From the v0.5 review round.
- The outbox is local, in this engine's own transactional store, with no
synchronous audit-core dependency inside the state-change transaction. Raised
by audit-core: "or equivalent" would otherwise let an implementer satisfy
atomicity by emitting synchronously, turning an audit outage into an
inability to revoke.
- The claim must carry the approval identifier and a digest over the same
canonical binding access-engine already computes, so "approved" and "approved
for this exact request" are distinguishable at decision time. Raised by
flex-auth, needed for FLEX-WP-0017 T05.
- Consumption ordering is recorded as UNRESOLVED rather than guessed. The
decision precedes the action and the action precedes consumption, so an
allow never consumed, a double consumption by racing callers, and consumption
after a failed action are gaps neither engine closes alone. Nothing may be
implemented by assuming that contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
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Condition of audit-core's assent to the approval evidence half
(AUDIT-IN-0001), now in the standard at §9.4.
Every issuance, use, supersession, and revocation is emitted in the same
transaction as the state change. Emit-after-commit is a defect, not an
optimization.
The reasoning is carried here rather than by reference because it constrains
implementation from the first commit: an append-only archive proves records
were not altered or truncated after arrival, but cannot prove one was never
sent (§9.6). A suppressed event leaves the chain intact and verification
reports intact. For approvals the most valuable event to suppress is a
revocation, so completeness is this engine's obligation and nothing downstream
can retrofit it.
Also records that audit-core's guarantee is bounded — not WORM, not object
lock, tamper evidence conditional on live preconditions — and that whether
approvals warrant stronger custody is an open gap this engine must not assume
closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 2564823@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2a7ed827-4928-4b9f-8613-9135c9cadfe9
approval-engine owns the approval object: durable, authenticated entries,
atomic supersession, single consumption, revocation without holder
cooperation. It is an Engine; access-engine remains the only decision point
and consumes approvals as input claims.
Origin: the unowned half of the approval contract, raised by flex-auth in
FLEX-DEC-2026-001 while assenting to the security layer model. Not gate-house
(Staff holds no runtime state), not access-engine (an evaluator that owns what
it evaluates is self-dealing), not audit-core (append-only, wrong property).
The seed README described this as "modelling and managing decisions" —
withdrawn. Under the standard, "decision" is access-engine's word.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 2564823@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2a7ed827-4928-4b9f-8613-9135c9cadfe9
