2026-08-16 00:24:33 +02:00
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[
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{
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"name": "user-engine",
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AUDIT-WP-0009-T03/T09 — evidence_kind, and approval-engine's registration inputs
T03. §9.6 gives load-bearing and attributive sources different obligations, so
the archive must record which one a source declared rather than infer it from
traffic. evidence_kind and completeness_trade now sit on SenderIdentity, the
AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS schema, and the non-secret scope overlay.
Two asymmetries are deliberate. The default is attributive, because the other
default would have audit-core imply a completeness obligation no source ever
accepted. And the overlay may raise the kind but never lower it — the same
principle that stops an ExternalSecret refresh shrinking user-engine's
tenants: a ConfigMap refresh must not drop a source's atomicity and detection
obligations without anyone deciding to. A load-bearing source may not carry a
completeness trade at all, since §9.6 requires atomicity of it, and
evidence_declaration() reports completeness_claimed: false for both kinds.
T09 (in progress). approval-engine's registration inputs are prepared and
recorded in docs/approval-engine-source-registration.md: scope entry declared
load-bearing, and audit-core-approval-engine-ingress with namespace and pod
label ANDed in one `from` peer — narrower than user-engine's namespace-only
rule, which is left unchanged. The scope entry lands ahead of the credential
because the overlay only applies to senders the Secret already carries, so it
admits nothing until the token exists; a test asserts that rather than
trusting the reading.
Two inputs remain approval-engine's: a confirmed tenant scope, since senders.py
requires a missing tenant restriction be justified per sender and audit-core
cannot justify it on another repo's behalf, and an explicit secret_policy
choice. Applying the manifests is an operator action.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0185wifnLzCxjEY2MT1XbK7L
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 713962@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2718d99d-d3ff-478f-83a2-3a30f01a02fc
2026-09-06 22:31:37 +02:00
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"sources": [
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"user-engine"
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],
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"tenants": [
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"*"
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],
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2026-08-16 00:24:33 +02:00
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"may_write": true,
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"may_read": false
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AUDIT-WP-0009-T03/T09 — evidence_kind, and approval-engine's registration inputs
T03. §9.6 gives load-bearing and attributive sources different obligations, so
the archive must record which one a source declared rather than infer it from
traffic. evidence_kind and completeness_trade now sit on SenderIdentity, the
AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS schema, and the non-secret scope overlay.
Two asymmetries are deliberate. The default is attributive, because the other
default would have audit-core imply a completeness obligation no source ever
accepted. And the overlay may raise the kind but never lower it — the same
principle that stops an ExternalSecret refresh shrinking user-engine's
tenants: a ConfigMap refresh must not drop a source's atomicity and detection
obligations without anyone deciding to. A load-bearing source may not carry a
completeness trade at all, since §9.6 requires atomicity of it, and
evidence_declaration() reports completeness_claimed: false for both kinds.
T09 (in progress). approval-engine's registration inputs are prepared and
recorded in docs/approval-engine-source-registration.md: scope entry declared
load-bearing, and audit-core-approval-engine-ingress with namespace and pod
label ANDed in one `from` peer — narrower than user-engine's namespace-only
rule, which is left unchanged. The scope entry lands ahead of the credential
because the overlay only applies to senders the Secret already carries, so it
admits nothing until the token exists; a test asserts that rather than
trusting the reading.
Two inputs remain approval-engine's: a confirmed tenant scope, since senders.py
requires a missing tenant restriction be justified per sender and audit-core
cannot justify it on another repo's behalf, and an explicit secret_policy
choice. Applying the manifests is an operator action.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0185wifnLzCxjEY2MT1XbK7L
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 713962@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2718d99d-d3ff-478f-83a2-3a30f01a02fc
2026-09-06 22:31:37 +02:00
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},
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{
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"name": "approval-engine",
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"sources": [
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"approval-engine"
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],
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"tenants": [
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2026-09-08 17:01:41 +02:00
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"tenant:platform"
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AUDIT-WP-0009-T03/T09 — evidence_kind, and approval-engine's registration inputs
T03. §9.6 gives load-bearing and attributive sources different obligations, so
the archive must record which one a source declared rather than infer it from
traffic. evidence_kind and completeness_trade now sit on SenderIdentity, the
AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS schema, and the non-secret scope overlay.
Two asymmetries are deliberate. The default is attributive, because the other
default would have audit-core imply a completeness obligation no source ever
accepted. And the overlay may raise the kind but never lower it — the same
principle that stops an ExternalSecret refresh shrinking user-engine's
tenants: a ConfigMap refresh must not drop a source's atomicity and detection
obligations without anyone deciding to. A load-bearing source may not carry a
completeness trade at all, since §9.6 requires atomicity of it, and
evidence_declaration() reports completeness_claimed: false for both kinds.
T09 (in progress). approval-engine's registration inputs are prepared and
recorded in docs/approval-engine-source-registration.md: scope entry declared
load-bearing, and audit-core-approval-engine-ingress with namespace and pod
label ANDed in one `from` peer — narrower than user-engine's namespace-only
rule, which is left unchanged. The scope entry lands ahead of the credential
because the overlay only applies to senders the Secret already carries, so it
admits nothing until the token exists; a test asserts that rather than
trusting the reading.
Two inputs remain approval-engine's: a confirmed tenant scope, since senders.py
requires a missing tenant restriction be justified per sender and audit-core
cannot justify it on another repo's behalf, and an explicit secret_policy
choice. Applying the manifests is an operator action.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0185wifnLzCxjEY2MT1XbK7L
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 713962@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2718d99d-d3ff-478f-83a2-3a30f01a02fc
2026-09-06 22:31:37 +02:00
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],
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"may_write": true,
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"may_read": false,
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"evidence_kind": "load-bearing"
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AUDIT-WP-0009-T11 — register informed-decision, and answer GH-DEC-2026-014
informed-decision is the browser-facing approver surface; GH-DEC-2026-012
limit 3 makes its evidence copy the one that must reach audit-core
independently of the emitter, because there the actor being audited and the
evidence source are the same component.
Registration accepted on every proposed field — exact source,
["tenant:platform"], write true, read false, load-bearing, secret_policy
redact. Prepared and inert: the scope overlay applies only to a sender the
Secret already carries, asserted by test rather than by reading. Ingress ANDs
namespace and pod label in one peer, following approval-engine rather than
user-engine's older breadth.
Gate House asked whether the record shape can carry a source-held-content
declaration with a retrieval expectation, and asked for a straight answer
rather than a rule the storage cannot meet. Both halves, which must travel
together:
It CAN carry the declaration. data is stored verbatim into details.data and
hash-chained, so content_exists and custody need no schema change and become
as tamper-evident as the commitment they accompany.
It CANNOT detect non-production. audit-core performs no retrieval and its
egress permits Postgres and DNS only. Detection happens at retrieval, by the
reviewer; the stored declaration is what turns a blank into a failure
attributable to the named custodian.
Residual stated rather than left to be found: a custodian that never held the
content can emit a false content_exists. audit-core validates the declaration's
shape, never its truth — the same class as omission at source, and not closed
by the chain, by attestation, or by T04/T06. A test asserts no egress to the
emitter exists, because that claim silently stops being true if one appears.
Cadence: reconciliation plus heartbeat is right for a mixed-volume source, with
both scoped per class rather than per source — a per-source heartbeat is
satisfied by the high-volume presentation stream and says nothing about a quiet
month of dispositions. Bound: a compromised emitter suppresses the event and
its own count together.
Also recorded: commitment-only satisfies non-alteration and never
reconstructability, in this repo's documents as in theirs; and tenant
provenance under GH-DEC-2026-013 lands in the registration record, not the
envelope, since audit-core checks a value the credential may write rather than
resolving an identity claim.
No secret was created and no production manifest applied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nb7Q6ZmXppNDkTWytfYqfv
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 2069992@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 167dd7f8-2a25-4be1-aa46-3b6f1a5f94c6
2026-09-10 15:15:35 +02:00
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},
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{
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"name": "informed-decision",
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"sources": [
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"informed-decision"
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],
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"tenants": [
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"tenant:platform"
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],
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"may_write": true,
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"may_read": false,
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"evidence_kind": "load-bearing"
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2026-08-16 00:24:33 +02:00
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}
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]
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