; the failure
is retained and registry/native release acceptance is still separate. Protected
actual-data backup/restore, manual image-only Argo rollout and same-schema
rollback are prepared protocol, not performed actions.


## Accepted guardrails now served; publisher workplan finished

The exact Policy Nexus R1 disposition is confirmed: approval
`52a3c479-2cb1-4074-abec-6a88117ad596` at01:14:23Z. Existing owner Helm
upgrade completed01:23:42Z at revision9/deployed, Ready1/generation9. Fresh
sealed preflight and all nine post-release UID/defaulted configurations match
the approved change. All158 public HTTPS file hashes match the actual image,
including73current documents and72original immutable paths. CertificateReady,
index/health200, legacy308 and unknownpath404 pass. The original failed
pre-actuation and namespace correction remain the same supervised trial; no
rollback was needed or extra permission inferred.

Native owner proof is `rapp-policy-nexus` commit `67329ab`; canonical approved
production selection is `railiance-apps` commit `c435979`. Publisher source
plan PNEX-WP-0005 is finished in `601724b`. Argo onboarding remains
RPF-WP-0043/RAPP-POLICY-NEXUS-WP-0002.


After native publisher completion the same13-owner source count is **47 open
plans:45nonresidual and2residual,101unfinished task blocks**. Initial49/48/105
baseline and every prior checkpoint remain retained; current snapshot is
[source-current-2026-10-11.json](evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/source-current-2026-10-11.json).
These are source workplan counts, not runtime safety scores. New RAPP-USER-ENGINE
work and risk findings outside the original13owner baseline remain live records
and are not hidden by this count.

The one-app catalogue executor is source commit `c89614e`, with a fresh
dedicated User Engine owner agreement and21actual isolatedPostgreSQL checks
on corrected b0dbbb97 source. Honest maintenance attribution, persistedoneuse,
nativeDBclockexpiry, exactcreated-only recovery and ordinarydenial audit are
verified mechanism evidence. Automatic drain excludes dead-lettered events;
privileged later replay can revive them and needs separate owner reconciliation.
NetKingdom exception review and exact founder decision remain pending; no
application/binding row was inserted.


## Confirmed bounded doctrine and catalogue continuation — 2026-10-11

Gate House doctrine memo `infd-20261011-staff-evidence-tension@1` is confirmed
ACCEPT, approval `d90c899b-f25c-4e66-a003-808ee5b1324f` at01:46:25Z. GH-DEC-2026-025
and exact source-owner handoff are committed7185919. NetKingdom retained the
exact bounded candidate in proposed v0.9, commit6180f87; acceptedv0.8 is unchanged.
NET-IN-0004 is the live successor adoption/publication record. This acceptance
does not accept that whole revision or resolve the carried Staff tension;
class-specific emission guarantees remain owed until actual source evidence.

Catalogue R1 memo `infd-20261011-user-catalogue-bootstrap-r1@1` is confirmed
ACCEPT, approval `b859698b-5d08-4da5-9599-4760c6a799f1` at02:07:09Z. Source
packet5d80644 contains separate User/NetKingdom/INFD owner returns,21isolated
PostgreSQL checks and6offline transport checks. Fresh immutable runtime package
hashes, Ready UID, genuine providers and absence checks passed. Approved native
dry-run rolled back; one exact apply committed two catalogue facts. Independent
read-only verification found1consumed ledger,3truthful audits and1unsent/unclaimed
registered event; ordinary identified denial remains retained with noPDPallow
claim. Real Access registry joins to the actual local app/binding, and a truthful
SERVICE account projection denies. Separate labelled native policy fixtures pass
allow/deny/stale-MFA/expiry/unavailable/cache checks. These are not signed-in human
login/MFA or scoped grant/revocation acceptance. Existing USER26T03/USER28T02 stay
open for their broader obligations. Checklist18 retains ordinary management
restoration before customers; private grant removed, no replay/delivery/rollback.

Forgejo proposed consumer type/case1.2 now has separate Maker/Mason/Platform/Net
technical returns for exact19file manifest5dbd04cf. Platform review found wrong
generated workload and delete-only recovery; both counterexamples were reproduced
before correction.44focused checks pass independently. Corrected source commits:
Masona41312e,Platform5b9c826,RailianceApps367f01c,Netc26b018. Existing1.1case/bundle
and its acknowledgment remain history; the stale consumer target is now refused.
Fresh1.2 acknowledgment, authenticated native observations/materialization and
contained first-session acceptance remain pending under ORGREF-WP-0002. No new
credentials/ESO resources or shareddefault-SA authority were materialized.

INFD purpose image actual ownerCI11484/source3e4bcb26 published763c3640; source
proposal e0359bc and distinct Product/Platform reviews c771a17 retain initial
failed attempts and protocol refinements. Actual full scan is0HIGH/CRITICAL and
1fixable inheritedMEDIUM, not zeroCVEs. INFD-RISK-20261011-ZLIB-85091/INFD9T05
retains manual Oct18follow-through. New concrete backup/actuator helpers are being
bound before human submission; no actual native backup/image rollout occurred.
Prior config-only7dbapproval does not authorize this image release.

The updated same13-owner checkpoint is **47 open plans:45nonresidual,2residual,102unfinished task blocks**. The extra unfinished block is the explicit INFD9T05 inherited vulnerability follow-through; successful bounded catalogue mutation did not erase broader User journey obligations. Previous47/101publisher checkpoint is preserved separately.


INFD source evidence reconciliation9268c9a replaces stale outbox/AUDIT-WP0009
blockers with actual transactional outbox, per-class86400s heartbeat,30s pump
and300s reconciliation mechanisms. Full class-specific verification remains
owed: retained native receipts omit stance-application/per-target rare-class
proof and reconciliation explicitly does not prove completeness. One unpromoted
residual intake INFD-IN-0009 retains that gap without reopening finishedWP5/7.
INFD-IN-0007 has GH025's bounded doctrine answer, pending acceptedstandardvoice
underNET-IN-0004. No conformance upgrade or native evidence action occurred.

Distinct Access owner response c829e53 and User owner wording c676a52 remove
the invented generic grant API debt from finishedFLEX35. USER26T03 initial
signed-in account projection is a human acceptance gate; ordinary catalogue
management restoration remains there beforecustomers, with bounded provider
policy/claims response FLEX-IN-0003. USER28T02 distinguishes U09readback from
T05management: name User membership/IAM coarse role/tenant-role/Access policy
fact and exact owner before scopedmutation/revocation evidence. A schema-based
response CoordinationCase references the intake, not a fakeworkplan, and central
metadata receipt693786bb is confirmed; no live workerwake or foreigntaskcopy.

### Informed-decision image trial: verified backup, transfer stopped

The founder confirmed exact purpose-overlay R1 at 02:34:20Z on 2026-10-11. The approved native backup completed and verified schema 5, integrity and count consistency. The subsequent drill-copy entered UNCERTAIN before creating an off-cluster database file; no offline restore or image rollout ran. Metadata-only inspection confirms the frozen main snapshot retains its approved hash and size, with zero WAL bytes and a 32 KB SHM sidecar left by read-only inspection. Source owners are preparing a bounded correction; the original journal and failed outcome remain retained. The approved helper is unchanged and no phase was retried. See `docs/evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/infd-purpose-drill-copy-diagnosis.json`.

### Forgejo dedicated consumer identity: exact source decision ready

NetKingdom source commit `584a964` records the complete proposed type 1.2 package, 22 passing package tests and reviewed six-object Forgejo render. The genuine native review `review-126c6c90-11ba-4609-b8d1-75e054c246cd` is ready for source acknowledgment. Old five rendered bodies remain unchanged; the new consumer role binds dedicated `forgejo/forgejo-keycape-forgejo-eso`, not shared workload `forgejo/default`. This does not implement the type, accept the canonical case, create credentials or authorize a native session. Existing ORGREF driver and owner tasks retain the remaining implementation and first-session work. The first physical review-file application preceded the existing-file task update; a retained explicit owner review after the completed T06 anchor now verifies exact actual source before human submission.

### Reviewed image rescue submitted as source version 2

The bounded existing-snapshot rescue is committed at informed-decision `c96b0c6` and published for a new exact founder decision. Product and Platform reviews verify all 134 source paths; 26 executor/reader tests and independent scope, custody and replay counterexamples passed. The original approved helper and the first rejected rescue packet remain immutable archived evidence. Source version 2 uses a new native review ID and preserves the original COMPLETE backup/UNCERTAIN copy journal. No rescue copy, restore drill, image rollout or extra provider probe has executed. The rescue uses zero-WAL, hash-bound immutable inspection only for the frozen snapshot; live and writable-clone inspection remains WAL-aware and explicitly closes connections. New source decision: `review-cda20761-f6ff-4d02-9c34-5097fc27539f`.

### Actual image accepted and task count reconciled

INFD Product and Platform independently accepted the exact deployed purpose image `763c3640…` at owner execution source `c96b0c6`. Deployment generation 25 is Ready with one replica; module `9d7c1be4…`, config/PVC identities and every controlled Pod field match, with native UID/GID 10001. Real protected offline compatibility, cleanup, fresh cutover backups/private copies and exact manual one-Deployment non-pruning Argo completion are retained. Schema 5/integrity and newer records remain intact. Actual authenticated post-rollout lifecycle.outcomes proves the canonical provider allow path; ten installed purpose fixtures include eight refusals and remain explicitly synthetic. Original drill-copy and final verifier UNCERTAIN outcomes stay unchanged; independent read-only reconciliation verifies actual target with refinement, not an unchanged execution success.

`INFD-WP-0009-T04` is done in source commit `0693c40`; T05 remains live for the inherited fixable MEDIUM zlib finding, due October 18. `INFD-IN-0010` is the unpromoted live handoff for the verifier omission defect before future reuse. WP0009 remains active. The same 13-owner source inventory now totals **47 open plans (45 nonresidual + 2 residual), 101 unfinished tasks**, compared with the previous per-repo sum of 47/102. A previously zeroed cached `_total` was corrected from authoritative per-repo arithmetic; the exact prior snapshot remains retained.

Forgejo source acknowledgment is recorded in Net commit `f6856cd` and the separate application-owner design receipt `d349815`. Explicit version selection is committed at `bb9b9b5`, with 43 loader/validator and 22 package compatibility tests passing. Both actual acknowledged types remain unimplemented and reject ordinary admission; canonical 1.1 and all native provider pins stay unchanged. Six-object materialization, authenticated provenance, adapters and first session remain under the existing ORGREF/owner gates.

### Zlib remediation completed and owner workplan closed

The founder accepted the distinct T05 packet at10:40:55Z on2026-10-11, approval
`b5ce337c-5d7d-44fa-864d-706b54039f7c`. All eight supervised phases completed:
fresh private backup and verified copy, isolated no-network schema5 restore
compatibility, exact clone cleanup, fresh cutover backup/copy, one-Deployment
manual non-pruning rollout and installed verification. Image `f5588f49…` is
actually deployed at Argo source `312ab97`, generation26Ready1. Installed zlib
is1.3.2-r1; the current full immutable-image scan has zero findings across44
packages. Schema, integrity and all recorded counts remain intact. Ten installed
purpose fixtures include eight refusals; actual authenticated canonical lifecycle
outcomes returnedHTTP200 at11:20:25Z, with the same Pod/image/source verified
before and after. Database-preserving rollback remained available and unused.

Three pre-execution refusals occurred before any custody or durable phase
journal existed. Root had used the service clock,1.1806seconds ahead, as its own
verification timestamp. Root-only bookkeeping now uses local verification time
and retains the service timestamp separately. Failed receipts and original
helper bytes remain retained; approved actuator, render, memo and plan bytes did
not change. This refinement is recorded in the same trial, not another scored
success. The earlier sandbox hypothesis was disproven. Checklist19 records the
exact accepted, unused one-trial outage option without a standing authority or
autonomy grant.

Separate owner returns are recorded under completed Product T10 and Platform
RPF-IN-0010. Product commit `47881fc` closes T05, resolves only
INFD-RISK-20261011-ZLIB-85091 and finishes INFD-WP-0009; Platform `8647587`
records actual native acceptance. Live INFD-IN-0010 and INFD-IN-0009 residual
handoffs remain unpromoted. Original T04 failed/UNCERTAIN evidence remains
unchanged. Safe receipts are in
`docs/evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/zlib-native-completed/`.

The same13-owner source inventory is now **46 open plans (44 nonresidual and2
residual),100 unfinished tasks**, compared with the initial49/105. Broader User
Engine human journey/ordinary management, Forgejo type implementation/native
materialization and first session remain in their existing owner records and
ORGREF driver. Three historical Platform C07 aliases still hold13 tasks
(8done/5wait); their diagnosis is retained, with no deletion or artificial
closure. Source totals do not silently include those unbacked historical rows.

### Current milestones and review checkpoints

The founder requested a summary, closure outlook, parallelism and an independent
assessment on2026-10-11. A fresh-context read-only reviewer checked current owner
workplans and safe native receipts. It used the same inherited model, so this is
an independent worker assessment, not a different-model or comprehensive estate
audit. Its effort ranges are planning judgments, not measured calendar promises.

| Bundle | Next acceptance | Conditional effort and closures |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Service JWT | Attended KEY39 negative claims and real expiry/cleanup; Mason operator/ESO capability and nonmember refusal; platform denial; separately scoped Secrets Engine backend execution entitlement and adoption |2–4focused sessions remains a conditional estimate for KEY39 and MASON9. SECRETS8 needs an owner-reviewed execution contract and implementation before a closure estimate is credible. RPF35T02 can finish; RPF35 retains six other unfinished tasks. |
| Human identity and membership | Actual signed-in readback, tegwick U05–U08, precise changed fact/owner for scoped mutation/revocation, Fluid salt create-once evidence; ordinary management restoration |1–2attended sessions plus1–2implementation/verification sessions. MASON5 can finish afterT05/T06. USER27 also needs matrix/invitation/mail and real VERGABE-WP-0019 acceptance; catalogue bootstrap is not that proof. |
| First reusable Forgejo SecurityCase | Implement acknowledged type1.2, authenticate six-object provenance, native closed adapters/receipts, separately authorized mint/delivery, login/denial/cleanup/created-only rollback |4–7focused sessions including attendance. First session closes NK48T06/MASON10T03/WARDEN44T03; their remaining reuse tasks still prevent whole-plan closure. A service-JWT target cannot reuse a browser type by relabeling. |
| Audit and independent monitoring | Six-pin sender/custody, compatible commit/acceptance-time windows, persistent native rollout, actual retry/heartbeat/silence and Qonto receiver/collector evidence |4–7focused sessions across independent Access and Qonto tracks. KG5 can close after observer acceptance; AUDIT13 needs both senders. Quiet-stream evidence also needs its real observation interval/grace, including a24h Qonto cadence. |

Keep three bounded implementation/preparation workstreams running under the
root coordinator, respecting the four-agent runtime limit. Separate artifact
ownership; serialize attended credential sessions and live cluster rollouts.
Parallel drafting/tests/native-proof preparation help; more workers do not
remove actual login, revocation, expiry or observation time. Replace repeated
full-history reviews with frozen inputs and explicit delta reviews after a
baseline is accepted, preserving failed receipts and exact final bindings.

Commission a different capable model's top-level architecture/dependency/risk
assessment now, before expensive first-case execution. Reassess the executable
adapter/receipt/recovery package before Forgejo's first session, integration after
service JWT and the real-human milestones, and evidence completeness after both
sender and observer acceptance. Use primary owner sources, native pins/receipts,
unresolved risks and the close-down checklist; source tests alone do not support
operational acceptance. User Engine still has44HIGH findings across8CVEs under
temporary acceptance, with the18October review deadline. Access mandatory-commit
source remains undeployed; HTTP503 does not prove an open-stance consumer denies.
Qonto process counters are not durable transactional completeness.

One source hygiene issue remains for the User owner: USER27T04's old qualifier
mentions unresolved factor custody, while its later narrative and USER28's
concrete evidence identify an available handoff and tegwick's attended run as
the next act. Verify and refresh that owner qualifier before scheduling; do not
revive an obsolete secret request from historical prose.

### JWT preparation checkpoint and corrected adoption forecast

Three parallel workers returned immutable source preparations. Root verified all
staged file hashes and original checkout pins: KeyCape/NetKingdom manifest
`870d8faf…`, Mason manifest `e5d4781c…`, and Secrets Engine revised manifest
`c4668709…`. Reported offline checks are 20 lifecycle plus 17 existing runner
tests, 19 capability-verifier tests, and 37 service-boundary tests respectively.
These are preparations, not owner acceptance or native proof; no checkout
application, credential session or runtime mutation occurred in this wave.

Secrets Engine has a material functional adoption gap: its deployed service JWT
permits login and self-management, while the protected backend operations use
that same token after approval consumption. No task-scoped execution entitlement
is wired. Switching the default would consume an approval and then fail at the
backend. Login-only proof cannot close SECRETS8. A concrete Platform/Secrets
owner design must bind action, target, TTL, uses, revocation and backend-enforced
scope, followed by implementation and actual permitted/refused-operation proof.
The prepared acceptance checklist preserves that gate and does not widen policy.

The Secrets verifier's first prepared transport was rejected during root review.
The new immutable version fixes origin, refuses redirects, disables environment
proxies, bounds JSON and suppresses unsafe error/evidence output. Original bytes
are retained. KeyCape also corrected the removed-client cleanup contract to the
actual `401 invalid_profile_usage` with `feature=client_id`; the changed proposal
needs fresh source acknowledgment. Mason uses the existing survey authority for
capability queries because reader tokens lack `sys/capabilities-self`, without
widening their policies. All three still require exact source review and fresh
founder authorization for attended native execution.

### Independent JWT review: changes required before attendance

Root reproduced three offline counterexamples against the immutable KeyCape
lifecycle preparation: a role observation one hour in the future passes,
an unrelated HTTPS OpenBao origin passes, and urllib's default opener inherits
environment proxy settings. Discovery and the reviewed runner also read
unbounded responses. The native lifecycle must supply a fixed-origin,
no-proxy, no-redirect, bounded transport to both probe and cleanup without
silently replacing the historical reviewed runner. Approval expiry must be
checked again before mutation and protected requests, while necessary cleanup
remains possible. Evidence is retained in
`docs/evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/key39-root-source-counterexamples.json`.
This is a root coordination finding, not a foreign owner's formal review.

The independent Mason reviewer also reproduced acceptance of an HTTP202
text/plain error body as a successful API response, followed by a claimed
confirmed revoke, and acceptance of a missing accessor as the hash of an empty
string. Endpoint-specific response validation and real session correlation are
required. Both original preparations remain immutable and unexecuted; changes
must produce new reviewed revisions before founder attendance. Separate
Platform and Secrets Engine designers are now developing the concrete backend
execution interface while these source reviews proceed.

Platform's owner design and request-changes review are now source-committed at
`e50a0d1`, under completed RPF35-T11. New live RPF35-T12 retains implementation
and native proof: typed grant, exact-body mediation, trusted consume verification,
durable one-shot journal and bounded owner-held token. The metadata-only pilot
explicitly does not complete Secrets Engine's general lifecycle adoption.
Source inventory therefore remains46 open plans, with101 unfinished tasks: the
additional task records an uncovered obligation rather than hiding it in prose.

Mason's original request-changes review is committed at `a36b610` and C17-pushed;
the completed review task precedes it. Sync returned0FAIL/4WARN, including a
finished-workstream task binding skipped by the CLI. Root sync returned0FAIL
and pushed the coordination evidence. Corrected Mason v2 and Secrets v3 are
immutable candidates awaiting exact independent re-review; original rejected
bytes remain retained.

Secrets Engine's proposed readiness guard was independently tested in an
isolated root overlay:36 tests passed. The actual apply regression verifies
that a configured login-only JWT provider refuses before claim/PDP, consume,
login or backend apply. The first root harness selected the original editable
module and then lacked unchanged classification/stance files; both harness
errors were corrected before the passing result. No guard source application,
native operation or owner acceptance is inferred. Root receipt is
`docs/evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/secrets-execution-readiness-root-review.json`.

### Reviewed JWT source applied; readiness guard now implemented

Secrets Engine `4378ec1` commits the corrected boundary verifier and truthful
adoption checklist after exact Platform source acceptance (`c0797e4`,52 checks).
Mason `969fe21` commits its corrected capability verifier after independent
source acceptance (29 maker checks plus4 additional counterexamples). Both keep
native receipts, attendance, revocation, nonmember identity and activation gates
open. Rejected original packets and reviews remain unchanged.

Secrets Engine `97dfa5e` implements the local pre-consume guard, proposes the
execution interface and records SECRETS-WP-0013. Platform `46f5c95` accepts only
that source guard and proposed direction under existingT11, with58 focused
checks including coverage of all10 protected backend handlers. Root's36 checks
also pass against the actual owner checkout. No service JWT protected action
can consume approval through those handlers while execution entitlement is
absent; existing ambient route reads are outside this guard and are not claimed
as governed. No runtime change or new privilege occurred. Proposed execution
work and whole-engine adoption remain open.

The same13-owner source inventory is now47 open plans (45 nonresidual+2residual)
and104 unfinished tasks. The new execution plan and Platform implementation task
expose actual uncovered work; they are not duplicated native acceptance or
artificial closure. Conditional closure estimates must include the real
execution interface rather than assume login alone completes adoption.

NetKingdom `98f09f4` records its independent request-changes review against KEY39
v2 under completed NK-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-11-T07. Its28 supplied and11 independent
checks reproduce nonfinite expiry acceptance and lack of a total HTTP elapsed
deadline. KeyCape is preparing a separate revision; native execution remains
disabled. A distinct Access owner and Approval owner are reviewing the proposed
canonical action/body binding and trusted consume-confirmation mechanisms, so
the execution design is grounded in actual served interfaces before selection.

Completed consistency sync published the two Secrets commits, corrected Mason
source and two Platform acceptance commits. Results: Secrets0FAIL/5WARN/1INFO,
Mason0FAIL/4WARN; Platform retains the same three historical C07 aliases
(3FAIL/19WARN/17INFO), with the new tasks indexed and commits pushed. No failure
was hidden or history deleted. Safe full receipts and the47/104 authoritative
source snapshot are retained under `jwt-source-preparation-consistency/` and
`source-after-jwt-source-preparation-2026-10-11.json` in the consolidation evidence
directory. These receipts prove source publication, not operational acceptance.

### Final source checkpoint: concrete integration gates

SECRETS-WP-0013-T02 is now done at `da92858`: the actual checkout passed36
checks and the published guard refuses protected service-JWT execution before
approval consumption. T01/T03 and SECRETS8 adoption remain open. The current
same13-owner inventory is **47 open plans (45 nonresidual+2residual),103
unfinished tasks**, versus49/105 initially. Newly discovered execution work
increases the count after earlier closures; it is retained as live work.

KeyCape `a46024b`, NetKingdom `dfc357e` and Platform `33aed8a` publish the v5
lifecycle helper and exact source acknowledgments. All46 lifecycle tests pass
in the actual checkout. Independent Net and Platform reviews retain rejected
earlier revisions and cover finite expiry, total elapsed deadlines and bounded
cleanup, including exceptional response close. This remains source acceptance.
Native attendance still needs an admitted private human/agent token handoff,
proof of the node's OpenBao route, installed role/clock-skew and GitOps ownership
checks, a reviewable exact packet and fresh authenticated founder disposition.

Access Engine `7ad8dec` publishes canonical execution-context binding tests and
its owner contract; both actual Go packages pass. Approval Engine `e864305`
publishes strict consumption-confirmation code and its owner contract;24 actual
checkout tests pass, with219 full staged tests reported by the maker. Their own
completed source work records precede the formal owner reviews. Neither source
change wires the mediator, action policy, journal or backend execution grant.
Important contract facts: Secrets' existing request builders drop enriched
context; consumed approvals are terminal and require a separate execution-stop
control; idempotent consume returns the original decision identifier. These
facts must shape implementation rather than be treated as native readiness.

KeyCape, NetKingdom, Approval Engine and Platform source syncs pushed their
commits. Platform retains the same three historical C07 alias failures, without
history deletion. Access Engine's first sync timed out against State Hub; the
original error receipt is retained and a separate retry verifies publication
(0FAIL/4WARN,38/38 bindings and two commits pushed). Custodian's final sync
also encountered a State Hub timeout; its separate error receipt is retained.
None of this source work changes native authority or scores a privileged trial.

### Execution integration source continuation

Secrets Engine `d8edd9e` implements the closed typed execution descriptor and
threads it through all four authorization/approval request builders. The new
descriptor is restricted to `execute-ccr`, prod/platform and human control;
generic apply semantics and the login-only readiness guard remain intact.
Access Engine's exact source agreement is `7687ac2`; maker, root and Access each
reproduced99 focused checks. The earlier draft instruction to reuse `apply` was
corrected. Shape/hash binding is not an authenticated initiator, owner body
compiler, distinct policy package or native execution grant.

Root reproduced ApprovalHTTPClient following a cross-origin redirect and
forwarding its bearer header, using only local synthetic credentials. The
counterexample receipt is `approval-confirmation-transport-counterexample.json`.
Approval `2eb045b` persists completed source preparation before formal review;
`b428ffe` repairs default transport with a fixed isolated stdlib child, no
redirects/environment proxies, strict bounded JSON and a parent network deadline.
Root reproduced51 transport checks in the actual checkout; the maker's full
source suite passed270. The injected test opener is explicitly not an admitted
production transport. No provider deployment or mediator route admission occurs.

Platform `4ed5050` adds the independently reviewed durable admission primitive:
actual multiprocess race, persisted intent, binding uniqueness and terminal
non-replay are tested. Root actual checkout passed15 checks; Platform passed20.
The rejected v2 ordinal-coercion confirmation remains in its owner review before
v3 source acceptance. The primitive is unintegrated: it does not authenticate,
authorize, compile bodies, dispatch or perform owner recovery. Platform `4e8fa6e`
adds the independently accepted v4 provider-format refinement, preserving exact
canonical `sha256:` request digests. Raw file/receipt SHA256 hashes have a distinct
representation. Root actual15 checks and Platform30 checks pass for v4.

Source syncs pushed all these changes: Secrets0FAIL/4WARN/1INFO, Access0FAIL/3WARN,
Approval0FAIL/6WARN. Platform pushed with the same three historical C07 failures
(3FAIL/19WARN/17INFO). Finished-ad-hoc task-binding skips remain explicit in the
CLI receipts rather than being reported as created database tasks.

The JWT node-route preparation exposed and corrected public-health sequencing
and then unbounded private stdin. Frozen v7 changes-requested reviews remain;
v8 has fresh KeyCape/Platform agreement for bounded health/input/native-action
gates only. The proposed private producer itself was rejected for missing
child-ready acknowledgment, stdout descriptor aliases and an overstated atomic
unlink guarantee. Its correction and trusted founder launcher are separate live
preparation, not new authority. Coding-agent custody/client admission, actual
node route/plugin/leeway/readiness evidence, exact founder go and native proof
remain open. Current inventory remains47 open plans/103 unfinished tasks.

NetKingdom `bf6a44d` publishes the reviewed v8 route/input corrections and prior
owner histories; root actual71 discovered tests pass. KeyCape `f60e741` records
the v7 refusal and exact bounded-v8 acknowledgment. Net sync returned0FAIL/
13WARN/5INFO, Key sync0FAIL/4WARN/1INFO, with both commits pushed. Platform's
v4 refinement was also pushed with its same three retained historical failures.
Root additionally passed36 actual Approval legacy/confirmation compatibility
checks alongside the51 transport cases. No staged source test is promoted to
native proof.

The next paired v9 ready-marker/node-wrapper and private producer preparations
remain uninstalled and unadmitted. Independent reviews reproduced dropped remote
uncertainty after delivery timeout and an unbounded FIFO contract read; immutable
refinements are underway. The proposed founder SSH profile must be separately
admitted and is incompatible with the existing warden silent-child lane. A
ready marker cannot grant authority, authenticate founder disposition or establish
runtime isolation. It must be carried by the reviewed authenticated owner path.

### Paired JWT handoff committed; audit chart repair under delta review

KeyCape `0f47e0c`, NetKingdom `7ceac43` and Platform `6bb406e`
commit the exact producer V4 / consumer V9 source pair and three owner source
agreements. Root verified all28 file hashes and passed40 actual KeyCape checks
and80 actual NetKingdom checks. Missing ready acknowledgment, remote delivery
uncertainty and public-contract FIFO counterexamples remain recorded in their
original refusals. The node wrapper carries a local child-ready gate through
captured SSH control stdout; it does not forward an arbitrary descriptor through
SSH or establish native identity/authority. Credential custody, actual route,
issuer/plugin/leeway, maintenance exception and attended founder go remain open.

A concrete four-choice founder source-design memo is committed. The preparation
builds a revision-bound six-document Informed Decision packet from these commits,
50,585 registration bytes, through the existing admitted State Hub dispatcher
path. It is not submitted yet; independent posting-helper review remains pending.
Source-design disposition cannot authorize credentials, SSH or native execution.

Platform's independent audit chart review reproduced three fractional numeric
ports that Helm accepted but Kubernetes would reject. Access prepared strict
integer/range validation and22 YAML/JSON rejection regressions, preserving the
original stage. Completed owner preparation anchors are persisted at Platform
`431df1d` and Access `c8a3766`; corrected chart source remains under independent
delta review. Receiver ingress, sender custody and actual rollout receipts remain
required before FLEX31T08 closure. Inventory remains47 open plans/103 unfinished
tasks; this source wave does not close a native workplan.

### Founder-requested settle checkpoint

The corrected inert audit delivery chart and native proof preparation are now
committed at Access `94fda23`; Platform's exact independent delta agreement and
original refusal are committed at `aa3dbda`. Root's actual chart renderer passed,
including the22 YAML/JSON port rejection cases. FLEX31T08 remains wait for native
custody, receiver/network admission, immutable image and same-trial acceptance.

A fresh review of every top-level open workplan across the same13 repositories
confirms47 open plans:45nonresidual and2residual,103 unfinished task blocks.
The source checkpoint retains file hashes and exact unfinished task IDs/statuses.
No operational plan is closed from these source checks or staged packets.

The draft Informed Decision submission helper is held for correction: independent
technical review identified that a blocked dispatcher result could be reported as
authored-and-queued. No source-design packet has been submitted through that helper.
The committed owner memo and provider-valid packet remain preparation evidence;
exact queue identity/status and recovery semantics need corrected review first.

The settle review also commits previously prepared, owner-verified consolidation:
Platform RPF50 historical-window retirement `b0e9a1e`, RPF54 first-generation
closure plus live unpromoted RPF55 rotation residual `93ac156`, and exact browser
type1.1 source pin `62bbdee` (ten offline tests). These closures were already
represented in the source count; committing them does not produce another count
reduction or prove Forgejo native materialization. NetKingdom `8964aff` retains
NK40/NK42 consolidation and generated bindings; `96eb40c` preserves exact October10
owner decision source packets as historical evidence, not fresh native authority.
Owner inspection verified all204 Net index rows; root verified34 updated index
rows across eight other security repos against authoritative source blocks.

Independent posting review additionally reproduced a629-character approval
purpose rejected by the actual provider's400-character limit. The helper also
needs exact authoring/envelope/queue identity correlation and refusal of blocked
queue results. The immutable changes-requested receipt is retained. The owner
source-design memo is committed; posting remains unexecuted.


### KEY39 source acceptance and service-pilot scope correction

The earlier posting holds above are historical. Root committed the repaired V3
helper at `cdac98d` after preserving both rejected versions and independently
checking the exact six-document packet. One actual submission through the already
admitted State Hub identity created `infd-20261011-key39-source-design-r1`, version1,
and review `review-62626f54-0212-4684-9b45-0a7222d61957`. Authenticated readback
confirmed the founder's source acceptance at2026-10-11T17:19:01Z, approval
`ca118afc-d746-4454-a5b9-9b387b120cd9`. The original submission uncertainty record
is preserved alongside confirmation. This accepts the source design; credentials,
SSH and the attended native probe require a separate exact execution decision.

An independent technical assessment pins nine accepted/source records. It corrects
my earlier universal human-initiator dependency: accepted doctrine permits an
authenticated service principal with exact human-control approval. Membership and
named-human representation are required when the operation policy depends on them.
The proposed, hard-closed human variant at Access `24c1f56` remains a separate
option. It is not accepted doctrine or a prerequisite for every service task.
This assessment used the same inherited model; the recommended independent
assessment by another capable model has not been performed.

Platform's source-only typed plan compiler now derives six fixed calls and exact
body hashes from pinned owner source; root passed40 checks before and after
application. The qualified Platform component receipt and independent technical
review preserve the actual café<&> cross-runtime digest counterexample. The
compiler is unintegrated: a real admitted CCR/catalogue, authenticated service
mapping, all approval/PDP bindings, durable consume/journal, owner grant and native
execution decision remain necessary. Source components do not close these plans.


Secrets `3ffb6a1` fixes the cross-runtime canonical request/approval-free digest
mismatch without changing catalogue fingerprints or old served approvals. The
independent review passed149 focused plus21 additional checks; final staged source
passed636 tests with1 skipped outside the sandbox. Root reproduced the exact
Go-oracle parity tests against the actual applied checkout. The sixteen sandbox
ownership failures and existing missing-auth_args test stub were reproduced on
unchanged source; original failures, correction and final source evidence remain
recorded. The test correction retains denial-before-backend coverage.

The separate service source component now prepares a fixed TokenReview caller
mapping and a hard-closed policy candidate. Root passed all three affected Go
packages against the exact source clone and verified all12 applied file hashes.
The candidate is structural characterization; served claim provenance, human
approver validation, exact canonical PDP joins, consume, durable journal and native
entitlement are unfinished. The original human nanosecond projection is explicitly
refused by the safe numeric wire profile and preserved as a counterexample; the
old human policy remains unchanged and closed.

KeyCape `21c6646` records source acceptance while retaining the attended execution
wait. Platform `9460f6f` prepares a proposed named coding-client custody packet,
correcting its standing tenant table to the current tenant:platform source. Its
new coordinates are candidates, not an admitted catalogue/CCR/grant. The qualified
source assessment identifies missing producer checks for exact coding subject,
tenant, type, roles and900s maximum lifetime. Native custody, version agreement,
issuer/ESO wiring and founder-contained delivery are still required.